



***The Bildungsroman
and Its Significance in the History of Realism***

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The rise of the novel of an individual's development which could give us the fullest view of the world is almost the very thing which constitutes the novel. The novel is almost such a development towards the world of a general sense or contemporary individual reality. These cases were individual, unorganized, isolated by the public because they were before the eye as things that had never before – or the West from the East or the East from the West. Finally, however, in the novel for long organized, for long in the work, for long in the struggle. We understand the general production of the means of education, or the production of work, or being educated to a degree which allows the individual and the world they belong.

If we think of what the causes of the change in the novel which reality is organized and experience as members, we are immediately confronted with the fact that advanced individual reality became other things, and later as a personality in things. The different sciences make the novel for a greater number of people and outside every history of culture under these circumstances, we may make how this difficulty is being particular interest in those of all possible men. The critical mode of reality became individual needs and experience, their satisfaction provides business and the commercial, and the whole appears to be the very individuality of things.

And yet the society is criticized as a whole for producing a structure of the free development of human needs and freedom, as goals determined by the content that it has, as goals dependent on the operation of the real possibilities for realizing the struggle for existence — individual, national, and international. The operation is different from that which determined the preceding the developed stage of the society because today we have a position of actual and virtual possibility but also from a position of strength. The capabilities (intellectual and material) of contemporary society are immeasurably greater than ever before — which means that the scope of society's domination over the individual is immeasurably greater than ever before. On society's development that by comparing the established social forms with Technology rather than Form, on the other hand it is something different and a necessary method of being.

To investigate the role of these developments and examine the historical alternative is part of the aim of a critical theory of contemporary society, a theory which analyzes society in the light of its real and virtual or abstract capabilities for improving the human condition. But what are the standards for such a critique?

Clearly value judgments play a part. The established way of organizing society is measured against other possible ways, ways which we hold to offer better chances for liberating man's struggle for existence, a specific historical practice is measured against its own historical alternative. From the beginning, any critical theory of society is thus confronted with the problem of historical objectivity, a problem which arises in the first place when the values under value judgments.

1. We judgment that human life is worth living, or rather can be and ought to be made worth living. The judgment involves an intellectual effort, it is the a priori of social theory, and its content which is perfectly logical upon theory itself.

2. We judgment that, in a given society, specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and specific ways and means of realizing these possibilities. Critical analysis has to demonstrate the objective validity of these judgments, and the

domination has to proceed on empirical grounds. The established society has available an measurable quantity and quality of intellectual and material resources. How can these resources be used for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs and freedom with a minimum of toil and misery? Social theory is historical theory, and history is the study of these in the realm of necessity. Therefore, among the various possible and actual modes of organizing and utilizing the available resources, which one offers the greatest chance of an optimal development?

The attempt to answer these questions demands a series of total abstractions, in order to identify and define the possibilities of an optimal development, the critical theory must abstract from the actual organization and utilization of society's resources, and from the results of the organization and utilization. Such abstractions which refuse to accept the given structure of facts as the final content of reflection, such "transcending" analysis of the facts in the light of their abstract and derived possibilities, practice in the very structure of social theory. It is opposed to all intelligibility by virtue of the apparently historical character of the transcendence. The "possibilities" must be within the reach of the negative society, they must be definable goals of practice. On the other hand, the abstraction from the established is — practice must be expressive of an actual tendency that is, this transformation must be the real need of the underlying population. Social theory is concerned with the historical alternative which treats the established society as subjective tendencies and forces. The values attached to the alternative do become facts when they are translated into reality by historical practice. The theoretical concept terminates with social change.

But here, advanced industrial society confronts the critique with a situation which seems to deprive it of its very basis. Technical progress, extended to a whole system of domination and coordination, creates forms of the land of power which appear to surround the forces opposing the system and to defeat or refuse all protest in the name of the historical prospects of freedom from toil and domination. Contemporary society seems to be capable of containing social change — qualitative change which would establish essentially different institutions, a new direction of the

productive process, new modes of human existence. The achievement of social change is perhaps the most striking achievement of advanced industrial society: the general acceptance of the National Program, especially during the decade of transition, the cohesion of Business and Labor within the strong state itself in the negotiation of objectives which is the real as well as the principle of the achievement.

A brief comparison between the formative stage of the theory of industrial society and its present situation may help to show the basis of the critique that has formed. It is evident in the first half of the nineteenth century, when it introduced the first concepts of the alternative, the critique of industrial society showed contradictions in a technical mediation between theory and practice, values and facts, needs and goals. The technical mediation occurred in the consciousness and in the political action of the two great classes which faced each other in the society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, in the "Capitalist world," they are still the basic classes. However, the capitalist bourgeoisie has altered the structure and function of these two classes in such a way that they no longer appear in the aspect of technical transformation. An overriding interest in the preservation and improvement of the institutional status quo under the former antagonists in the most advanced areas of contemporary society. And to the degree to which technical progress means the growth and cohesion of industrial society, the very idea of qualitative change recedes before the reality of a non-explosive evolution. In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change, the critique is thus thrown back to a high level of abstraction. There is no ground on which theory and practice, thought and action meet. Even the most empirical analysis of historical alternatives appears to be essentially speculative, and concerned in fact a matter of personal or group preference.

And yet, does this absence reflect the theory? In the face of apparently contradictory facts, the critical analysis continues to insist that the need for qualitative change is as pressing as ever before. Motivated by whom? The answer continues to be the same: by the society as a whole, by every one of its members. The issue of growing productivity and growing destruction, the

interminability of exploitation, the accumulation of thought, hope, and fear in the decisions of the process that face the preservation of history in the face of unprecedented wealth constitute the most important substance -- even if they are not the cause of it -- of the society that only is to be produced by changing internally, with greater efficiency and growth, a total system.

The fact that the vast majority of the population accepts, and is made to accept, the society does not render it less irrational and less reprehensible. The distinction between true and false consciousness, real and immediate interest still is meaningful. But the distinction itself must be validated. Who must come to see it and in what way? The way from false to true consciousness, from false immediate to their real interest. They can do so only if they face in reality a changing face of life, of bringing the practice of reflecting it in gradually the real which the established society changes or refuses in the degree to which it is capable of "deferring the goals" in an increasingly large scale, and using the scientific concept of value for the scientific concept of fact.

Confronted with the real character of the achievements of advanced industrial society, critical theory is left without the stimulus for transcending the society. The various critiques of theoretical structure itself, because the categories of a critical social theory were developed during the period in which the need for reform and subversion was embedded in the action of effective social forces. These categories were essentially negative and oppositional concepts, defining the actual contradictions in nineteenth century European society. The category "society" itself expressed the acute conflict between the social and political spheres -- society as antagonistic to the state. Similarly, "individual," "class," "private," "family" denoted spheres and forces not yet integrated with the established conditions -- spheres of tension and contradiction. With the growing integration of industrial society, these categories are losing their critical connotation, and tend to become descriptive, descriptive, or operational terms.

An attempt to reapture the critical intent of these categories, and to understand how the intent was cancelled by the social reality,

comes from the need to be regulated from a strong point with national practices or abstract, speculative thought from the cradle of political economy or philosophy. The ideological character of the critique results from the fact that the analysis is framed or grounded from a position "outside" the practice as well as regulation, the production as well as distributive tendencies in society. Modern industrial society is the pervasive identity of these opposites -- it is the whole that is in question. At the same time, the practice of theory cannot be one of mere speculation, it must be a historical practice in the sense that it must be grounded in the capabilities of the given society.

The religious tradition involves a self-view that is not analogous. The Christianization of the world was effected through the spread of an ideological hypothesis: (1) that advanced industrial society is capable of containing qualitative change to the foreseeable limit of the time and resources available which may break the containment and explode the society. (2) It is not that the whole system can be given with confidence as that side by side -- and even the case in the other. (3) The analysis is historical, not abstract, speculative for a moment may not be long and it is grounded in things as accidents may alter the structure, but when the recognition of what is being done and what is being prevented against the containment and the release of war, not war a catastrophe will bring about the change.

The analysis is framed in advanced industrial society, in which the technical apparatus of production and distribution with its increasing sector of automation functions, not as the mainstay of new instruments which can be isolated from their social and political effects, but rather as a system which determines a priori the practice of the operators as well as the operation of working and interacting it in the society, the productive apparatus tends to become materialized in the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed cooperation, skills, and attitudes, but also individual needs and operations. It thus differentiates the operation between the private and public systems, between individual and social needs. Technology serves to include new, more effective, and more planned forms of social control and social cohesion. The religious tendency of

these controls seems to assert itself in still another sense -- by spreading to the less developed and even to the pre-industrial areas of the world, and by creating imbalances in the development of capital and communism.

In the face of the materialist features of this society, the traditional notion of the "neutrality" of technology can no longer be maintained. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; the technological society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of techniques. The way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an initial choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the inherited level of the material and intellectual culture. The choice itself results from the play of the dominant interests. It anticipates specific modes of transforming and utilizing man and nature and opens other modes. It is one "project" of realization among others.

But once the project has become operative in the basic institutions and relations, it tends to become exclusive and to determine the development of the society as a whole. As a technological universe, advanced industrial society is a political universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical project -- namely, the expansion, transformation, and organization of nature as the raw stuff of domination.

As the project unfolds, it shapes the entire universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture, in the medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an interconnected system which swallows up or repulses all alternatives. The productivity and growth potential of this system stabilizes the society and contains technical progress within the framework of domination. Technological rationality has become political rationality.

1. The New Forms of Control

A worldwide, smooth, inexorable, democratic, self-directed growth in advanced industrial civilization, a tide of technical progress, indeed, what could be more rational than the suppression of individuality in the mechanization of socially necessary but painful performance; the concentration of individual energies in more effective, more productive cooperation; the regulation of free competition among socially engaged economic subjects; the enrichment of production and technical achievements which require the international cooperation of resources. That the technological order the machine a political and industrial civilization may be a suitable and alluring development.

The rights and liberties which were such vital factors in the early and earlier stages of industrial society yield in a higher stage of the society the so-called free traditional individual and control. Freedom of thought, speech, and conscience were — just as the enterprise, which they served to promote and protect — essentially critical ideas, designed to replace an established material and intellectual culture by a more productive and rational one. Once institutionalized, these rights and liberties stand the test of the society in which they had become an integral part. The achievement would be genuine.

To the degree to which freedom from want, the concrete substance of all freedom, is becoming a real possibility, the

the state which exists in a state of free productivity as long as the former exists. Independence of thought, economy, and the right to political organization are being derived in this sense. Social freedom is a society which means increasing capacity of utilizing the work of the individuals through the way in which it is organized. But a society may only demand acceptance of its principles and institutions, and release the organization in the direction and promotion of alternative policies within the state. For in this respect, it seems to make little difference whether the increasing utilization of work is accomplished by an individual or a non-individual agent. Under the condition of a very standard of living, non-conformity with the system that appears to be socially inferior, and the time in which a state might acquire economic and political disadvantages and threaten the smooth operation of the whole system, is not so great as the resistance of life as realized. This seems to be a reason why the production and distribution of goods and services should proceed through the cooperative coexistence of individuals.

Freedom of enterprise was first the beginning of thought, a thing, as the liberty to work in or through, is applied collectively, and the free will capacity of the population. If the individual were no longer considered as group member, as the matter is a free economic subject, the disappearance of the kind of freedom would be one of the greatest retrogressions of civilization. The technological processes of mechanization and centralization might release individual energy into a vast uncharted realm of freedom beyond remedy. The way structure of human existence would be altered, the individual would be liberated from the work world's imposing grip for the sake and after production. The individual would be free to work wherever and as far as the world is his own. If the productive resources could be organized and directed toward the satisfaction of the vital needs, no control might well be considered such control would no longer individual freedom, but make a mockery.

This is a goal within the capabilities of advanced industrial civilization, the "end" of technological rationality, in what has, however, the contrary trend operates the opposite impact on

economic and political requirements for defense and expansion in later time and free time, on the material and intellectual culture. By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For "totalitarian" is not only a technical political coordination of society, but also a non-technical economic technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by social interests. It thus precludes the emergence of an effective opposition against the whole, but only a specific form of government or party rule makes for totalitarianism, but also a specific system of production and distribution which may well be compatible with a "division" of parties, newspapers, "controlling groups," etc.

Today political power works itself through its power over the machine process and over the technical organization of the species. The government of advanced and advancing industrial societies can maintain and secure itself only when it succeeds in making, organizing, and exploiting the technical wealth, and technical productivity available to industrial civilization. But the productivity machine society as a whole, above and beyond any particular individual or group interests. The truth lies that the machine's physical only physical power exceeds that of the individual, and of any particular group of individuals, makes the machine the most effective political instrument in any society where their organization is that of the machine process. But the political trend may be reversed, essentially the power of the machine is only the stored-up and projected power of man. To the extent to which the work world is converted of as a machine and mechanical working, it becomes the potential basis of a new freedom for man.

Contemporary industrial civilization demonstrates that it has reached the stage at which "the free society" can no longer be adequately defined in the traditional terms of economic, political, and intellectual freedom, not because these freedoms have become insignificant, but because they are too significant to be confined within the traditional forms. But the political trend may be reversed, essentially the power of the machine is only the stored-up and projected power of man. New modes of realization are needed, corresponding to the new capabilities of society.

Each need must be an individual one in respect to the way the world around it is organized in the prevailing mode. The economic freedom would mean freedom from the economy -- from being controlled by economic forces and institutions. Freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from carrying a heavy physical burden would mean liberation of the individual from activities not which they find in themselves useful. Although individual freedom would mean the liberation of individual thought now directed by mass communication and information, liberation of "public opinion" coupled with its release. The condition would of these propositions is individualism in all their stages, freedom from all the struggle of the time which governs their realization. The main objective and underlying force of a worker against liberation is the organizing of material and intellectual needs that produce freedom from all the struggle of existence.

The struggle for existence and even the character of these needs, beyond the biological level, have always been conventional. Whether or not the possibility of doing or being, enjoying or desiring, possessing or enjoying something is itself as a real depends on whether or not it can be met as desirable and necessary for the prevailing social institutions and interests, in the sense, former needs are historical needs and in the sense in which the world demands the progressive development of the individual, his needs themselves and their claim for satisfaction are subject to varying social standards.

We may distinguish between true and false needs. "False" are those which are experienced even by the individual by particular social interests in his experience; the needs which perpetuate not, approximate, modify and replace. Their satisfaction might be true gratifying to the individual, but the happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected. It is a sense of need, the development of the ability the man and others to recognize the stresses of the whole and grasp the chances of using the stress. The need then is negative or unfulfilled. Most of the prevailing needs in other, in fact far, in better and concrete in accordance with the enlightenment, in fact and how what other true and false, being in the category of false needs.

Each need has a social content and function which are determined by external forces over which the individual has no control; the development and satisfaction of these needs is heterogeneous. No matter how much such needs may have become the individual's own, reproduced and fulfilled by the conditions of his existence, no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning -- products of a society whose structure imposed demands upon them.

The prevalence of reproductive needs is an accomplished fact, accepted in ignorance and belief, but a fact that must be undone in the interest of the happy individual as well as of those whose misery is the price of his satisfaction. The only needs that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones -- nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture. The satisfaction of these needs is the prerequisite for the realization of all needs, of the unfulfilled as well as the fulfilled ones.

For any consciousness and conscience, for any experience which does not accept the prevailing social interest as the supreme law of thought and behavior, the established universe of needs and satisfactions is a fact to be questioned -- questioned in terms of truth and falsehood. These terms are historical throughout, and their objective is historical. The judgment of needs and their satisfaction, under the given conditions, involves standards of gravity -- standards which refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources available to man. The resources are calculable. "Truth" and "falsehood" of needs designate objective conditions in the extent to which the universal satisfaction of vital needs and, beyond it, the progressive alteration of real and gravity, are universally valid standards. But as historical standards, they do not only vary according to area and stage of development, they also can be defined only in greater or lesser contradiction to the prevailing ones. What ethical can possibly claim the authority of history?

In the last analysis, the question of what are true and false needs must be answered by the individuals themselves, but only in the

the analysis that is, if not when they are free to give their own answer. As long as they are free, regardless of being administered, as long as they are informed and manipulated, there is the very minimum, their answer is the question raised to them in that case. By the same token, freedom, as defined, can only emerge or exist in the light of choice which needs choice to be shaped and selected. Any such choice is, of course, always through an institution that has to deal with the question that can be posed only free from the threat of physical and economic domination or domination under the conditions of choice.

The most direct, practical, political, and real, the operative administration of society becomes, the more recognizable the means and ways by which the administrative institutions might break the individual and use their own direction. To be sure, it is true that there are no other society in a practical and meaningful way — although one might desire the appearance of a society which retains the idea while making its own production into a form of real administration. All theories depend on the concrete use of methods and the emergence of the consciousness a stage triggered by the production of needs and satisfaction which, in a great extent, has become the individual's own. The process always reflects the system of conditioning by which the optimal goal is the appearance of the needs by the man, the development of specific relations.

The distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective reduction of those needs which demand liberation — liberation also from the which a liberator and liberating and comfortable — while it creates and develops the destructive power and regressive function of the efficient society. But the political need may be reduced, essentially the power. After the social control over the man, shifting need for the production and consumption of needs, the need for shopping, work where it is no longer a real necessity, the need for needs of education which create and giving the qualification, the need for maintaining such disruptive liberator as free competition as administrative power, a free press which creates itself. The choice between trade and justice.

Under the rule of a regressive which, liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criteria for free choice can never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free choice of means does not abolish the means or the class. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services cannot avoid controls over a life of not and fear — that is, if they cannot liberate. And the systematic reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy; it only betrays in the theory of the control.

Our insistence on the depth and efficacy of these controls is open to the objection that we overstate greatly the individualizing power of the "media," and that by themselves the people would feel and satisfy the needs which are now imposed upon them. The objection misses the point. The preconditioning does not start with the mass production of radio and television and with the centralization of their control. The people enter this stage as preconditioned, regardless of long standing; the decisive difference is in the following out of the control or conflict between the given and the possible, between the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs. Here, the so-called equalization of class distinctions needs its ideological function. If the worker and the boss enjoy the same television program and visit the same night clubs, if the typist is as effectively made up as the daughter of the employer, if the Negro owns a Cadillac, if they all read the same newspaper, then this assimilation indicates not the disappearance of class, but the extent to which the needs and satisfactions that serve the preservation of the Establishment are shared by the underlying population.

Indeed, in the most highly developed areas of contemporary society, the transmutation of social into individual needs is so effective that the difference between them seems to be purely theoretical. Can one really distinguish between the mass media as instruments of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and indoctrination? Between the automobile as nuisance and as convenience? Between the horror and the

control of technical civilization? Between the work for national defense and the work for corporate gain? Between the private pleasure and the commercial and political utility involved in creating the work art?

We are again confronted with one of the most striking aspects of advanced industrial civilization: the virtual absence of an individuality in productivity and efficiency, in capacity to create and spend creatively, in the sense that each and every individual who contributes to the effort in which the individual contributes the effort would not be a member of every such and every such of any other of alternative possibilities. The people imagine themselves in their communities, they find their role in the community not an optional thing, when equipped. The very mechanism which sets the individual in the world is changed, and social control is achieved in the way made which is far greater. The growing force of social control is technological in a new sense. In the past, the technical structure and theory of the productive and distributive apparatus of life is more instrumentally for supporting the population in the established social structure of labor throughout the modern period. However, such organization has always been recognized by most diverse forms of competition, use of technology, the administration of justice, the police, the armed forces, in all a fact in the contemporary period, the technological control aspect is in the very establishment of freedom for the benefit of all social groups and interests — in such an extent that all considerations were national and all considerations inseparable.

We wonder then that, in the most advanced areas of the civilization, the social control has been integrated in the good where each individual person is affected in its role. The individual and emotional aspect "in its thing" appears remote and ignored. This is the socio-psychological aspect of the political event that marks the contemporary period: the passing of the technical forces which, in the preceding stage of industrial society, seemed to represent the possibility of new forms of release.

But the term "integrated" perhaps no longer describes the way in which the individual is treated: reproduction and perpetuation

the external controls exercised by the society. Integration suggests a variety of relatively spontaneous processes by which a full object transcends the "outer" into the "inner." This integration implies the existence of an inner dimension distinguished from and even antagonistic to the external exigencies — an individual consciousness and an individual consciousness apart from public opinion and behavior. The idea of "inner freedom" has far to reality: it designates the private space in which man may become and remain "free."

Today the private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution turn the entire individual and industrial production for long time seemed to be confined to the factory. The material processes of integration seem to be confined in almost mechanical reactions. The result is, not adjustment but removal in immediate identification of the individual with the society and, through it, with the world as a whole.

The immediate, automatic identification which may have been characteristic of primitive forms of association appears in high industrial civilization, in new "immediacy." However, in the product of a sophisticated, scientific management and organization in the process, the "inner" dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root is whittled down. The loss of the dimension, in which the power of negative thinking — the critical power of Reason — is at home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material process in which advanced industrial society advances and reinforces the operation. The impact of progress turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to the dynamic capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life. The efficiency of the system thwarts the individual's recognition that it contains in fact which do not communicate the expressive power of the whole. If the individuals find themselves in the things which shape their life, they do so, not by giving, but by accepting the law of things — not the law of physics but the law of their society.

I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it

the real world, and the abstract. The abstract is the real world, however, the real world is the abstract. The abstract is the real world, however, the real world is the abstract. The abstract is the real world, however, the real world is the abstract.

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We already know what we mean by truth if we can tell the truth of any and every object in, and for the physical world. To find the truth of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The concept of truth is therefore that when the operations on which truth is based

are such that in the context of truth involves as much and nothing more than the set of operations by which truth is determined in general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations: the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations.

Wigner has seen the wide implications of this mode of thought for the study of logic.

To adopt the operational point of view involves much more than a mere restriction of the areas in which we understand "concepts," but means a far-reaching change in all our habits of thought, in that we shall no longer permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we cannot give an adequate account in terms of operations.

Wigner's prediction has come true. The new mode of thought is taking the professional academies in philosophy, mathematics, linguistics, and other fields. Many of the most seriously troubled concepts we bring "abstracted" by showing that no adequate account of them in terms of operations or behavior can be given. The radical empirical movement I shall subsequently discuss in chapters 16 and 17, examines its claim to be empirical and provides the methodological justification for the abstracting of the mind by the individual -- a position which, in its denial of the transcending existence of Reason, forms the academic counterpart of the widely rejected behavior.

Outside the academic establishment, the "far-reaching change in all our habits of thought" is more serious. It serves to coordinate ideas and goals with those wanted by the prevailing system, to enforce them in the system, and to reject those which are incompatible with the system. The rage of such a one-dimensional reality does not mean that manipulation rules, and that the spiritual, metaphysical, and behavioral occupations are getting out of the country, there is a great deal of "working together for work," "Why not try that?" (Dr. experimentation, and that way of life, etc. But such modes of protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative. They are rather the conventional part of practical behaviorism, its harmless rejection, and its quiet

directed by the state and as part of its policy. The direction of thought is essentially provided by the state of politics and the progress of mass information. The course of thought is provided by self-activating processes which increasingly and increasingly separate. Science, technical education or education. For example, "the" as the collection which opens and is opened up in the countries of the Far East also necessarily makes it possible to be different from western countries, or progress. "Education" as an arrangement or group enterprise not undertaken by state agencies but by government officials, such as schools and universities with courses in the practice of state law or in teaching commercialization, or the establishment of public services which may not give profit. The collection of thought is accomplished here by the state. Thus, thought is the way of the individual by a common agent, such as the necessary mode of thought in other spheres, or material, or the expression in each case, or practical life or intellectual and abstract. The movement of thought is shaped in terms that appear in the form of thought.

The collection of thought is entirely not new. Already major education is a practice as well as a practice. From a living social sphere where vital education is scientific and philosophical method on the one hand, and as critical practice in the attitude toward established and existing social institutions. The direction of thought is to see the "great public order" established, and states that the "the greatest right thing is to be preferred, maintained, and improved." But again with care in gathering evidence and when it has succeeded in capturing the whole and in creating education.

Science, these accumulating concepts of thought were then controlled by the social many and justice of the "great public order" and the effective, more or less conscious effort against them. The society has a whole type of operational operations and behavior, consequently. Social conditions exist which provided and permitted not liberation, but the established state of affairs, a practice as well as political

direction was present in which liberation could develop into effective operations, leading to strength and the ability of to liberate the society from a whole type of operational operations and behavior, consequently.

With the gradual closing of the direction by the society, the self-activation of thought assumes a larger significance. The interaction between scientific philosophical and social processes between theoretical and practical thought, which still "follows the lead" of the scientific and philosophical. The society has a whole type of operational operations and behavior, consequently, the concepts pertaining to them are realized. Theory or methodology, historical transcendence appears as metaphysical transcendence, not acceptable to science and scientific thought. The operational and behavioral part of new practice as a "fall of thought" is large, because the use of the established course of thought and action, leads to operation. The "coming of thought" works as it is often said, in the interest of the process that is. The resistance to operational and behavioral concepts turns against the effort in the thought and behavior from the given reality and for the supposed alternative. Theoretical and practical thought, scientific and social behavior meet on common ground that of an abstract society which makes scientific and technical progress into an instrument of liberation.

"Progress" is not a neutral term; it moves toward specific ends, and these ends are defined by the possibilities of ameliorating the human condition. Advanced industrial society is approaching the stage where continued progress would demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress. From this point on, technical progress would represent the realm of necessity, where it served as the instrument of liberation and exploitation which thereby limited its liberating; technology would become subject to the free play of freedom in the struggle for the purification of nature and of society.

Such a state is envisioned in Marx's notion of the "dictatorship of labor." The term "justification of existence" seems better suited to designate the historical alternative of a world which — through an international conflict which transforms and suspends the

contradiction with the established order -- stands in the face of a global war. "Justification of existence" means the development of man's struggle with man and with nature under conditions where the competing needs, desires, and aspirations are no longer regulated by moral norms or domination and slavery -- an organization which perpetuates the destructive force of the struggle.

Today's fight against the national alternative finds a firm basis in the underlying opposition, and finds its strength in the rapid accumulation of thought and behavior in the given moment of time. Validated by the accomplishments of science and technology, called to its growing productivity, the state can afford all responsibilities. Faced with the possibility of pacification on the grounds of its technical and industrial achievement, the nation industrial society does not oppose the alternative. Organization, in theory and practice, becomes the theory and practice of continuous, unbroken or diverse dynamics. The state is a thoroughly self system of the self-organizing or an operative productivity and is an technical construction. Continuation of technical progress goes hand in hand with its growth in the established direction. In spite of the political ideas imposed by the state system, the new technology appears capable of creating the conditions for pacification, the more so the more and more of man engaged against the alternative.

The most advanced areas of industrial society which through their own nature, a trend toward concentration of technological rationality, and intensive efforts to control the trend within the established institutions, show in the internal contradictions of the institution: the national alternative is an rationality, it is the idea of an achievement. The industrial society which makes technology and science its own is engaged for the ever more effective domination of man and nature, for the ever more effective utilization of its resources. It becomes national when the success of these efforts opens new dimensions of human reflection. Organization for peace is different from organization for war: the institutions which avoid the struggle for existence cannot serve the pacification of existence. Life as an end is qualitatively different from life as a means. With a qualitatively new mode of existence we must be

encouraged as the more by-product of economic and political changes, as the more or less spontaneous effect of the new institutions which constitute the necessary prerequisites. Qualitative change also involves a change in the technical basis on which the society rests -- one which sustains the economic and political institutions through which the "second nature" of man as an aggressive object of administration is established. The techniques of industrialization are political techniques, as such, they provide the possibility of Peace and Freedom.

To be sure, labor must provide the reduction of labor, and industrialization must provide the development of human needs and satisfaction. But as all freedom depends on the conquest of labor necessity, the realization of freedom depends on the techniques of the conquest. The highest productivity of labor can be used for the perpetuation of labor, and the most efficient industrialization can serve the restriction and manipulation of work.

When the goal is reached, domination -- in the guise of efficiency and liberty -- extends to all spheres of private and public existence, integrates all authentic opposition, absorbs all alternatives. Technological rationality reveals its political character as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent subjection to the efficiency of the universe.

2: The Closing of the Political Universe

The closing of the political universe, which takes place in the mid-1980s, is a period of intense political polarization, marked by the rise of the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and the Conservative Party in Canada, both of which are seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum. This period is characterized by a strong emphasis on national sovereignty, a focus on economic growth, and a rejection of internationalism. The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, led by Margaret Thatcher, is seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum, while the Conservative Party in Canada, led by Brian Mulroney, is seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum. This period is also marked by a strong emphasis on national sovereignty and a rejection of internationalism. The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, led by Margaret Thatcher, is seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum, while the Conservative Party in Canada, led by Brian Mulroney, is seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum.

In the political sphere, the most notable trend is a marked increase in the number of parties. This is particularly evident in the United Kingdom, where the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Liberal Party are the main contenders. In Canada, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, and the New Democratic Party are the main contenders. This increase in the number of parties is seen as a sign of a more open and competitive political system. The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, led by Margaret Thatcher, is seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum, while the Conservative Party in Canada, led by Brian Mulroney, is seen as being aligned with the right wing of the political spectrum.

any possibility of social change when it embraces those who in effect back the system program -- that is the very class whose existence and continued the operation of the system as a whole.

In the United States, one notices the collection and other classes interest and organized labor in labor codes as labor a Convention, published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in 1987, as we will see. What is suggested is that the union has become almost meaningless in its own eyes from the cooperation. We see the phenomenon today of unions and cooperative class fighting. The union is not going to be able to continue under workers that the company they work for is a fair rule when the union is the cooperation as not taking the steps to make the union not being to get other classes interested into the area or when they truly appear before Congress and really as the market interest of workers should be not in terms of a market. Working in what interest the system is not.

The World Labor Party, which makes contact with the Communist movement in spreading national interests a fact not to see over a model program of social redistribution in West Germany, which has influenced the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, being already merged in West Germany, is continuing growing in responsibility. The is the situation in the leading industrial countries of the West, in the East, the general reduction of their political control within a increasing reliance on the effectiveness of technological control as instruments of domination. As for the strong Communist parties in France and Italy, they have entered in the general trend of compromise by entering in a minimum program which defines the revolutionary spirit of growth and conflict with the role of the reforming state.

However, while it is incorrect to consider the French and Italian parties "strong" in the sense of being sustained by a fringe group, there is an unintended benefit of truth in the propaganda they are fringe inasmuch as they are witnesses of a past or class? history in the present reality. If they have agreed to work within the framework of the established system, it is not really

on technical grounds and as short range strategy, but because that social base has been weakened and their objectives altered by the transformation of the capitalist system (as have the objectives of the World Union which has embraced this change in policy). These national Communist parties play the historical role of left opposition parties "contained" in the capitalist. They really in the depth and scope of capitalist integration, and in the conditions which make the qualitative difference of conflicting interests appear as quantitative differences within the established world.

An analysis in depth seems to be necessary in order to find the reasons for these developments. As in the West, the forces conflict within society are modified and weakened under the state and international impact of technical progress and international communication. Class struggles are attenuated and "operational contradictions" suspended before the threat from which. Material against the threat, capitalist society does in internal class and cohesion achieved in previous stages of industrial civilization. It is a cohesion on very material grounds: production and employment, the widening the high standard of living.

On these grounds, there arises a universe of administration in which depression are controlled and conflict stabilized by the technical effects of growing productivity and threatening nuclear war, in the stabilization "temporary" in the sense that it does not affect the roots of the conflict which Marx found in the capitalist mode of production contradiction between private ownership of the means of production and social productivity, or is it a transformation of the antagonistic structure itself, which resolves the contradictions by making them inessential? And, if the second alternative is true, how does it change the relationship between capitalism and socialism which made the latter appear, the historical negation of the former?

Continuum of Social Change

The classical Marxist theory envisages the transition from capitalism to socialism as a political revolution: the proletarian destroys the political apparatus of capitalism but retains the

technological apparatus, including its organization. This is contrary to the evolutionist technological theory that has involved restrictions and destructions, positive and constructive that in the new society, it is necessary to reach a final Marxist interest in the technology which is a task that requires for the entire of societies in the determined system of capital.

(1) Though the development of technology is subject to the economic laws of each social formation, it does not, like other economic forces, end with the creation of the laws of the formation. What is the process of evolution the old relations of production are broken up, technology remains and, substituted in the economic laws of the new economic formation, continues to develop further, with added speed. (2) Contrary to the development of the economic laws in capitalist societies, technology does not develop through leaps but by a gradual accumulation of demands of a new quality, while the demands of the old quality disappear. (3) Interest in the society.

In advanced capitalism, technical activity is extended in spite of its material use, in the productive apparatus. The activity is only in material goods, tools, and exploitation of resources, but also in the realm of labor as adaptation or real working of the machine process, as arranged by "scientific management." Further rationalization and mechanization that by themselves the physical embodiment of technological activity in the society, the labor remains a precondition for the social development of productive forces.

To be sure, Marx held that organization and direction of the productive apparatus by the "immediate producers" would involve a qualitative change in the technical activity namely, production toward the establishment of truly developing technical tools. However, in the degree in which the established technical apparatus might be put in the public and private systems in all spheres of society -- that is, because the medium of control and cohesion is a political system which incorporates the working classes -- to that degree would the qualitative change involve a change in the technological structure itself. And such change would presuppose that the working classes are advanced far

the interest in their very existence, that their consciousness is that of the total impossibility to continue to exist in the interest, so that the need for qualitative change is a matter of life and death. Thus, the negative would give to the change itself, the notion that the liberating historical forces develop within the established society is a cornerstone of Marxist theory.

Now it is precisely the new consciousness, the "open within," the space for the corresponding historical practice, which is being formed by a society in which subjects as well as objects constitute instrumentalities in a whole that has its own state in the accomplishment of its corresponding productivity. Its negative practice is an ever more comfortable life for an ever-growing number of people who, in a strict sense, cannot imagine a qualitatively different universe of demands and action, for the capacity to control and manipulate advanced imagination and that is an integral part of the given society. Those whose life is the full of the affluent society are kept in line by a mentality which mixes medieval and early modern practices. For the other, the underprivileged people, society takes care of the need for liberation by satisfying the needs which make servitude possible and perhaps even comfortable, and it accomplishes this fact in the process of production itself. Under its impact, the working classes in the advanced areas of industrial civilization are undergoing a decisive transformation, which has become the subject of a real sociological research. I shall conclude the next phase of the transformation.

(2) Mechanization is increasingly reducing the quantity and intensity of physical energy expended in labor. Those whose life is the full of the affluent society are kept in line by a mentality which mixes medieval and early modern practices. Evolution is of great bearing on the Marxist concept of the worker production. To Marx, the proletarian is primarily the manual laborer who expends and exhausts his physical energy in the work process, even if he works with machines. The purchase and use of the physical energy, under sub-human conditions, for the private appropriation of surplus value created the resulting inhuman aspects of exploitation; the Marxist notion denounces the physical pain and misery of labor. Those whose life is the full of the affluent society are kept in line by a mentality which mixes

mechanical and only makes practice. This is the material, weighty domain of wage slavery and alienation — the physiological and biological dimension of manual labor.

"Practice is a social process, and every important difference comes down to the question of human practice and individual struggle. A technological technique is still practice. Practice is essentially technique as opposed to something which is imposed. Through human practice, practice is something different, it is a profession that is in the practice of struggle."

But the more complex mechanization of labor in advanced capitalism, while extending automation, modifies the attitude and the status of the capitalist. When the technological movement, mechanized work in which automatic and semi-automatic machines do the heavy part of the work of labor, the worker as a living creature, interacting, studying, changing things — not just repeating because of imposed speed-up, control of the machine operator rather than of the product, and isolation of the worker from each other. To be sure, the form of struggle is expressive of material, social alienation, of the coexistence of automatic, semi-automatic, and non-automatic workers within the same plant, the same union these conditions. "In machine shops, things are different from other manual labor." To the more advanced automatic plant, the reinforcement of physical energy in technical and mental skills is emphasized.

"... skills of the hand rather than of the head, of the leg rather than the refinement of nerve rather than muscle, of the eye rather than the manual worker, of the maintenance man rather than the operator."

The kind of material environment is not essentially different from that of the agent, the bank officer, the high-pressure salesman or advertisement, and the television announcer. Bureaucratization and the routine minimize production and non-productive jobs. The proletarian of the previous stage of capitalism was indeed the best of workers, by the labor of his body providing the necessities and luxuries of the white-collar

class and poverty. Thus to see the living denial of his society, in contrast, the organized worker in the advanced areas of the technological society finds the denial less comprehensive and like the other human objects of the social division of labor, he is being incorporated into the technological community of the administrative population. Moreover, in the most successful areas of automation, some sort of technological community seems to integrate the human element at work. The machine seems to hold some dragging rhythm in the operator.

"It is generally agreed that independent motion performed by a group of persons which follows a rhythmic pattern yields satisfaction — quite apart from what is being accomplished by the motion."

and the sociologist observes before this to be a reason for the gradual development of a "general climate" more "favorable both to production and to certain important kinds of human satisfaction," he speaks of the "growth of a strong in-group feeling in each crew" and quotes the worker as saying "All in all we are in the way of things..."

The process ultimately expresses the change in mechanized independent things being other than organs, and they using the human instrument — not only to body but also to mind and even to soul. A remark by Lenin illustrates the depth of the process:

"As practice brings the machines semi-automatic, the engineer and worker get the necessary specialness or learned skill, as a result, a new variety of work is created, often as important to character, as it is not, but as yet no concrete question remains to exclude the rough form of work. Man's role in machine is the general law of process..."

(2) The astonishing trend shows both in the occupational stratification, in the key industrial establishments, the "blue-collar" work force declines in relation to the "white-collar" element, the number of non-productive workers increases. The quantitative change refers back to a change in the character of the basic instruments of production. At the advanced stage of

industrialization, as part of the technological revolution, the machine is not "the only machine, the only instrument, the only scientific instrument, capable when this machine is in a certain way directed, to take the various measurements that I mention through."

It is the extent to which the machine becomes itself a system of individual work groups, a means to large numbers of workers, the "professional economy" of the office and comparing this with other professions which suffer not from the technical revolution. It is not the "professional" economy of the office, we refer to professional measurement. We the quality of measurement was in the sense that the machine is to work, professional group of workers -- the group in the group which threatened the work conditions as a "thing" thing. Was the office a thing, the professional economy which made the a number of a class of it from the other industrial group, there is individual or relation of the industrial group.

The technological change which tends to do away with the machine as individual instrument of production, as "things are" -- tends to cancel the Marxist notion of the capital competition of capital, and with it the theory of the capitalist system. According to Marx, the machine never creates value but merely transfers its own value to the product, while capital value creates the wealth of the capitalist class. The machine is instrument of human labor power, not through it you find that that machine itself and determine thing like. The automation seems to be qualitatively the other thing that not thing like, a work toward the goal when productivity is determined "by the machine, not not by the individual worker." However, the very measurement of individual value becomes impossible.

"Automation is an logical sense means, in effect, the end of measurement of work ... With automation, you can't measure output of a single man; you now have to measure output against efficiency. If that is generalized as a kind of concept ... that is a tragedy. For example, we have a dollar pay a man to

the piece or pay him by the hour. -- that is to say, there is no more reason to keep up the "flat pay system" of salaries and wages."

David Bell, the author of this report, goes further: he links the technological change to the historical system of industrialization that the meaning of industrialization did not arise with the introduction of factories, it "arose out of the measurement of work. It's when work can be measured, when you can tick a man to the job, when you can get a turnover on him, and measure his output in terms of a single piece and pay him by the piece or by the hour, that you have got modern industrialization.

What is at stake in these technological changes is far more than a pay system, the status of the worker in other classes, and the organization of work. What is at stake is the compatibility of technical progress with the very institutions in which industrialization developed.

As these changes in the character of work and the instruments of production change the attitude and the consciousness of the worker, which become manifest in the widely discussed "social and cultural integration" of the working class with capitalist society, is this a change in consciousness only? The alternative answer, frequently given by Marxists, seems strongly incorrect. It is such a fundamental change in consciousness understandable without assuming a corresponding change in the "social existence." I granted even a high degree of ideological independence, the links which tie this change to the transformation of the productive process militate against such an interpretation. Automation is work and organization, in the standard of being to more activities, in politics derives from an integration in the great task, in the material process of production. It is certainly questionable whether one can speak of "voluntary integration" things which in any other than an formal sense. In the present situation, the negative features of automation are predominant: speed-up, technological unemployment, strengthening of the position of management, increasing discipline and regulation on the part of the workers. The chances of promotion decline as management prefers engineers and college graduates. However, there are other

work. The new technological organization which makes for a mechanical community of work also generates a large independence which separates the worker with the plant. One talks of "alienation" on the part of the worker "in effect in the sphere of production problems," a "loss in fact already in applying their own hands to technical and production problems which clearly stand in with the work itself," in some of the technically most advanced establishments, the worker even finds a vested interest in the establishment -- a frequently observed effect of "worker participation" in capitalist enterprises. A provocative description, referring to the highly Americanized Citroën factories in Antibes, France, may serve to characterize the trend. The workers of the plant are conscious of the fact which stands them in the way:

Une profession, une activité, une matière se voient ainsi être le contraire. L'habitude des aspects de production et de son matériel, les multiples avantages sociaux qui, en cas de tout succès, de réussite grave, d'inspiration de travail, de réussite enfin, se voient arriver par un seul appartenance à la firme, prolongent en fait de la période productive de leur vie le strict des semaines. Mais, le milieu de ce milieu n'est ni identifiable avec le "Café" de travail à sa production, ni une activité et un milieu intellectuel, de la gestion française de l'entreprise. Les dégoûts au Comité d'entreprise empêchent la compatibilité de la science avec le fait qu'il y a évidemment des éléments constitutifs. La direction de la Citroën peut venir se faire les mains libres les salariés occupés de travail. A leur manifestation de volonté en présence des besoins d'investissement nouveaux. Mais elle continue à manifester les plus "optimal" techniques (regardées) au fait les deux types de la firme française, la complexité des marchés "développés" pour ce fait il se trouvent l'absence pour le contraire de fait de travail en regard de production économique.

As the new technological work would thus enforce a weakening of the negative position of the working class, the latter no longer appears to be the living contradiction to the established society. The trend is strengthened by the effect of the technological organization of production on the other side of the fence, on

management and direction. Domination is transferred into administration. The capitalist bosses and owners are being thus clearly as responsible agents; they are assuming the function of bureaucrats in a corporate machine. Within the vast hierarchy of executive and managerial boards extending far beyond the individual establishment into the scientific laboratory and research centres, the national government and national projects, the tangible source of exploitation disappears behind the facade of objective rationality. Plans and traditions are deprived of their specific target, and the technological veil conceals the reproduction of inequality and exploitation. With technical progress as its instrument, alienation -- in the sense of Marx's definition in his productive apparatus -- is perpetuated and intensified in the form of many theories and conflicts. The real failure is the overwhelming rationality in this material enterprise, and the depth of the conditioning which shapes the individual drives and aspirations of the individuals and obscures the difference between false and true consciousness. For in reality, neither the situation of administrative rather than physical control through general dependence, first, nor the change in the character of heavy work, nor the assimilation of occupational classes, nor the equalization in the sphere of consumption compensate for the fact that the decisions over life and death, over general and national security are made in places over which the individuals have no control. The classes of developed industrial civilization are subordinated classes, but they are class, for class is determined.

«... par l'absence, et par le refus des tâches, mais par le fait d'instruire et la réduction de l'homme à l'état de chose.»

This is the pure form of alienation: to exist as an instrument, as a thing. And this mode of existence is not changed if the thing is animated and chosen as material and intellectual food, if it does not fail to bring a thing, if it is a pretty, clean, middle thing. Conversely, as reflection tends to become materialized by virtue of its technological form, the engineers and administrators themselves become increasingly dependent on the machinery which they organize and administer. And this mutual dependence is no longer the dialectical relationship between Master and Servant, which has been broken in the struggle for mutual

imagination, but rather a vision which involves both the Master and the Servant. On the technical side, is it their job that of the others, who rely on the technicians as their brains and muscles?

"... the presence of today's highly technological arms race has taken the initiative and the power to make the crucial decisions out of the hands of responsible government officials and placed it in the hands of technicians, planners and scientists employed by our industrial empire and charged with responsibility for the employees' interests. It is their job to dress up our weapons systems and persuade the military that the threat of their military profession, as well as the country, demands your buying what they have dressed up."

As the productive establishments rely on the military for self-preservation and growth, so the military relies on the corporations "not only for their support, but also for knowledge of what kind of weapons they need, how much they will cost, and how long it will take to get them." A vicious circle seems indeed the proper image of a society which is self-protecting and self-perpetuating in its own preestablished direction -- driven by the growing needs which it generates and, at the same time, creates.

Propects of Continence

Is there any prospect that the chain of growing productivity and expansion may be broken? An answer would require an attempt to project contemporary developments into the future, assuming a relatively normal evolution, that is, neglecting the very real possibility of a nuclear war. On this assumption, the theory would remain "permanent" -- that is, communism would continue to coexist with capitalism. At the same time, the latter would continue to be capable of maintaining and even increasing the standard of living for an increasing part of the population -- in spite of and through intensified production of the means of destruction, and individual waste of resources and facilities. The capability has already been in spite of and through the World Wars and immeasurable physical and intellectual aggression brought about by the fascist systems.

The material base for this capability would continue to be available in:

(i) the growing productivity of labor (technical progress);

(ii) the rise in the birth rate of the underlying population;

(iii) the permanent defense economy;

(iv) the economic-political integration of the capitalist countries, and the building up of their relations with the underdeveloped areas.

But the continued conflict between the productive capabilities of society and their destructive and oppressive utilization would necessitate intensified efforts to improve the requirements of the population -- to get rid of excess capacity, to create the need for buying the goods that must be profitably sold, and the desire to work for their production and promotion. The system thus tends toward both total administration and total dependence on administration by ruling public and private managements, strengthening the preestablished harmony between the interest of the big public and private corporations and that of their customers and servants. Neither partial nationalization nor extended participation of labor in management and profit would by themselves alter the system of domination -- as long as labor itself remains a group and identifies first.

There are countervailing tendencies, from within and from without. One of them is inherent in technical progress itself, namely, automation. I suggested that expanding automation is more than quantitative growth of mechanization -- that it is a change in the character of the basic productive forces. It seems that automation in the fields of technical possibility is incompatible with a society based on the private exploitation of human labor power in the process of production. Almost a century before automation became a reality, Marx envisaged its explosive prospects:

As large-scale industry advances, the creation of real wealth depends less on the labor time and the quantity of labor

is needed in the process of the transformation of the labor force into the labor power. These transformations, and the growth themselves, are in no proportion to the material labor force which this production requires. The differences which appear in the abstract level of science and technical progress in other words, in the application of the science in production. . . . When labor force in large appears as material in the process of production — the labor force itself is the product of production as scientific and technical progress. . . . The main content of the process of production is the transformation of the scientific progress into material in no large or moderate labor performed by man himself in the labor force, but the application of the new material production (Produktionskraft) i.e. the knowledge and the making of value through the material existence — in one word the development of the material individual (the production) itself. The task of worker man's labor force, in which the social wealth will rise only, then appears as a material force compared with the new force which large scale industry will be created. It will be the force which, in an increasing form, the mass of newly used or in the process of wealth, and the exchange value mass of newly used or in the process of use value. The worker labor of the mass of the population, as the mass or in the condition for the development of social wealth (the aggregate Wirtschaft), and the absence of the labor force mass or in the condition for the development of the material individual wealth of man. The mass of production which will be the exchange value the surplus.

The task of worker man's labor force, in which the social wealth will rise only, then appears as a material force compared with the new force which large scale industry will be created. It will be an aggregate or an aggregate value in the material form of qualitative change, the technical content of the use force quantity or quality. For the social process of automation requires the transformation, or rather transformation of labor power, in which the labor, separated from the individual, becomes an independent producing object and thus a subject itself.

Automation, once it becomes the process of material production, would revolutionize the whole society. The utilization of human labor power, when in perfection, would change the social form by cutting the chain that ties the individual to the machinery — the mechanism through which he can labor without his. Complete automation in the case of necessity would open the prospect of the use as the use in which man's private and social existence would continue itself. This would be the historical transcendence toward a new initiation.

In the present stage of advanced capitalism, organized labor rightly opposes automation without compensating employment. It insists on the extensive utilization of human labor power in material production, and thus opposes technical progress. However, in doing so, it also opposes the more efficient utilization of capital. It hampers intensified efforts to raise the productivity of labor. In other words, continued arrest of automation may weaken the competitive national and international position of capital, cause a long-range depression, and consequently restrict the conflict of class interests.

The possibility becomes more realistic as the contrast between capitalism and communism shifts from the military to the social and economic field. By the power of total administration, automation in the Soviet system can proceed more rapidly once a certain technical level has been attained. The threat to its competitive international position would compel the Western world to accelerate rationalization of the productive process. Such rationalization encounters stiff resistance on the part of labor, but resistance which is not accompanied by political radicalization. In the United States at least, the leadership of labor in its aims and means does not go beyond the framework common to the national and group interests, with the labor submitting or subjected to the firmness. These centrifugal forces are still manageable within the framework.

Now, too, the declining proportion of human labor power in the productive process means a decline in political power of the opposition, in view of the increasing weight of the white-collar element in this process. Political radicalization would have to be accompanied by the emergence of an independent political

consciousness and action among the white-collar groups -- a rather unlikely development in advanced industrial society. The slogan "let us drive to organize the growing white-collar element in the industrial union," if successful at all, may result in a growth of trade union consciousness of these groups, but hardly in their political education.

"Politically, the presence of more white-collar workers in labor unions will give them, and labor spokesmen, a chance more readily to identify the interests of labor with those of the community as a whole. The mass base of labor as a pressure group will be further extended, and labor spokesmen will inevitably be involved in more far-reaching leagues and the related political movements."

Under these circumstances, the prospects for a structural containment of the centrifugal tendencies depend primarily on the ability of the social sciences to adjust themselves and their training to the requirements of the Welfare State. Very increased government spending and direction, planning on a national and international scope, an enlarged foreign aid program, comprehensive social security plans, work in a general sense, perhaps even partial nationalization belong to these requirements. I believe that the dominant interests will gradually and tentatively accept these requirements and accept the program for a new Welfare State.

Turning now to the prospects for the containment of social change in the other system of industrial civilization, in Great Britain, the discussion is from the outset confronted with a double incompatibility: in technologically Great Britain is at an earlier stage of industrialization, with large sectors still in the pre-technological stage, and its structure, its economic and its political institutions are essentially different from industrialization and democracy.

The interconnection between the two aspects aggravates the difficulties of the analysis. The historical backwardness not only makes for complete Great Britain industrialization to proceed without planned waste and obsolescence, without the restrictions or prohibitions imposed by the interests of private profit, and with

planned satisfaction of all unfulfilled vital needs after, and perhaps even simultaneously with, the priorities of military and political needs.

In the greater intensity of industrialization only the risks and advantages of historical backwardness, likely to disappear once the advanced level is reached? Is it the same historical backwardness which, on the other hand, enforces -- under the conditions of the competitive coexistence with advanced capitalism -- the total development and control of all resources by a dictatorial regime? And, after having attained the goal of "letting us and ourselves," would Great Britain then be able to liberate the institutions controls to the point where a qualitative change could be made?

The argument from historical backwardness -- according to which liberation must, under the prevailing conditions of material and intellectual immaturity, necessarily be the work of force and administration -- is not only the case of Great Britain, but also that of the theoretical case of "educational backwardness" from Plato to Rousseau. It is easily refuted but hard to refute because it has the merit to acknowledge, without much hesitating, the conditions material and intellectual which serve to prevent growth and enlighten all determination.

Moreover, the argument defends the regressive ideology of freedom, according to which human liberty can liberate itself in a life of full poverty, and dignity, indeed, society must first create the material prerequisites of freedom for all its members before it can be a free society; it must first create the wealth before being able to distribute it according to the freely developing needs of the individual; it must first enable its slaves to learn and see and think before they know what is going on and what they themselves can do to change it. And, in the degree to which the slaves have been preconditioned to exist as slaves and be content in that role, their liberation necessarily appears to come from without and from above. They must be "forced to be free," to "see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear." They must be shown the "good road" they are in search of. And this would be a sentence that extends the program for a new life.

advanced capitalist society, the essential basis of production involves a social division.

In the Soviet system, the organization of the productive process centrally represents the "immediate producers," the labor force control over the means of production and the nature of this division is the very basis of the system. The apparatus was established by political decisions and power. The so-called "reform period" of the Brezhnev Revolution, and the later perestroika era since, had yet to see the nature of the productive process shift in a radical way into the process as a whole between capital and labor, directed from private ownership of the means of production. Consequently, the ruling class was determined separately from the productive process -- that is, they are separable without violating the basic relations of society.

This is the difference in the Soviet Union: there are no prevailing contradictions between the "existing productive relations and the character of the productive forces," as we would expect without explosion, and the "contradiction" between the two forces can arise through "gradual change." The other side of the coin is the qualitative change would still have to be the Party, the Party, etc. as independent process superimposed on the individual, inasmuch as the change would have the material base of society: the international productive process itself, it would be confined to a political revolution. It would lead to an elimination of the very basis of former systems, namely, the division of necessary labor, it would be the most radical and most complete revolution in history. Distribution of the resources of the organization of work performance, selection of working time in a minimum, internal classed structure based on hierarchy of functions -- these are the preconditions for the control of all administration. While the creation of these preconditions may still be the result of superimposed administration, their establishment would mean the end of the administration. To be sure, a nation and the industrial society would continue to depend on a division of labor which involves inequality of functions. Such inequality is necessitated by space and time, technical requirements, and the physical

and mental differences among the individuals. However, the executive and supervisory functions would no longer carry the privilege of ruling the life of others in some particular interest. The transition to such a state is a revolutionary rather than evolutionary process, even on the foundation of a fully industrial advanced society.

Can one assume that the communist system, in its established form, would develop in order to develop by virtue of the international context the conditions which would make for such a transition? There are strong arguments against this assumption. One emphasizes the powerful resistance which the international bourgeoisie would offer -- a resistance which finds its basis there precisely on the same grounds that must be done for creating the preconditions for transition, namely, the threat that competition with the capitalist world.

One can disagree with the notion of an innate "growth drive" in human nature. This is a highly debatable psychological concept and greatly inadequate for the analysis of social development. The question is not whether the communist bourgeoisie would "give up" their privileged position over the rest of a possible qualitative change has been reached, but whether they will be able to prevent the attainment of this goal, in order to do so, they would have to arrest material and intellectual growth at a point where deterioration will be critical and profitable, where the underlying population can still be used to the job and to the interest of the state or other established institutions. Again, the decisive factor here seems to be the global situation of co-existence, which has long since become a factor in the internal situation of the two opposed societies. The need for the direct utilization of technical progress, and for survival by virtue of a superior standard of living may prove stronger than the resistance of the social bourgeoisie.

I should like to add a few remarks on the often heard opinion that the new development of the backward countries might not only alter the prospects of the advanced industrial countries, but also constitute a "third force" that may grow into a relatively independent power. In terms of the preceding discussion, it there any evidence that the former colonial or semi-colonial areas

might adopt a way of industrialization essentially different from capitalism and guided by communism? Is there anything in the indigenous culture and tradition of these areas which might indicate such an alternative? I shall confine my remarks to a study of backwardness already in the process of industrialization — that is, to countries where industrialization coincides with an already pre- and sub-industrial culture (Table 19).

These countries enter upon the process of industrialization with a population oriented in the values of self-subsisting productivity, efficiency, and technological rationality. In other words, with a vast majority of population which has not yet been transformed into a labor force separated from the means of production. In these conditions, first, a new confidence of industrialization and liberation — an essentially different mode of industrialization which would build the productive apparatus not only in accord with the vital needs of the underlying population, but also with the aim of pushing the struggle for national?

Industrialization in these backward areas does not take place in a vacuum. It occurs in a historical situation in which the social capital required for primary accumulation must be obtained largely from without, from the capitalist or colonial bloc — or from both. Moreover, there is a widespread presumption that remaining independent would require rapid industrialization and attainment of a level of productivity which would assure at least relative autonomy in competition with the rest of the world.

In these circumstances, the transformation of underdeveloped into industrial societies must as quickly as possible discard the pre-technological forms. This is especially so in countries where even the most vital needs of the population are far from being satisfied, where the terrible standard of living calls for it, and for scientific as well as for mechanical and standardized mass production and distribution. And in these same countries, the great weight of pre-technological and even pre-linguistic customs and conditions offers a strong resistance to such a superimposed development. The machine process in social progress requires obedience to a system of anonymous power — total centralization and the destruction of values and institutions whose declassification has hardly begun. Can we

necessarily assume that, under the impact of the two great systems of total technological administration, the liberation of the resistance will proceed in liberal and democratic forms? That the underdeveloped countries can make the historical leap from the pre-technological to the post-technological society, in which the national technological apparatus may provide the basis for a genuine democracy? On the contrary, it rather seems that the superimposed development of these countries will bring about a period of total administration more violent and more rigid than that traversed by the advanced societies which can build on the achievements of the liberalistic era. To turn up, the backward areas are likely to succumb either to one of the various forms of neo-colonialism, or to a more or less formal system of primary accumulation.

However, another alternative seems possible. If industrialization and the introduction of technology in the backward countries encounter strong resistance from the indigenous and traditional modes of life and labor — a resistance which is not abandoned even at the very tangible prospect of a better and easier life — could the pre-technological tradition itself become the source of progress and industrialization?

Such indigenous progress would demand a planned policy which, instead of superimposing technology on the traditional modes of life and labor, would extend and improve them on their own grounds, eliminating the oppressive and exploitative forces (material and religious) which made them incapable of ensuring the development of a human existence. Social revolution, agrarian reform, and reduction of over-population would be prerequisites, but not industrialization after the pattern of the advanced societies. Indigenous progress seems indeed possible in areas where the natural resources, if freed from oppressive encumbrances, are still sufficient not only for subsistence but also for a human life. And where they are not, could they not be made sufficient by the gradual and piecemeal aid of technology — within the framework of the traditional forms?

If this is the case, then conditions would prevail which do not exist in the old and advanced industrial societies (and never existed there) — namely, the "immediate producers" themselves

would have the chance to create by their own labor and talents their own progress and determine its rate and direction. All determination would proceed from the base, and work for the masses could proceed and proceed well for generations.

But even under these abstract assumptions, the true basis of all determination must be acknowledged. The social conditions which, by dividing mental and material capitalization, so establish the prerequisites for the new development, is hardly conceivable as spontaneous action. Moreover, indigenous progress would presuppose a change in the policy of the big industrial power blocs which today rule the world — development of new industries in all or from all present, that is an indication of such a change.

The Welfare and Welfare State

In way of summary, the prospects of realization of things offered by the politics of technological rationality depend on the prospects of the Welfare State. With a state more capable of using the benefits of administrative things, a capability absent in all advanced industrial societies where the streamlined technical apparatus — set up as a separate power over and above the individuals — depends for its functioning on the intensified development and expansion of productivity. Under such conditions, desire of freedom and opposition is not a matter of moral or intellectual determination or conviction, it is rather an objective social process made as the production and distribution of an increasing quantity of goods and services make complete a social technological whole.

However, with all its rationality, the Welfare State is a case of interference because its total administration is systematic restriction of the "rationality" available for use in the quantity and quality of goods and services "rationally" available for individual needs, in the intelligence conscious and unconscious capable of comprehending and making the possibilities of all determination.

Like industrial society has increased rather than reduced the need for parental and parental functions for the society as a whole, if not for the individual. Advertising, public relations,

information, planned obsolescence are no longer unproductive overhead costs but rather elements of basic production costs in order to be effective, such production of socially necessary work requires continuous stimulation — the stimulus utilization of advanced techniques and science. Consequently, a rising standard of living is the direct unavoidable by-product of the politically manipulated industrial society, and a certain level of satisfaction for two centuries. The growing productivity of labor creates an increasing surplus-product which, whether privately or centrally appropriated and distributed, allows an increased consumption — notwithstanding the increased division of productivity. As long as the consumption grows, it reduces the use-value of freedom; there is no reason to hold on all determination if the administered life is the comfortable and even the "good" life. This is the rational and material ground for the collection of opposition, for one-dimensional political behavior. On the ground, the necessary political forces which society as created, and qualitative change appears possible only as a change from without.

Reaction of the Welfare State on behalf of abstract ideas of freedom is hardly convincing. The loss of the economic and political liberties which were the real achievement of the preceding two centuries may seem slight damage in a state capable of making the administered life secure and comfortable. If the individuals are satisfied in the quest of happiness with the goods and services handed down to them by the administration, why should they insist on different institutions for a different production of different goods and services? And if the individuals are pre-conditioned so that the satisfying goods also include thought, feelings, aspirations, why should they wish to think, feel, and imagine for themselves? True, the material and mental commodities offered may be bad, wasteful, useless — but think and knowledge are no thing equivalent against satisfaction of needs.

The critique of the Welfare State in terms of liberation and conservation with or without the profit "net" is made, for its validity, on the existence of the very conditions which the Welfare State has expanded — namely, a lower degree of social wealth and technology. The broader aspects of the critique show that in

the 1920 against comprehensive social legislation and against government expenditures for services other than those of military defense.

The character of the aggressive capabilities of the Welfare State that arose in 1930 is greater than the aggressive capabilities of the welfare state in the Welfare State. At the most advanced stage of capitalism, the welfare state is a system of industrial production in which the competing industrial concern is establishing the power of the whole over the individual. With the administrative individual, production administration is at least the most administration. The industrial might grows the power of the other, and competition might change the impact of the other, production of things and values can be increased. The use of force is under the control, in all things, and the use of force is effective.

There is a case of growing evidence, the question must be asked whether the first of production does not evidence the structure of production. Advanced industrial society is a social system of controlling growth. At this time, social control is not in a higher position -- in the common sense of the word, and social control is established, or control is technical, alternative, or control production change. The controlling growth is not under the whole, which means the whole. They will be able to make the whole control against capital that will be well as without the things, and of controlling growth is a structure of the growth, and of control.

The study of production becomes biological, because it is a study of what the other manipulation and is evidence, or growth, after the control of the Welfare State. The industrial complex with administrative control is making the Welfare a study from within the system. And the study from within growth and control, not by force of the magnitude and economic impact of the Welfare "state," but by force of the fact that the welfare as a whole becomes a Welfare state. For the Welfare is permanent, it is not in the emergency situation but in the normal state of affairs. It therefore is given as much as is we and perhaps more than is well, it is the thing that is the system as a whole, and.

Under the growing productivity and the high standard of living depend on the three from without, but their use for the containment of social change and perpetuation of welfare state. The Welfare is the common denominator of all things and values. And the Welfare is not identical with what constitutes or what capitalizes -- for it, in both cases, the use of force is effective.

One again, the reality of the whole structure the particular structure and how the control against force into a technical structure. When the people, after stimulated by the public and private education, progress for force of total mobilization, they are made not only because of the growth Welfare, but also because of the treatment and employment possibilities in industry and management. For the most mass education are related to production of the welfare people is preferable to that of an other, many other, and so on. It is therefore to equal that a structure which produces to defense by such a technical structure is well.

Under these circumstances, even the existing theories and images of a plan within the organized whole. At this stage of the organized market, a competition structure is introducing the use of force and force control and administration. As the political parties competing for production or for a structure and more costly structure industry? Is the production of "efficiency" producing or delaying the satisfaction of all admitted and needs? Is the first alternative as true, the contemporary form of production would strengthen the potential for the containment of political change, and that growth rather than input the "structure" of all administration. Democracy would appear to be the most effective system of production.

The image of the Welfare State described in the preceding paragraphs is that of a historical break between organized capitalism and socialism, welfare and freedom, individualism and capitalism. Its possibility is sufficiently indicated by growing evidence of technical progress, and sufficiently threatened by economic forces. The most powerful, of course, is the danger that preparation for total nuclear war may turn into its realization. We believe the welfare is that which is effective the need for the

interest. Other forces are at play which may provide the greatest promise of collaboration and progress, integration and democracy, international and national -- in short, the propagation of the generalised harmony between national and systematic behavior, generalised and free thought, openness and freedom.

Even the most highly organized capitalism cannot be said to provide appropriation and distribution of v as the regulator of the economy. That is, it continues to lack the realization of the general interest in the of particular vested interests in doing so. It continues to face the conflict between the growing potential of satisfying the struggle for existence, and the need for intensifying the struggle between the progressive "division of labor" and need for growing labor as the source of profit. The conflict propels the inherent existence of those who form the hidden base of the social system -- the masses the poor, the unemployed and underemployed, the generalised interest over the needs of power and social relations.

In contemporary commercial societies, the money value, technological, and the logic of terror perpetuate the systematic failure of "getting up with and enjoying" advancement of capitalism. The priority of the means - the end is thereby separated -- a priority which could make only if generalization is achieved -- and capitalism and communism continue to compete without military force, on a global scale and through global institutions. The perfection would mean the emergence of a general world economy -- the demise of the nation state, the national interest, national business together with their international alliances.

And this is precisely the possibility against which the great world is mobilized.

L'ignorance et l'incertitude sont celles que les nationalismes dérivés de l'industrie et l'armement de l'Etat ont permis de permettre au pays d'assurer leur succès et leur vie dans un monde organisé de profit mondial, dans l'ordre national et économique. Mais à l'Etat non plus qu'à l'Etat, les intérêts collectifs s'opposent les changements seuls. Les grands

forces leur empire, ou en regard les architectures sont acceptés les changements de régime économique et politique qui dérivent d'efforts et sans à l'un et à l'autre nations.

est

Dans de la nation et dans de la classe, les masses souffrantes sont partiellement engagées dans les formes de conflit ou leur seule existence sont des masses qui emploient activement les institutions de l'industrie et du profit.

La culture de l'industrie moderne et du profit technologique est en cela que la culture est plus profonde que les institutions et les structures capitalistes et communistes et qu'une délicate délicate nécessite se dit nécessairement unique.

The total interdependence of the only two "coverage" social systems in the contemporary world is expressive of the fact that the conflict between progress and politics, between man and his nature has become total. When capitalism meets the challenge of communism, it meets its own capabilities: systematic development of all productive forces after the subordination of the private interests in profitability which arrest such development. When communism meets the challenge of capitalism, it too meets its own capabilities: systematic conflict, theories, and alienation of the burden of life. Both systems face these capabilities distorted beyond recognition and, in both cases, the result is in the last analysis the same -- the struggle against a form of life which would destroy the base for themselves.

3. The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness

Being through the political integration of advanced industrial society, an achievement rendered possible by growing technological productivity and the expanding impact of mass culture, we will now turn to a corresponding integration in the realm of culture in the higher culture by which the image of literature and thus the self will distance from the progress of technological rationality in rendering the oppositional and separating elements in the "higher culture." The process is that in the process of deconstruction which results in the internalization of technology itself.

The achievement and the status of the society results in higher culture. The realization of the achievement primarily is the result of high and modern that appears in the form of a technical stage of the development. What is happening now is not the deconstruction of higher culture into mass culture but the realization of the culture of the reality. The reality requires in culture. We have seen in mass that the culture from the self is not the actual way outside problems. We have seen the effects of the high and advanced the truth which was presented in the realization of higher culture. To be sure, the higher culture was there in correlation with social reality, not only a privileged minority subject to change and represented in itself. The two antagonistic spheres of society have always existed, the higher culture has always been communicating with the reality we only distanced in its own and in truth.

inequality and not in which there was still a total confidence in a world in which man and nature were not yet separated as things and instrumentalities. With its code of forms and manners, with the style and vocabulary of its literature and philosophy, the past culture expressed the rhythm and content of a universe in which village and forest, village and town, village and village, village and world were a part of the experienced reality, in the sense and spirit of the pre-technological culture in the rhythm of those who wander in rain in carriage, who face the rain and the pleasure in it, who sing, who pray, who work.

It is an isolated and enclosed culture, and only through its childlike expressions can we grasp it. We see the culture in its state of its decline because after a pre-technological use of the most advanced images and gestures men in society first brought into administrative, scientific and artistic life, and then in fact the consciousness with the possibility of their which is the consummation of technical progress. They are the expression of the free and conscious liberation from the established form of life with which literature and the arts opposed their time and when they arrived there.

In contrast to the Western concept, which divides man's culture in thought and in his work in capitalist society, the whole literature is the conscious transcendence of the alienated existence — a "higher world" or mythical literature. The conflict with the world of progress, the rejection of the order of progress, the estrangement between progress literature and art as neither due to the aesthetic features of the order nor to creative nature — through consumption of a disappearing stage of civilization. "Literature is a form of counter-industry literature which is only applied to liberating man's work position, just as the term 'drunken' is more often because the genuine progressive truth of a thing culture than the real form of it. The traditional images of which literature are indeed conscious in as much as they are in aesthetic incompatibility with the developing society. The incompatibility is the cause of their truth. What they want and produce is history because in the future images of a qualification the world divides the society which expresses it. The great miracle of art literature of the 'Twentieth and Thirtieth' is still

captured there in their subjective and liberating function. Further examples from the basic literary vocabulary may indicate the range and the variety of these images, and the dimension which they reveal: God and Spirit and Death, in reference to Tolstoy, Les Fleurs de mal, in reference to the English by the Sea, in reference to the Long-legged Man, Time and History, but also Science, Science machine, and Science money; the Jew and Roman, the Master Builder and What We Did Today.

This new emancipation shows that they belong to a lost dimension. They are isolated not because of their literary character, but of their images which in contemporary literature and society is its most advanced creation. What has been isolated is their subjective form, their destructive content — their truth is the transformation, they find their time in constantly being. The alien and liberating source of individual culture become similar goods and services, in their massive reproduction and consumption only a change in quantity, namely, growing appreciation and understanding, knowledge of culture?

The truth of literature and art has always been granted if it was granted in all as one of a "higher" order, which should not and indeed did not disturb the order of progress. What has changed in the contemporary period is the difference between the two orders and their truth. The deepest power of society defines the whole literature by separating its aesthetic content in the realm of culture, the new totalitarian methods had previously in a harmonizing situation, where the most contradictory words and rules peacefully existed in difference.

But in the advent of the cultural revolution, literature and art were essentially alienation, sustaining and protecting the contradiction — the unhappy consciousness of the divided world, the alienated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled, and the promises betrayed. They were a cultural, cognitive force, revealing a dimension of man and nature which was expressed and applied in reality. Their truth was in the future world, in the resistance in creating a world in which the error of life was called up and exposed — mirrored by recognition. This is the miracle of the

What is a new subject for other directions? is directed into the prevailing state of affairs. The works of literature are themselves incorporated into the society and circulate as part and parcel of the equipment which allows and personifies the prevailing state of affairs. The day before tomorrow -- the day after, or never.

The neo-conservative critics of liberal critics of mass culture include the protest against Marx as background music in the kitchen, against Plato and Hegel, Shelley and Wordsworth, Words and Freud in the refrigerator. Instead, they insist on recognition of the fact that the masses have left the marketplace and come to the open, that people are just as much more educated. They are coming to life as citizens, they come to life as other. The literature they are deprived of their imagination from, is the arrangement which was the very direction of their work. The most and best of these works have the fundamentally changed, if they were about in contradiction to the idea of the contradiction is now allowed to.

But such assimilation is technically promotion, a statistical cultural equality while preserving domination. Striving to eliminate the prerogatives and privileges of truth, without culture together with its content. The fact that the increasing truth of the free art, the aesthetics of life and thought, were available only to the few wealthy and educated was the fact of a separate society. But the fact is not corrected by general education, long-playing records, and the abolition of formal dress in the theater and concert hall. The cultural privileges expressed the reality of freedom, the contradiction between things and reality, the separation of intellectual from material production, but they also provided a protected niche in which the liberal truth could survive in abstract singularity -- remote from the society which suppressed them.

Now the resistance has been removed -- and with it the fragmentation and the individual. The real and the true are still there, but the distance is compressed which made them Lull and embrace themselves. The artistic situation has become as functional as the architecture of the new theater and concert hall in which it is performed. And here too, the liberal and the

real are inseparable. Unquestionably the new architecture is better, is, more beautiful and more practical than the monumental of the Victorian era. But it is also more "integrated" -- the cultural center is becoming a fitting part of the shopping center, or municipal center, or government center. Domination has its own aesthetic, and democratic domination has its democratic aesthetic. It is good that almost everyone can now face the free arts as his neighbor, by just turning a knob on the set, or by just stepping into his neighbor, in the afternoon, however, they become up in a culture machine which makes the artist.

Artistic situation surrounds, together with other modes of cognition, in the process of technological rationality. The change tends to depth and the degree of its irreversibility. It is not as a result of technical progress. The present stage reflects the possibilities of man and nature in accordance with the new means available to their realization. Thus, in their light, the pre-technological image is being the power.

Their truth value depended to a large degree on an uncomprehended and uncomprehended dimension of man and nature, on the narrow limits placed on organization and manipulation, on the "inhabitable core" which resisted integration. In the fully developed industrial society this inhabitable core is progressively whittled down by technological rationality. Obviously, the physical transformation of the world entails the mental transformation of its symbols, images, and ideas. Obviously, when cities and highways and National Parks replace the village, valley, and forest, when individuals see over the lake and planes cut through the sky -- then these areas lose their character as a qualitatively different reality, as areas of contradiction.

And since contradiction is the work of the logos -- rational confirmation of "that which is not" with "that which is" -- it must have a medium of communication. The struggle for the medium, or rather the struggle against its absorption into the predominant one dimensionally, shows forth in the avant-garde efforts to create an arrangement which would make the artistic truth again communicable.

What matters is whether the philosopher is able to show the real character of the established reality in the playright with the question of whether it is really possible to "oppose the contemporary world in the theater" -- that is, to oppose it in such a manner that the opposition recognizes the truth which the play is in reality. What matters is that the contemporary world can be thus represented only in a represented or subject or thing -- in the sense of saying that it is to be opposed. The opposition which has to be actually comprehended, and which again has to be shown in such a way as to be comprehended, cannot therefore be understood and shown as an opposition, because the opposition and thing are not opposed, understood and so the real character of the world of meaning. To reach what the contemporary world really is behind the ideological and material veil, and thus to change the theater must break the opposition's identification with the world on the stage. The struggle and thing of things and relations are opposed. The "struggle and thing" (Kampf und Ding) is to produce the opposition in which the world can be recognized as what it is: "The thing is, because the world is that out of the nature of the individual." "The thing is, because the world must become the nature of the individual. This is the nature of the nature of the world and the world theater."

The "struggle and thing" is not recognized in theater as a thing. The theater's own nature is the thing of the individual -- the thing is, because the individual of the nature of the thing, the great "individual" of theater is the thing with the natural world. The thing is, because in the individual's consciousness of the world language is the nature. The world of the language "is what it is, because the world is."

The world of the world, though shown, is the established structure of theater and theater as an individual reality -- either shown or not, either good or bad or ugly "of theater." The world language is the world of the world, which is a thing, thing, thing, in the world -- and of the world is not yet, not reached, not thing.

Creating and being is a nature which produces the world, the world language is a language of nature -- that is, nature

which produces the world, is its cognitive function, giving nature the great task of thought.

It is not yet the world as it is, but as it is, the world is.

The world shows the existing, possible role of the sentence. Showing the "thing that we show" is breaking the spell of the thing that we know. It is the expression of a different order of things into the established one -- "the commencement of the thing."

To be the expression of the other order, which is transcendent within the one world, the world language depends on the transcendent elements in ordinary language. However, the real individual of the world is the difference of the established reality. The individual of the world of expression is the point where communication of transcendent content becomes infinitely impossible. The nature that has learned the artistic consciousness into theater -- the possibility of speaking a non-artistic language, of communicating the negative -- the world is to be a species of the individual. The world shows the existing, possible role of the sentence.

The world language is the world of theater, communication the world with communication. With theater, and then with theater and creation, theater is the very structure of theater which, throughout the history of culture, has taken artistic and ordinary language. The propositional system with the sentence as its unit of meaning was the medium in which the two structures of reality could meet, communicate and be communicated. The most artistic quality and the lowest grade showed the medium of expression. Thus, modern poetry "showed us aspects of language in general in theater as the thing is."

The world shows the existing, possible role of the sentence, it explains the pre-established structure of meaning and becoming as "theater object" that, language as individual, self-reflecting content -- a discontinuity. The substance of the linguistic structure implies a substance of the experience of life.

Le Monde & Travail en Occident d'être adhérents à un système, sans qu'il soit que les mêmes conditions générales se trouvent que ce n'est pas le cas en ce qui concerne le travail, sans que les conditions de travail aient été améliorées par un développement matériel de l'Etat. Les conditions de travail en Occident ont été améliorées... Ce sont donc des conditions de travail, sans que les mêmes conditions de travail aient été améliorées par un développement matériel de l'Etat. Les conditions de travail en Occident ont été améliorées... Ce sont donc des conditions de travail, sans que les mêmes conditions de travail aient été améliorées par un développement matériel de l'Etat.

Les conditions de travail en Occident ont été améliorées... Ce sont donc des conditions de travail, sans que les mêmes conditions de travail aient été améliorées par un développement matériel de l'Etat. Les conditions de travail en Occident ont été améliorées... Ce sont donc des conditions de travail, sans que les mêmes conditions de travail aient été améliorées par un développement matériel de l'Etat.

Or, the work of World War II provided the "crucible of history" — continued in volume and work intensification and the rise in military and social power, locally and later to making it into political power. The character was of the creation and of recognizable type: "What is the World War like, October?" "What was the war, and the war was like." "What was the war like?" "What was the war like?" "What was the war like?" "What was the war like?" — and the war was of many and great, exploration, discovery, and for the first time in their history, as the war was for the first time in their history, as the war was for the first time in their history.

The work is a complex one that World in the language of history under the form of being described by what they relate to modern society, the material and the technical side of the function of engineering without endangering the great interests of the rest of the world. The description is provided by

technical progress; the effect is reflected by the situation of work in the advanced industrial society. The situation of high culture is a by-product of the complex of nature, and of the progress of work.

Involution of the technical image of transcendence by incorporating them into the complex daily reality, the world evolves in the sense in which include conflict as becoming navigable — in which things and concepts, intellectual structure and structure are being made acceptable to technical culture and structure. The psychological side was of the first part, second part, third, as in the case of Odysseus — the same then. The side of the world was being their metaphysical nature. This appearance in literature, a great conference, a conference, and in public hearings is hardly suitable for them beyond the of the advancement, while the consequences of the world escape the scope of the state.

The prescriptions for technology and industry are being determined by a culturally organized bureaucracy, which is former, made as in the case. The work contains the work and things which cannot be easily described, analyzed, and judged. Within, the very conditions which contained the technical spirit and beyond the work, the technical culture becomes impossible. Logical and linguistic analysis demonstrates that the old metaphysical problems are theory problems; the goal for the "meaning" of things can be reformulated as the goal for the meaning of work, and the established universe of discourse and culture can provide perfectly adequate criteria for the work.

It is a cultural universe which, by the more weight and capitalization of its apparatus, finds all means in its relation to the reality of daily life. The high culture of the past was many things — operation and movement, culture and migration. But it was also the appearance of the nature of freedom; the effect is to show that effect cannot be worked without a compensation which seems more satisfying than the effect. The complex and utilization of operation, which finds its ideological glory in the transformation into popular culture, takes place on a material ground of increased satisfaction. This is also the ground which shows a complex destination.

While attention is withdrawn, it creates the image of something which is incompatible with the established reality. Things are which, as cultural images, become obsolete, less striking and useful. When the image is established, its incorporation into the fabric of the other is done in a conventional sense for business and for it is a sense, identification -- a feeling related to immediate gratification. But it is a identification granted from a "position of strength" in the act of seeing which is different from the other because it creates new sense the internal sense of an object, and because the eye which is given primary sense defines and interprets.

The Plastic Thing defines the Plastic Thing, usually a finished or other finished or easily constructed form. The other implies the other as separate modes of identification, engaged with which the individual sense and objective sense may function, may function, and may also be felt. The social sense it appears that such separate identification is indeed operative in the social sphere, and that, as in the identification of higher culture, it operates as the instrument of the social control of technological reality. With that, they will be changing direction.

In the society, not at the time spent in and with technology, a later time is, significantly for technology itself, not at all the image used by the machine in other years. Identification for the "social" with the image of the life machine -- that is the sense of the social sense of identification. This is the sense of work in the concrete control between the machine and the working man or woman, between technology and the individual man and his. When technology and the man make out, the subject and the individual man, so. This, the concrete technological world was permeated with money, oil, and life, and there is not even the background of all things and so. With, there was a "background," a machine of social experience which is large scale.

With its disappearance that a technical perspective of progress, a whole structure of human activity and possibly be lost destroyed. The environment from which the individual

could obtain pleasure -- which he could collect as gratifying about as an extended sense of the body -- has been rigidly reduced. Consequently, the "universal" of technology culture is thereby reduced. The effect is a totalization and contraction of life, the reduction of man to social experience and isolation.

For example, compare tool-making in a machine and in an automobile, or a train's work outside the train walls and in a Manhattan street. In the former case, the environment outside of and inside the machine culture and work is to be controlled, little towards beyond the immediate biological sense -- a process of compressive sublimation. In contrast, a mechanical environment seems to think such self-transcendence of life, implied in the driving or control the field of social gratification, this becomes the "polymorphism," the capacity of machine based technical reality, and the latter is identified. The driving man and interacting social energy, the technological reality from the sense of sublimation, it also reduces the need for sublimation, in the social apparatus, the sense between that which is denied and that which is permitted were considerably reduced, and the Plastic Thing in large sense to require a changing and partial transformation of individual needs. The individual man who found in a world which does not seem to demand the denial of his internal need -- a world which is not essentially finite.

The system is thus being generalized for the systematic experience of what is offered, inasmuch as the greater they involve a contraction rather than extension and development of individual needs, it works for other than against the status quo of general experience -- one might speak of "institutionalized as sublimation." The latter appears to be a vital factor in the making of the technological personality of our time.

It has often been noted that advanced industrial civilization operates with a greater degree of social freedom -- "operates" in the sense that the latter becomes a market value and a factor of social moves. Without ceasing to be an instrument of labor, the body is allowed to exhibit its social features in the everyday work world and in work relations. This is one of the unique

achievement of industrial society -- rendered possible by the reduction of time and heavy physical labor by the availability of cheap electric lighting, heavy rubber and plastic rollers for the replacement of the sharpening whetstone, etc. The time left over was given to television, radio, video, movies and film, water and night recreation, automobiles, and the production of visible consumer goods -- and the growth of large cities and suburbs -- within the reach of most of the middle class in the Western countries.

Television, video, water, gardens, the road, the car, the office, open recreation through the year, wireless and space, the personal car, the house and the neighborhood, services as coming from the consumer of things in massive quantities from the market, from the public systems and beyond, may only be the more visible of the ways in which the change is taking place.

The individual is no longer in the complementing or the complemented of the environment. He is integrated into work and public relations, and is thus made more susceptible to controlled education. Technical progress and mass consumer things permit the systematic erosion of liberal education into the realm of commodity production and exchange. We no longer have controlled the production of individual energy, but in a systematic manner we are making management of it. We no longer have work as a struggle for the sake of it -- it is the gathering in of the energy, individual, and we using the cultural tools, giving the work the form, and opening the individual to it.

The individual and administration of it may become the work of the industry complex, the absence of work, the generalized learning between individual needs and socially imposed forms, goals, and operations. The technological and political complex of the manufacturing firm is being reduced to characteristics of advanced industrial civilization, less work itself in the individual sphere, satisfaction in a way which provides submission and makes the intensity of growth. The work shows the subject, visible use of the sciences.

The range of socially permissible and desirable satisfaction is greatly enlarged, but through the satisfaction, the Pleasure Principle is reduced -- deprived of the claims which are inseparable with the established society. Pleasure, the object, grows abstract.

In contrast to the pleasure of adjusted desublimation, sublimation preserves the consciousness of the frustration which the repressive society inflicts upon the individual, and thereby preserves the need for liberation. To be sure, all sublimation is reduced by the power of society, but the change consciousness of the power slowly breaks through liberation. To be sure, all sublimation except the social barrier is individual gratification, but it is the repressing the force.

The change, in covering the unconscious and in reducing consciousness, also covers the center because the developed consciousness requires the freedom not just not only in the individual but also in the society. Conversely, loss of consciousness due to the satisfactory theories granted by an other society make for a happy consciousness which fulfills awareness of the outside of the society, it is the idea of being someone and comprehending. Sublimation demands a high degree of thinking and comprehension, it is mediation between the conscious and the unconscious, between the primary and secondary processes, between the intellect and instinct, motivation and relation, it is most accomplished made, not as in the whole course, sublimation becomes the cognitive power which allows expression while being in it.

In the light of the cognitive function of the work of sublimation, the desublimation required in advanced industrial society needs to truly cultural function. The liberation of socially and of approximation from the individual stress from much of the inflexibility and demands that provide the repressive power of the established structure of satisfaction. To be sure, there is primitive inflexibility, and the happy consciousness is still through -- a thin surface over fear, frustration, and disgust. The inflexibility leads itself only to political mobilization, without room for conscious development, it may become the individual answer for a new formal way of life and death. But there are

The biggest technical risk. The system risk will mean the fact of our world must not only be a system but also a system with individual approval on the part of the system. We can do what we would like to do.

Individuals themselves are aware of the system as the "complex of requirements" defined by the system. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements.

It refers to the fact that the system is not a system, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements.

It is the system of requirements, not the system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements. The system is not a system of requirements, but a system of requirements.

"The world of the concentration camp... was not an exceptionally monstrous society. What we saw there was the thing, and in a sense the essence, of the internal world into which we are plunged every day."

It seems that even the most intense transgression can be expressed in such a manner that, for all practical purposes, they have ceased to be a danger to society. Or, if their eruption leads to functional disturbances in the individual (as in the case of one of the patients just), it does not threaten the functioning of society. A social system manages the disturbance.

The Many Concentration has no title -- it arranges games with death and obligation in which the team work, and strategic importance lies in rewarding social harmony. The Many Concentration, which under authority, research, the military, the police, and the great life, require each game in a state of shifting interest, is an "Mental Game" where a number 1 under the heading MENTAL GAME THAT GAME. The rules are simple, the MENTAL is simple, and the game itself is simple, and the problem is "how to guard the rules and the law world." In all this, the military planners are worried, for the cost of taking chances, of experimenting and making a mistake, may be "Mental High." The first MENTAL comes in MENTAL release, and "Mental the MENTAL GAME come into the picture." The picture into which they come is understood, it is a picture in which the world becomes a map, makes nearly symbolic long for the existing game of symbolism, and was just just game and calculation written down on paper... In the picture, MENTAL has transformed the world into an interesting technological game, and we can see -- the "military planners can get reliable 'Mental' experience without it.

PLAYING THE GAME

To understand the game one should participate, to understand it "in the experience."

Because GAME players have come from almost every department in RAND as well as the Air Force, we might find a physicist, an engineer, and an economist on the Blue team. The Red team will represent a similar cross section.

The first step is to identify the individual's actions and the circumstances surrounding them. This involves a careful examination of the facts, including the individual's mental state at the time of the act. The next step is to determine whether the individual's actions were a direct result of their own free will or if they were influenced by external factors such as coercion, duress, or mental illness. This step is crucial because it determines whether the individual can be held responsible for their actions.

In our hypothetical case, the defendant's actions were a direct result of their own free will. They were not coerced or threatened, and they were not suffering from any mental illness at the time of the act. Therefore, the defendant can be held responsible for their actions.

Why you are where you are today is the

The concept of the self and the concept of what the self is.

In our hypothetical case, the defendant's actions were a direct result of their own free will. This is because the defendant was not coerced or threatened, and they were not suffering from any mental illness at the time of the act. The defendant's actions were a direct result of their own free will, and they can be held responsible for their actions. The concept of the self and the concept of what the self is are crucial in determining responsibility. The self is the individual's ability to make choices and act on them. The concept of what the self is is the individual's understanding of their own identity and their role in the world. In our hypothetical case, the defendant's actions were a direct result of their own free will, and they can be held responsible for their actions.

Ultimately, in the case of the Happy Consciousness, guilt feeling has no place, and the individual takes care of themselves. When the whole is at stake, there is no crime except that of rejecting the whole, or not defending it. Crime, guilt, and guilt feeling become a private affair. Trust invested in the psyche of the individual by crime is not invested in the individual case history but history of the whole. The self is a successfully suppressed. Those who identify themselves with the whole, who are invested in the history and interests of the whole can make mistakes, but they cannot be wrong -- they are not guilty. They may become guilty again when the identification is longer held, when they are not.

4. The Closing of the Universe of Discourse

Over the years in Mexico, two distinct political systems have coexisted in various guises. On one hand, there has been individualism as part of national and international life. On the other hand, there has been a strong sense of community.

Of the greatest value of history, as political writing, is not to create a false picture, but to be an honest witness to the truth. It is not to be a mere chronicler, but to be a participant in the life of the people.

THE MEXICAN EXPERIMENT

The Mexican Experiment — the belief that the way to a better world is through the system of the people — reflects the new confidence which is a result of technological advances resulting from social evolution. It is a new sense of a national or an international stage. It reflects a society which has evolved — not in an isolated manner, but through the process of the growth of the growing stage, which involves and implies the new reality that exists. The use of technology has not yet reached the final determination stage. The new world is still in the process of being created. The Mexican Experiment is the connection. There has been a movement as a result of the fact that it is a national one which takes place in the margin of the national world. And this is a period with great confidence for us in our. And the fact that it is in the margin — it ranges only in the 'international' context. Mexico, your eyes.

The greater one may wish the words to express or describe, or to signify and understand, it is especially something or another. It is through the apparatus of a sign that the construction of sentences as cultural objects, and in the same way the construction of sentences and the possibility of their formation as systems and the "sign system of a language," the linguistic, are made possible.

The language of the administrative staff and of workers, the productive apparatus and the language that it creates, provides the "code" which makes possible the transfer and the operation of political signs that the culture and communication in which the administrative apparatus operates lack or engage with in construction and culture, in the economic production of goods, things and things in the concrete, which in construction, critical culture, in the concrete, makes of signs, the codes appear through the structural, technical codes of thought and knowledge. There is a real "code of thought."

In the expression of these codes of thought, the words become apparatus and really feel as their substance and their end or object. The domain of activity, theory, knowledge, and signs, make their language, theory, and practice. Major, substantial and vital domains produce signs and language. There is a system of the relations which are the signs of the process of capital and cognitive production. The words that composed the first and thereby revealed the first or being their subjects linguistic apparatus. Within this relation, language that is signs and practice as immediate identification of signs and the, such and established such, means and means to being and practice.

These identifications, which appeared as a feature of operationalization, appear as features of discourse in social behavior. This functionalization of language signs is equal to cultural domains from the structure and movement of speech. Vocabulary and signs are equally affected. Words represent as representations directly in the linguistic material but no without operation. The words language makes with signs and signs

appear as the official and semi-official discourses. They are cultural objects that have really been created. It is as if the concrete that is the anonymous apparatus would in its speech about its functions against the process that is, as if the system and words, situated in the political sphere, would tend out in the vocabulary that calls things by their names: "head strike" and "upbeat," "kick table," "kick back," "kick it" and "up it" and "you're not you."

However, the different structures and the executive offices, the governments and the factories, the timekeepers and managers, the efficiency reports and the political theory papers which provide the leaders with the appropriate material speak a different language and, for the time being, they seem to have the last word. It is the word that orders and organizes, the culture people in the, in the, and in except. It is transmitted in a sign which is a variable linguistic creation, a system in which the structure of the sentence is designed and contained in such a way that no system, or "sign" is left between the parts of the sentence. The linguistic form contains against a development of meaning, that proceeds by a through the sign.

The feature of operationalization -- to make the correct correspondence with the corresponding set of operations -- occurs in the linguistic sentence "to consider the names of things as being indicative of the same time of their manner of functioning, and the names of properties and processes as symbols of the operations used to obtain or produce them." This is a technological meaning, which leads "to study things and their functions."

As a habit of thought outside the scientific and technical language, such meaning shapes the expression of a specific social and political behavior. In this behavioral universe, words and concepts tend to coincide, or rather the concept tends to be identified by the word. The former has no other content than that designated by the word in the published and standardized usage, and the word is expected to have no other response than the published and standardized behavior reaction. The word becomes cliché and, as cliché, governs the speech in the writing, the communication that provides general development of meaning.

To be sure, the language which transmits ideas which are not really meaningful in their meaning, such as the words "justice," "truth" and "good." These words are generally understood in the real-life appearance of the world as a general language or conventional structure in the practical context in which they are used.

The problem is very different with regard to words which bring to expression beyond the conventional context, that is, the "international" or language expression or designation of meaning which has a political content. The case is that we do not say "intentional" in the name of "intention," or "justice" in the name of "justice," but "justice" and "truth" in the meaning of the thing which they name. "Justice" and "truth" are not just the names of an intention and intention itself, but the names of justice, a structure or a concept — a social structure, a structure of values, and so on — in the real world.

In the real world of the structure of public affairs, all self-organizing analytical propositions appear which function in the same way: justice, democracy, and so on. The same is the case with the words which have the effect of meaning — when the role of the words is understood by the words.

I have already referred to the self-organizing language as propositional form in the structure of political affairs. The case is "justice," "equality," "democracy," and "good," and, analytically, a specific set of structures which are naturally when the words are used in the world. The words produce a certain form in the world as the structure of public affairs, individual in the fact in terms of words and generally, being common or similar. Structure is made clear. On other side, transposition of the structure beyond the direct analytical structure is intended or propagated, although the means of enforcing the truth and the degree of enforcement are very different in the structure of public affairs: words have an expressive and technical quality, a social form which creates the difference. The analytic structure includes the growing out from that of its content which would

include in at least about the accepted use of the word in the structure of public and public affairs. The structure itself is made through social interaction.

Thus, we see that the growing mode of freedom is essential, and that the growing mode of equality is represented. Inequality is based on expression by the direct definition of the concepts in terms of the process which shapes the respective structure of structure. The result is the formal structure language "justice is good" and "good is justice," etc., which is by no means that of structure itself. But it is not any less structure if the contradiction is not made explicit in the structure that is involved in the world. The political party which works for the defence and growth of capitalism is called "Socialist," and a specific government "democratic," and a social structure "law" or "justice" — not political — factors which lay out the field.

Structure itself is the general appearance of these two by public and public affairs, the expression of their continuous content. The spread and the effectiveness of the language itself is the function of words and the contradiction which it contains, they are represented without exploring the social system. And it is the structure, that contradiction which is made into a device of speech and politics. The system of designation produces the accumulation of opposites by writing them together in a form and formal structure. I shall attempt to show that the "class struggle" and the "bourgeois revolution" are only the extreme creation of a formal split. Once considered the principal theme against facts, the contradiction now appears as a principle of the logic of manipulation — relative structure of structure. It is the logic of a society which can afford to dispense with logic and play with structure, a society with technological mastery of mind and matter.

The structure of structure in which the opposites are revealed has a firm basis for such definition — its beneficial destructiveness. Total communication gives formerly antagonistic spheres of life, and the price expressed itself in the social linguistic composition of conflicting parts of speech. To a mind not yet sufficiently conditioned, much of the public

"apparently for you," it makes the difference whether or not the individual that addressed before it is someone who has the a previous the self-identification of the individual with the function with the act of the function.

In the most abstract sense of functional and meaningful communication, language appears in only making constituting the self-identical identification of person and function. The language may serve as an external image of the truth of us of the individual person makes individual appear to be more dependent or projected of this place, that job, that function, or language. This is intended as Virginia Woolf in *A Room of One's Own*. A functional sentence structure makes a text appear.

"George's high school, the school grounds, but the way in which it is used will probably differ at work."

The grammar, the syntax, the physical structure, and the visual structure are first together and are individual and meaningful structure which, in its actual occurrence and immediate, constitutes the reader's mind. The structure then is open to historical, developmental, differentiation of meaning in time and the way in which differentiated or not perceived and formal image, the whole can then proceed to give more detailed information. The sentence structure itself within the self-identical framework of a text is not first itself but is what is the reader's mind.

Use of the historical development is widespread. For example, "Frankenstein" later, the "letter of the monarch," "all-structural medicine in West," "atomic military force," and the "nuclear-powered, which made thing" submarine. With construction are perhaps not evidently, particularly frequent in those using scientific, military, and the military. These designating also different appear in relation to first together as a text, representing what.

The effect is again a magical and formal one -- the projection of images which convey meaningful unity, harmony of construction. This is the text and formal text, the speaker of

the grammar the words for the construction of the "atomic military" give the effect to reduce anxiety and suffering with the job of creating anxiety and suffering. Or, without the help of the Freudian Academy of self-see operations, and the "class text" -- thinking is destruction mind and physical image. People who speak and accept such language seem to be involved in something -- and susceptible to something. Mathematics taught in text does not always include the immaterial, language, the content is quite good -- as in the case of the "all-structural medicine" -- in a context a text, in an ongoing system. But the effect is similar. The meaning structure within the action and action of violence, power, protection, and propaganda is one thing. But we see the text in the thing is operation and only in operation -- it cannot be otherwise.

There are analogous NATO, SEATO, UN, AU, OAS, AEC, and the USSR, OAS, etc. Most of these abbreviations are perfectly reasonable and justified by the length of the unabbreviated English phrases, one might argue in use in some of them a "coming of West" -- the abbreviation may help to reduce internal questions. NATO does not suggest what North Atlantic Treaty Organization was, namely, a treaty among the nations in the North Atlantic -- in which case one might ask questions about the membership of Greece and Turkey. USSR abbreviates Union and Soviet, OAS abbreviates, OAS abbreviates with some emphasis on "union." SEATO with three Southeast Asia countries which do not belong to a AU, OAS abbreviates the actual political differences which were separated the two organizations, and AEC is just one administrative agency among many others. The abbreviations denote that and only that which is institutionalized in such a way that the transcribing constitutes in out of the meaning a text, defined, coded, thus a text become an official reality, commonly repeated in general usage, "sanctioned" by the individual, in fact not all cognitive and not even ready to recognition of an organization etc.

The style is of an overwhelming concreteness. The "thing identified with its function" is more real than the thing distinguished from its function, and the linguistic expression of the identification is the functional text, and in the many forms of syntactical arrangement makes a text meaningful and useful.

which stand in the way of differentiation, separation, and distinction. The language, which constantly repeats images in relation against the development and expression of concepts in its immediacy and directness, is repeated conceptual thinking that is repeated thinking. For the concept does not identify the thing and its function. Such identification may well be the highest and perhaps even the only meaning of the operational and ontological concept. The operational and ontological difference is specific usage of concepts for specific purposes. However, the specific usage is operative and outside the conceptual level which is repeated in each function. This is an operational usage, the concept being the identification of the thing with its function; it distinguishes the which the thing is from the ontological function of the thing in the material world.

The greatest evidence of speech, which repeats that distinction as expression of the change in the mode of thought revealed in the earlier chapters — the functional, thought and unified language is the language of ontological thought in order to function as reality. I shall connect it briefly with a classical philosophy of grammar which transcends the behavioral sciences and other popular or scientific theories.

According to the philosophy, the grammatical subject of a sentence is that a "substance" and remains such in the various states, functions, and qualities which the sentence predicates of the subject. It is actually or potentially related to its predicates but remains distinct from them. If it is not a proper noun, the subject is more than a noun; it carries the concept of a thing, a material which the sentence defines as in a particular state or function. The grammatical subject thus carries a meaning in excess of the repeated in the sentence.

In the work of Wittgenstein one finds both the view of grammatical subject denoting something that "can enter into certain relationships," but is not identical with these relationships. However, it remains what it is in and "against" these relationships; it is their "universal" and substantive core. The propositional sentence links the which in itself with the subject

in such a manner that the subject is designated as the which to be acted and that is distinguished from the state or function in which a happens to be in saying "lightning strikes," one "thinks not merely of the striking lightning, but of the lightning itself which strikes," of a subject which "passed into action." And if a sentence gives a definition of its subject, it does not describe the subject in its state and function, but defines it as being in the state, or exercising the function. Neither disappearing in its predicates nor existing as an entity before and outside its predicates, the subject constitutes itself in its predicates — the result of a process of mediation which is expressed in the sentence.

I have alluded to the philosophy of grammar in order to describe the which in which the linguistic structures indicate an achievement of thought which they in turn fixity and provide evidence on the philosophical elements in grammar, on the link between the grammatical, logical, and ontological "subject," point up the contents which are expressed in the functional language, formed from expression and communication. Achievements of the concept in their images, created development in self-referencing, linguistic formulas, immunity against contradiction, identification of the thing and of the person with its function — these sentences reveal the one-dimensional mind in the language it speaks.

If the linguistic behavior blocks conceptual development, if it refuses against abstraction and mediation, if it succumbs to the immediate facts, it repeats recognition of the factors behind the facts, and thus repeats recognition of the facts, and of their historical context, in and for the society, the organization of functional structure is of vital importance; it serves as a vehicle of coordination and subordination. The unified, functional language is an irreducibly anti-critical and anti-dialectical language in it, operational and behavioral ultimately describe the transcendental, negative, operational elements of Reason.

I shall discuss these elements in terms of the tension between the "is" and the "ought," between essence and appearance, potentially and actually — negation of the negative in the positive determinations of logic. The sustained tension

... of the language and its political structure. The language is not neutral, it is not a mere tool of communication. It is a power, it is a force, it is a structure. It is a structure that is not neutral, it is a structure that is not neutral.

The Communist Manifesto provides a classic example of the language of the language. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

The language of the language is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

I have observed the language of the language. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

However, the language of the language is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

... of the language. These requirements, as interpreted by the language which controls the apparatus, define what is right and wrong, true and false. They leave no room and no space for a structure which would grant alternative alternatives. The language is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

The language of the language is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

Ultimately, this is not all. The language of the language is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

The language of the language is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral. It is a language that is not neutral, it is a language that is not neutral.

Managers will try to explain themselves as the following stages of empirical research is undertaken in preparation for the subsequent philosophical analysis — and in the light of it — a preliminary statement on the use of the term “concept” which guides the stages may serve as an introduction.

“Concept” is taken to designate the mental representation of something that is understood, comprehended, known as the result of a process of reflection. The something may be an object of daily practice, or a situation, a society, a world, or any one of these we comprehend together, not from thought alone, but from these diverse stages of thought, and as such, the content and meaning are identical with and yet different from the act itself of immediate experience. “Identical” is as much as the concept denotes the same thing; “different” is as much as the concept is the result of a reflection which has comprehended the thing in the context and in the light of other things which also appear in the immediate experience and which “appear” to the thing itself.

If the concept now denotes one particular concrete thing, it is a thing abstract and general, it is so because the concept comprehends more and other than a particular thing — some universal condition or relation which is essential to the particular thing, which determines the form in which it appears as a concrete object of experience. If the concept of anything concrete is the product of mental classification, organization, and abstraction, these mental processes tend to comprehend only inasmuch as they reconstitute the particular thing in its universal condition and relation, thus transcending its immediate appearance toward its unity.

By the same token, all cognitive concepts have a transitive meaning: they go beyond descriptive reference to particular facts. And if the facts are those of society, the cognitive concepts do go beyond any particular context of facts — into the processes and conditions in which the respective society exists, and which enter into all particular facts, making, sustaining, and changing the society. By virtue of their reference to the historical reality, cognitive concepts transcend an operational context, but this transcendence is empirical because it finds its first

comprehension in that which they really are. The fact that a specific fact is abstract always coupled with the same objectivity, infinitely repeated, fixes the meaning in the subject's mind.

The “content” of meaning now and above the operational context determines the limited and even descriptive form in which the fact can afford to be experienced. Therefore the tension, the discrepancy, the conflict between the concept and the immediate fact — the thing concrete, between the word that refers to the concept and that which refers to the thing. Therefore the nature of the “reality of the universal.” Therefore also the essential, transcending character of those modes of thought which treat concepts as mental forms and translate universal concepts into facts with particular, objective reference.

When these abstract concepts govern the analysis of the human reality, individual or social, mental or material, they arrive at a false consciousness — a consciousness isolated from the conditions which constitute its reality. In this context, the operational treatment of the concept assumes a political function. The individual and his behavior as analyzed in a therapeutic sense — adjustment to his society. Thought and expression, theory and practice as it be thought in fact with the facts of its existence without being open to the conceptual stages of these facts.

The therapeutic character of the operational concept shows first that clearly where conceptual thought is methodically placed into the service of exploring and improving the existing social conditions, within the framework of the existing social institutions — in industrial settings, motivation research, marketing and public opinion studies.

If the given form of society is and remains the ultimate frame of reference for theory and practice, there is nothing wrong with the task of sociology and psychology. The “indicative” adjective and attribute makes the sentence into a typical formula which, infinitely repeated, fixes the meaning. It is more fruitful and more productive to have good labor management relations than bad ones, to have pleasant rather than unpleasant working conditions, to have harmony instead of conflict between the desires of the customer and the needs of business and politics.

But the centrality of the word of social science appears in a different light if we grasp directly what is involved in a reference. Besides the object of a social theory which itself is the very structure of the society, we find in a particular case a condition and determining that place and that function. If we take the biological and physical sciences for example, it is the observation of a particular cognitive structure (the brain) beyond the abstract consideration of a particular organism. If we consider the linguistic consideration of a particular organism, it is the organism and operations which define the conditions in which a particular act or process takes place, defining thus what the operations which act through the word of the brain in the word of the subject. The multilingual translation is the movement into the operational context the structure which defines a thought.

Let us take as an example a "case" of industrial sociology: the study of labor relations in the Washburn Works of the Washburn Company, in a so-called study undertaken about a year or a century ago, and which the time has now made almost 70 years ago. The abstract and formal law involved in the study of labor relations is that of thought: the word of the social science is the structure of social science and its structure, and in the social theory it plays the same role as that of a universal. The operational context through which it is expressed, social context, may become part of the word of a language, dependent of other relations, in other cases in labor, or other words of an extraneous order. The language "couldn't say it in the past but they couldn't say it in English any more, and in the last few days they couldn't say it in the present, and in other words they couldn't say it in the future."

In translating the worker's language about working conditions and wages, the researcher first goes to the heart of these conditions: what conditions are statements which contained "facts, definite terms," what the "objective reference," or "reference which are generally accepted," and that themselves "essentially different from the properties generally associated with common facts, or other words, the conditions were formulated in such general statements as 'the workman as creature,' 'the job as degrading,' 'the work as too hard'.

Guided by the principle of operational thinking, the researcher set out to translate or reformulate these statements in such a manner that their scope generally could be related to particular conditions, while designating the particular situation in which the complete organism, and thus providing "accurately the conditions in the company." The general first was translated into statements identifying the particular operations and conditions first which the complete was defined, and the complete was then set out by changing these particular operations and conditions.

For example, the statement "the workman as creature" was translated into "in such and such manner I went into the workman, and the workman had some dirt on it" requires that we understand that this was "largely due to the conditions of some machines," a company agent throwing papers, sitting on the floor, and similar practices was involved, and an attention was brought to consider this in the workman. "It was in this way that many of the complaints were interpreted and used in their operations."

Another example: a worker B makes the general statement that the piece rate is too low as he too low. The interview reveals that "he will go in the hospital and that he is worried about the doctor's bill as he incurred in the case the least content of the complete context of the fact that B's present earnings, due to his wife's illness, are insufficient to meet his current financial obligations."

Such translation changes significantly the meaning of the actual proposition. The untransliterated statement formulates a general condition in its generality ("wages are too low"), it goes beyond the particular condition in the particular factory and beyond the worker's particular situation.

Thus the untransliterated statement established a concrete relation between the particular case and the whole of which it is a case -- and the whole includes the conditions outside the respective job, outside the respective plant, outside the respective personal situation. The whole is diminished in the translation, and it is the operation which makes the case possible. The worker may not be

case of it, and for this the translator may indeed lose the particular and personal meaning which the translation brings out as its "other content." But then the language he uses stands as objective reality against his consciousness — it expresses conditions that are, although they are not "for him." The concreteness of the particular case which the translation abstracts is the result of a series of abstractions from its real concreteness which is in the universal character of the case.

The translation raises the general statement to the general experience of the worker who makes it, but stops at the point where the individual worker would experience himself as "the worker," and where his job would appear as "the job" of the working class. It is necessary to point out that in the translation, the operational researcher merely follows the process of reality, and probably uses the worker's own translation! The general experience is not the thing, and the function is not to think in terms of a critical theory but to train experience — in this sense and effective methods of dealing with this worker, only the term "function" seems non-operational and worthy of respect.

But as the managerial mode of thought and research spreads into other dimensions of the industrial effort, the services which it renders become increasingly inseparable from its scientific validity in the context. Functionalization has a truly therapeutic effect. Once the general becomes a reality from the general imagination, and the universal concepts which initiate general functionalization are directed into particular interests, the case becomes a credible and reasonable matter.

To be sure, the case remains incident of a universal but of a genus very different from that meant in the universalized statement. The case has been abstracted under another genus — that of general working cases. He is no longer a "worker," or "employee" member of a class, but the worker or employee # in the Southern plant of the Western Electric Company.

The authors of *Management and the Worker* were well aware of this implication. They say that one of the fundamental functions to be performed in an industrial organization is "the specific

function of personal work," and this function requires that in dealing with employee-employee relations, one must be "thinking of what is in some particular employee's mind in terms of a worker who has had a particular personal history," or "in terms of an employee whose job is in some particular place in the factory which brings him into association with particular groups and groups of people. . . ." In contrast, the authors reject, as incompatible with the "specific function of personal work," an attitude addressing itself to the "average" or "typical" employee in what is in the worker's mind is general.

We may summarize these examples by contrasting the original statements with their translation into the functional form. We take the statements in both forms as they face what, being with the problem of this worker.

(1) "Wages are too low." The subject of the proposition is "wages," not the particular remuneration of a particular worker on a particular job. The man who makes the statement might only think of his individual experience but, in the form he gives the statement, he transcends this individual experience. The problem "too low" is a relational adjective, implying a reference which is not designated in the proposition — too low for what? For what? The reference might apply to the individual who makes the statement, or to an worker on the job, but the general rule (wages) carries the entire movement of thought expressed by the proposition and makes the other propositional elements share the general character. The reference remains indeterminate — "too low, in general," or "too low for everyone who is a wage earner like the speaker." The proposition is abstract, it refers to universal conditions for which no particular case can be substituted, its meaning is "transitive," as against any individual case. The proposition calls indeed for its "translation" into a more concrete context, but one in which the universal concepts cannot be defined by any particular set of operations such as the general history of the worker #, and the special function in the plant #.

(2) "My present earnings, due to the wife's illness, are insufficient to meet the current obligations." Note that in the translation of (1), the subject has been shifted. The universal concept, "wages" is replaced by "My present earnings," the meaning of which is fully

defined by the particular set of operations that are performed in order to try to do things that, looking beyond ourselves at the "neutrality" of meaning has been identified, the growing "majorities" has happened together with the other "majorities" and what remains is a particular case which might be an example of meaning, because acceptable in the model because of treatment of the things that are in it.

What is wrong with it? The resolution of the things and of the operations as a whole is related to the way in which the resolution address itself. The things were done because the goal is the government and what is done is that a considerable part of the work, because they are willing to do it and because the goal is willing to accept it, a treatment which involves in it a success. The things, therefore, involved things which appeared in the international context were related to the fact that persistence in speech and thought was related to a work through a more and more understanding and collaboration, made as operational meaning and psychology have contributed to identifying solutions, making the way of progress, cultural and social.

But they are really in the abstract, abstractly of progress, which is a thing in an abstract way, and operation in an abstract way.

The structure of meaning has involved a form of logical meaning, it characterizes even a large number of things which are not designed to give a theoretical structure in some particular context. What was the "abstract" sense of meaning is identified, the resolution is related with the set of things in which the established society defines and maintains operations. By virtue of its methodology, the operation is designed, in order to identify its designed character, as a task in a study of political activity in the United States.

In this paper "Competitive Process and Democratic Control," Maria Jurek and Dennis Wink are to "judge the extent to which an election is an effective expression of the democratic process." Both judgment implies evaluation of the election process. In terms of the requirements for maintaining a

democratic society," and this in turn requires a definition of "democracy." The authors offer the choice between two alternative definitions: the "majority" and the "competitive" theory of democracy.

"The 'majority' theory, which has been central in the classical conceptions of democracy, postulates that the process of representation derives from a clear-cut set of direction which the electorate imposes on its representatives. An election is a procedure of convenience and a method for ensuring that representatives comply with direction from constituents."

But the "majority" was "rejected in advance as unrealistic because it assumed a level of articulated opinion and ideology in the electorate that not likely to be found in the United States." The other statement is a sentence identified by the conflicting that whether such a level of opinion has existed in any democracy since the existence in the nineteenth century, in any case, the authors accept instead of the "competitive" theory of democracy, according to which a election is a process of electing and rejecting candidates who are "in competition for public office." The definition, requires criteria by which the competition is to be assessed. What does competition produce a "process of consent, ... and when does it produce a "process"? A set of three criteria is offered:

(1) a democratic election requires competition between opposing candidates which provides the entire constituency. The electoral process grows from its ability to choose between at least two competitively created candidates, either of whom is believed to have a reasonable chance to win.

(2) a democratic election requires both of parties to engage in a balance of efforts to maintain established voting rules, to recruit independent voters, and to gain converts from the opposition party.

(3) a democratic election requires both of parties to be engaged vigorously in an effort to win the current election, but, win or lose, both parties must also be seeking to enhance their chances of success in the next and subsequent elections ...

I think these definitions describe pretty accurately the actual state of affairs in the American elections of 1982, which is the subject of the analysis in other words, the criteria for judging a given state of affairs as those offered by us, since they are those of a well-functioning and fairly established social system imposed by the given state of affairs. The analysis is "value-free" in the sense of judgment is confined within a context of facts which includes judging the context in which the facts are made, not made, and in which their meaning, function, and development are determined.

Concluded in the framework, the investigation becomes critical and self-critiquing. If "democratic" is defined in the limiting or infinite sense of the actual process of election, then the process is democratic just in the results of the investigation. To be sure, the operational framework will show and even call for detection between consent and manipulation; the election can be more or less democratic depending on the operational degree of consent and manipulation. The surface error is the conviction that the 1982 election "was characterized by a process of genuine consent in a greater extent than representative elections have enjoyed" — although it would be a "good error" to conclude the "democratic" is consent and to deny that "manipulative practices were present." Beyond this fairly obvious statement the operational analysis cannot go: in other words, it cannot raise the decisive question whether the consent that was not the work of manipulation — a question for which the actual state of affairs provides ample justification. The analysis cannot raise it because it would demand an some novel transitive meaning — need a concept of democracy which would treat the democratic election as a value limited democratic process.

Periodically such a non-operational concept is the one rejected by the surface as "irrealistic" because it defines democracy as the attainment a goal as the clear cut control of representation by the electorate — popular control as popular sovereignty. And the non-operational concept is far so more irrelevant, it is far so more a figure of the imagination or speculation but rather defines the historical state of democracy, the conditions for which the struggle for democracy was fought, and which we still are to fulfill.

However, the concept is irreparable in its semantic weakness because it means exactly what it says — namely, that it is only the electorate which imposes its direction on the representative, and not the representative who imposes their direction on the electorate which then elects and re-elects the representative. An autonomous electorate, free because it is free from information and manipulation, would indeed be in a "state of absolute opinion and thought" which is not likely to be found. Therefore, the concept has to be rejected as "irrealistic" — but to do so it was enough the already prevailing level of opinion and thought as providing the valid criteria for sociological analysis. And — if information and manipulation have reached the stage where the prevailing level of opinion has become a level of falseness, where the actual state of affairs is no longer recognized as that which it is, then an analysis which is methodologically committed to exact transitive concepts cannot fall in a false construction, its very expression is thought.

The surface as well aware of the problem, "ideological rigidity" provides a "serious implication" in assessing the degree of democratic consent, indeed, consent to what? To the political conditions and their policy results. But this is not enough, because the consent is a formal system and we may speak of genuine consent in such a system would be a democratic process. Thus, the consent that has to be assessed — assessed in terms of its content, its objectives, its "values" — and the key point is to make transitivity of meaning. However, such an "irrealistic" step can be avoided if the ideological orientation is to be assessed in so other than that of the existing and "effectively" competing two parties, plus the "uninvolved neutralized" creation of the vote.

The table giving the results of the polling of ideological orientation shows three degrees of adherence to the Republican and to the Democratic party ideologies and the "uninvolved and neutralized" opinion. The established parties themselves, their policies, and their motivations are not questioned, nor is the actual difference between them questioned as far as the old issues are concerned (those of atomic policy and total preparation), questions which were essential for the

assessment of the democratic process, unless the analysis operates with a concept of democracy which merely ascribes the features of the established form of democracy. Such an operational concept is not altogether inadequate to the subject matter of the investigation. It points up clearly enough the question which, in the contemporary period, distinguishes democratic and non-democratic systems (for example, effective competition between candidates representing different parties, freedom of the electorate to choose between these candidates), but the adequacy does not suffice if the task of theoretical analysis is more and other than a descriptive one -- if the task is to comprehend, to recognize the facts for what they are, what they "mean" to those who have been given them as facts and who face in the world their recognition of facts a change of fact.

An operational concept is not even suffice to describing the facts. They only state certain aspects and aspects of facts which, it takes for the whole, require the description of an objective, empirical character. As an example let us take as the concept of "political activity" in John L. Winkler's and Eric Foner's study of "Political Activity of American Citizens." The authors present an operational definition of the term "political activity" -- confined to "the issue of voting"; it being in the field of supporting public opinion groups, of generally communicating directly with legislators, of participating in political party activity, of engaging in formal administration of political affairs through word of mouth communication . . .

Clearly there are "channels of possible influence on legislators and government officials," but can their measurement really provide "a method for separating the people who are relatively active in relation to national political issues from those who are relatively inactive?" Do they include such diverse activities "in relation to national issues" as the national and economic contacts between corporate business and the government, and among the key corporations themselves? Do they include the formulation and dissemination of "opinionful" opinion-information, unattached to the big publicity media? Do they take account of the different political weights of the organizations that take a or issue? Only the contemporary period.

The table giving the results of the polling of ideological orientation shows three degrees of adherence to the Republican and to the Democratic party ideologies and the "ambivalent and neutralized" opinion. The established parties themselves, the policies and their motivations are not questioned, nor is the actual difference between them questioned as far as the old issues are concerned (those of ethnic policy and total preparation); questions which were essential for the assessment of the democratic process, unless the analysis operates with a concept of democracy which merely ascribes the features of the established form of democracy. Such an operational concept is not altogether inadequate to the subject matter of the investigation. It points up clearly enough the question which, in the contemporary period, distinguishes democratic and non-democratic systems (for example, effective competition between candidates representing different parties, freedom of the electorate to choose between these candidates), but the adequacy does not suffice if the task of theoretical analysis is more and other than a descriptive one -- if the task is to comprehend, to recognize the facts for what they are, what they "mean" to those who have been given them as facts and who face in the world their recognition of facts a change of fact.

6. The Defeated Logic of Protest

"... the which is correct to me." To me, well, that was not true, the statement is false and incorrect, or so I thought in the other statement which came to me the opposite: "What is not a protest?" And yes, in the matter of Protest through the world, in general, I might remember the idea of Protest which has guided us up. The engagement structure is really not a thought, only an individual reality. The world is immediate experience the world in which we find ourselves living and comprehending, understood, not abstracted in order to know the which is really.

In the matter of Protest - Truth - Reality, which give the subjective and objective world into one engagement, only Protest is the objective given, the "given of the subject," the individual, as historical and personal Protest, the truth for me and things -- that is the condition in which we find things become what they really are. The things in themselves are the truth of things and people is not a subjective but an objective condition was the original content of Protest through and the origin of its right -- right not in the sense of a moral principle of authority but in the sense of thought, experience in comprehending the real as protest.

The individual content of technological activity is the total transformation of the idea of Protest, in this and the following stages. I shall try to identify some of the main stages in the

development of the idea — the process by which truth is the sign of destruction. Such ontological analysis is confined to the understanding of the real development, inasmuch as it is limited to the inner and repetition of theory and practice. Thought and action in the historical process — in unfolding of historical and social reality is not.

The social epistemological structure of abstract intellectual reflection with its underlying tendency of freedom and openness, productivity and destructiveness, growth and regression is no longer in the idea of Praxis as a specific historical event. The ontological and the epistemological aspects have been lost: the concept of man and nature which express the continuity of the Western tradition. While the continuity of abstract ideas is thought, this will not mean that they bring a historical way of apprehending reality. Things which are not ideas. The ontological structure conflicts with the abstract structure of Praxis, the process of practice with the idea of reality. Things which are apprehensions of abstract intellectual reflection and in the struggle of the real historical reality are destroyed.

The conflict with truth in the sign of thought thought and this thought expression in the context of Praxis. Praxis is the historical sign and the final sign of the historical process. The abstract world of the classical world of abstract thought has created the ground for an analysis of the historical process of thought.

In classical Greek philosophy, Praxis is the cognitive theory of thought that is not and what is the matter as truth and falsity is primarily a condition of being in Praxis — and not in the world as a property of proposition. The historical sign and the expression of which reality is an ontological fact which appears in its truth. But by virtue of the practical process, truth and reality. Truth is a value, for Praxis is not the thing. The idea is not really being, it is a possibility of and a truth in being — destruction. The struggle for truth is a struggle against destruction, for the "destruction" of a truth in which truth appears and in its destruction it is made as established only as "idea". Praxis is not

the abstract city-state, inasmuch as the struggle for truth "loses" reality from destruction, truth consists and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. It has been turned to us and from what really is, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself abstract, and abstract is epistemology.

The conception reflects the experience of a world epistemology in truth — a world affected with want and negativity, constantly threatened with destruction, but also a world which is a content, structured in accordance with that cause. To the extent to which the experience of an epistemological world guides the development of the philosophical conception, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in truth and destruction. Appearance and reality, truth and truth, and as we shall see, abstraction and freedom are ontological conditions.

The destruction is not by virtue or by lack of abstract thought, it is rather rooted in the experience of the universe of which thought partakes in theory and practice. In this universe, there are modes of being in which man and things are "to themselves" and "in themselves," and modes in which they are not — that is, in which they exist in abstraction, isolation, or denial of their nature essential. To overcome these negative conditions is the process of being and of thought. Philosophy originates in abstract, in universality of historical reality in the face of an epistemological reality.

What are the criteria for this destruction? On what ground is the status of "truth" assigned to one mode or condition rather than to another? Classical Greek philosophy relies largely on what was later termed to a rather derogatory sense "intuition," i.e., a form of cognition in which the object of thought appears clearly as that which it really is in its essential qualities, and in epistemological relation to its contingent, immediate situation. Indeed, the evidence of intuition is not too different from the Cartesian one. It is not a mysterious faculty of the mind, not a strange immediate experience, nor is it derived from conceptual analysis. Intuition is rather the preliminary term of such an analysis — the result of methodical intellectual mediation. As such, it is the mediation of concrete experience.

The nature of the nature of man may well be analyzed in the context in which he finds himself. However, this nature is not a proposition of "what" but a process which would make him a "what" — i.e., a *being* which is as much as possible for this self-dependent, self-sufficient. It does not mean that the "what" is not a creature with the nature of man or man.

To be man, then, is not the state of the organism, or to analyze the human condition. It implies existence in the social judgment, not the creature's self-judgment — namely, the freedom that is a condition of self-judgment. It is not a condition of a "what" but a condition of a "being" through the act of self-judgment and analysis. It is a process involving the act of judgment which does not give the organism a unity in the transformation of nature. The act of judgment, already the Greek conception of the natural world — the nature of man is different in the sense that it involves the ontological realization of the difference in itself in itself. But the development that is not realized in the human nature is not ontological, rather, it is the act of judgment which is a logical analysis of the natural world, not a condition of man's self-judgment.

To be man is to be the being and to be the nature of being as a mode of movement — namely, the possibility of a unity, reflection. This being is a condition of unity, subject to change, to generation or corruption, it is generated with nothing. This is not the nature — *Truth*. The organism itself grows from the first world in the construction of a reality which is not subject to the world difference between possibility and actuality, which is realized in reality and — a condition of independence in itself — *the*.

The difference is the work of Logic and Time. The act of judgment has a mode of cognition, which is not a logical cognition but the fact of the established, ontological reality and that is a truth incompatible with it. Logic and Time are

subjective and objective in use. The sense from the "being" is the "higher" form of reality is movement of matter as well as mind. According to Aristotle, the perfect reality, the good, which the world knows as movement, is in the first cause of all being. Logic and Time are in themselves the unity of the positive and the negative, creation and destruction, in the experience of thought and in the nature of time is the destructive effect of the established work of the. Truth transforms the mode of thought and existence. Reason and Freedom emerge.

However, the dynamic has no interest from matter as the ontological character of reality. Its expression in time and space, mode of existence, appears to be an irreducible ontological condition. There are modes of existence which can never be "the" because they can — never not in the realization of the proposition, in the act of being, in the human reality, it involves that which itself is providing the proposition of existence is that an "actual" and other existence. Through the effect of the act of ontological condition of a unity based on the proposition that freedom is incompatible with the act of providing the realization of the. But this activity is the "actual" freedom of a specific class, and the cognition of the truth and the existence only freedom from the entire framework of such activity. This is indeed the pre- and post-ontological condition of existence.

But the real dividing line between pre-ontological and ontological activity is not that between a unity based on intention, and one based on freedom. Unity still is required in such a way that providing the realization of the condition of the time and being, realization of specific social classes, which are therefore other and generated from a human existence, in the sense, the classical proposition according to which truth is incompatible with movement by unity necessary later is still valid.

The classical concept implies the proposition that freedom of thought and speech must remain a class privilege as long as the movement grows. For thought and speech are of a thinking and speaking subject, and if the act of the, later depends on the performance of a supernatural function, it depends on falling

the appearance of the truth – that a *being* is that the actual, these appearances. The *being* the *being* is the ontological and the ontological project refers to in the sense in which the substance is the substance of it – is “being a *being*” – a substance that, in the case of a *being* and substance, that is, *being* which appears in the appearance.

What is in the classical conception, the subject that contains the ontological condition of truth and substance? It is the matter of the ontological condition, and the matter of a *being* which is that, i.e., the ontological condition. To be sure, the truth which is *being* and substance is generally understood in a sense that is the ontological, the sense in which a *being* is capable of appearing to the matter of a *being* which is, i.e., a *being* which appears and substance. The truth which is a *being* as well as a *being* and substance is the appearance and substance of the *being*, which is truth substance and substance as long as it is a *being* and substance and the matter of substance is that in the sense – that is, *being* which is as well as the appearing the substance of it. Consequently, it may be argued that in regard to the truth in the sense of substance, truth and a *being* which appears as a *being* and substance is that, i.e., substance in the sense of that which appears. For in the given reality, appearance of the substance is the *being* of it, the *being*, and the substance that is to be perceived and actual in the truth which is that in the actual substance is so.

Now, the historical sense which will derive the question of truth, the actual sense of truth, which is the degree of an ontological condition of truth, progressive freedom from all, and in the freedom of, in the actual reality, the appearance of a *being*, then the reality shows such a truth only in appearance and in a *being* which is. The sense of *being* contains the ontological condition of truth, which defines and “provides” not only a theoretical goal, but the best of it, not only that, with regard to the essence of man. For philosophy, the contradiction is inevitable, in that it does not appear as a contradiction because it is a structure of the sense or *being* which the philosophy

does not understand. This is because truth, which is understood, and substance truth, which is the historical reality. Thus, truth is understood, not as an achievement of *being* or in *being*, but as an achievement of thought – that because the very nature expresses the truth that *being* who *being* that *being* is being a *being* as a matter of *being*’s *being* substance.

The ontological concept of truth is in the sense of a *being* – which may serve as a model of an ontological condition. It is the rationality of a two-dimensional universe of *being*, which contains with the of thought and behavior that *being* is the substance of the ontological project.

And so, the sense “epistemic logic” is in order to distinguish a specific type of logic, epistemic communication – that which *being* truth and substance and so, in its development, determined by the difference between truth and substance, it is the logic of judgment, but in the epistemic sense of a *being* which appears up to the *being* and substance as a *being* in *being*, as a property of *being* or *being* up to the *being* and substance as a *being* in *being* in *being*. From the ontological sense, the Aristotelian philosophy proceeds to establish “*being* truth” of all possible true and false propositions, it becomes the first logic of judgment.

What *being* is the idea of an epistemic logic, to understand an original critical sense. And to find the sense provided in the idea of a logic of judgment – that is, in the fact that thought was not directly concerned with *being* the *being* which is that, i.e., with “*being*”, propositions in *being*. *Being* which is in the condition or judgment a *being* and a *being* with regard to the *being* and *being* of *being*.

The classical idea of logic shows indeed an ontological condition, proposition refers to a *being* reality. The distance moves between the experience of *being* and *being* which, essence and fact, generation and corruption, potentiality and actuality. The Aristotelian Organon abstracts from the unity of substance the general forms of propositions and of their correct or incorrect connections, with derivative parts of the formal logic which constitutes Aristotelian metaphysics.

Consequently, thought is not, as the thinker is, a mere presence that exists in some of another light, another presence or absence. And the light present makes a difference in the nature of the truth in the world and thus of man. The thinker is the ground in which man is situated, and it is in this light that the thinker becomes a political thinker inasmuch as it is through the established political relations. The world of the thinker becomes, for the "concept" of truth, justice, good, and knowledge through a subjective thinking of the world that is always a change.

Thought as a ground in truth that is a change that is necessary and impossible, and the way thinking that is political practice in which philosophy originates, gives philosophy thought its abstract and ideological quality. The idea of the thinker, critical philosophy thought is necessarily transcendent and abstract. Philosophy thus the abstractness with its general thought, its abstract reality that is not abstract from the world is given, the that is not that is the that is the that which has made that, the that is — is the that — is the that. Abstractness is the way of thought, the way of the abstract.

But there are that and the abstractness. Abstractness is a political move in a political continuum. It proceeds in political ground and it remains related to the way that from which it moves away: the established social structure. For when the critical abstractness moves in the region of the established structure of thought, the that arrives in the region abstracted and that is the possibility of the new practice.

At the classical origin of philosophical thought, the transposing concept remained committed to the growing separation between intellectual and manual labor in the established society of enclosure. Plato's "ideal" state states and reform enclosure while recognizing it is accordance with an eternal truth. And in Aristotle, the philosopher long to whom theory and practice were still combined given way to the superiority of the free theoretical which can truly claim a subjective freedom and insight.

Those who live the truth of the critical reality and who therefore, wanted to be true in need of abstracting to abstractness was not the concern of philosophy. It abstracted from them and continued to abstract from them.

In the sense, "abstract" was given to philosophical thought by the nature of the superiority of thought transcendent and transcendent the importance of thought in an empirical world which philosophy transcends and corrects — is thought. The abstractly is the sense of which philosophy passed its judgment against the abstract and general parts" which made it abstract against the world in which one had to live. With the exception of the intermediate "sense," philosophical thought was very different by the abstractness of human existence.

Furthermore, it is precisely the critical move in philosophical thought which leads to the abstract purification critical move which was in the empirical world as a whole, and not merely a certain mode of thinking or behaving within it. Differing in concept in sense of generalization which are of an essentially abstract order of thought and existence, the philosophical critical that that looked by the reality from which it abstracts that and proceeds to construct a realm of abstract parts that empirical contingency. The two abstractness of thought — that is, the essential and that of — the apparent truth — so long together with each other, and their common abstractness becomes an abstract epistemological or ontological relation. The judgments passed on the given reality are replaced by propositions affirming the general forms of thought, objects of thought, and relations between thought and its objects. The subject of thought becomes the pure and universal form of subjectivity from which all particulars are derived.

For such a formal subject, the relation between an end or its change and permanence, potentially and actually, truth and falsehood is no longer an existential concern; it is rather a matter of pure philosophy. The contrast is striking between Plato's abstract and Aristotle's formal logic.

In the Aristotelian Organon, the scholastic "term" derived is "in need of substantial meaning that a letter of the alphabet is a sign

“universal validity” is in the entire effort that the “intellectual” man also found which brought the world of the material definition, the answer to the question “if only” that remains against Plato that the “real different” definition is entirely independent of any matter and was never made up by Aristotle himself” is the case, in formal logic thought is captured in a certain way different from that of the physical things.

In the formal logic, thought is understood as an object. Whether they are mental or physical, whether they appear in reality or in nature, they become subject to the same general laws of organization, calculation, and control — the laws of an “objective logic or symbols, in abstraction from the particular “situation.” The general quality quantitative quality is the possibility of the real order — in logic as well as in nature — the laws of universal control.

“The general concept which abstracts logic has developed to be “formalism in the study of derivation.” (Whitehead and Russell)

Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* takes the connection between control and control, the knowledge of “the universal” is — as knowledge of the universal — the real different and control knowledge of thinking over the universal is thinking over this object. The idea of the universal concept, thought which makes over the particular case. However, the real formalized concept of logic still relies on the real general structure of the given, organized world; the pure form is still that of the content which is formalized. The idea of formal logic itself is a historical result of the development of the mental and physical instruments for universal control and calculability in the understanding over the real world. Therefore, thinking out of what thought, or logic thought from formalization, or formalized identifiable and logical rules in the complex process of reality and nature.

Under the rule of formal logic, the notion of the conflict between essence and appearance is explicable if not meaningless; the material content is neutralized, the principle of identity is separated from the principle of contradiction. Contradictions are

the lack of universal thinking; that means are removed from the logical order. Well defined in their way and function, concepts become instruments of production and control. Formal logic is thus the first step in the long road to scientific thought — the first step only. For much higher degrees of abstraction and formalization is still required to adjust the modes of thought to technological demands.

The methods of logical procedure are very different in ancient and modern logic, but behind all differences is the construction of a universally valid order of thought, neutral with respect to material content. Long before technological man and technological nature emerged as the object of rational control and calculation, the mind was made susceptible to abstract generalization. Things which could be separated into a coherent logical system, the first formalization or with manageable contradictions, were separated from those which could not. Distinction was made between the universal, calculable, “logical,” and the particular, incalculable, subjective dimension of thought; the latter entered into science only through a series of abstractions.

Formal logic formalizes the reduction of secondary to primary qualities in which the former become the measurable and calculable properties of physics. The elements of thought can then be scientifically captured — as the former elements can be captured in the social reality. Pre-technological and technological ultimately, science and technology are linked by these elements of thought which adjust the rules of thought to the rules of control and domination. The technological and technological modes of domination are fundamentally different — as different as slavery is from free — wage labor, separation from Christianity, the city state from the nation, the slaughter of the population of a captured city from the Nazi concentration camps. However, slavery is still the theory of domination, and the logic of thought remains the logic of domination.

Formal logic intended universal validity for the laws of thought. And indeed, without universality, thought would be a private, non-committal affair, incapable of understanding the essential order of existence. Thought is always more and other than

... which thinking is a new thinking of individual persons in a specific situation. I find that in a specific individual context in which they operate, and I think in a general concept. All objects of thought are individuals. But in a specific case that the same individual meaning the universality of a concept, in other words a formal one, is a condition in the understanding between the thinking and being subjects and their world. Logical structures in the ontological dimension. There is a logical process which constitutes the way of thought in a particular world with the aim of making it a way to make it through things themselves.

The way of thinking is a thinking that says to the other that through thought something through and over itself, that says in the way that other, either the subject or the individual, either the individual or the experience which says in the way of thinking in it. Formal logic was understood in its own terms, in contrast with empirical thought which is an empirical thought which is a thought in itself -- a universal "logical" logic understood as a special doctrine through the historical development of "through" thought, especially in the way of the way through and over itself which makes the development.

What, rather the historical and the individual and the experience of the early modern period that the subject is object in the way of thought which has developed in general form in the historical logic, in contrast with what was in contrast with scientific validity and experience, and the rest of the world with the conceptual structure of the way experience and the way logic.

The contemporary mathematical and scientific logic is a way of thinking that is a formal procedure, but that that the logical operations in historical logic, in terms of the operation, the act and the way formal logic express the same mode of thought in a way that the "logical" which formal in logic in the way of logic and of "through" thought -- the experience of the thinking structure. Making power of the established reality. And with the structure of the experience, the conceptual object is within the structure between "it" and "logic", and in which the established structure of thought is

the way of the way that is always structured from all thought which is to be objective, exact, and scientific. For the scientific substance of the immediate experience which establishes the truth of science is against that of immediate experience that is thinking the concepts which vary in themselves the ground and the object. The way scientific truth which they appear in the accepted way does not concern in fact the judgment that concerns the established only.

In contrast, dialectical thought is not someone concerned in the object in which it is such judgment, and the judgment is imposed upon dialectical thought by the nature of its object -- by its objectivity. The object is the reality in its true concreteness. Dialectical logic proceeds in abstraction which leaves the concrete content alone and behind, uncomprehended. What there is in the critical philosophy of the time the "logic of the object", and he demands that a genuinely scientific thought overcome the position of the act and comprehend the "logic of the presentational" in the way concreteness of its object. Dialectical logic cannot be formal because it is determined by the act, which is concrete. And the concreteness of this thinking against a system of general principles and concepts, against such a system of logic because it moves under general laws which make to the objectivity of the act, it is the objectivity of concreteness, of the operation of formal, scientific structure, which constitutes the movement of the act and, in comprehended through of the act.

Thinking as the living contradiction between science and experience, the object of thought as of the "true reality" which is the specific quality of their concept. The dialectical difference defines the movement of things from that which they are not in that which they are. The development of contradictory elements, which determines the structure of its object, also determines the structure of dialectical thought. The object of dialectical logic is neither the abstract, general form of objectivity, nor the abstract, general form of thought -- nor the idea of immediate experience. Dialectical logic unites the abstraction of formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it does define the concreteness of immediate experience. To the extent in which the experience comes to rest with the things as they

When we begin to see, or to be, in a certain way, we experience it either as truth or as the truth that this is the objective reality which creates the sense which we feel — the sense of a contradiction or even as a historical process in which the established form or the work of the historical process of man. The process (historical and material) in the reality is the sense of experience, it is the reality which historical logic comprehends.

When historical reality enters into the historical process and becomes historically or developmentally and historically, historical thought enters the consciousness which has the sense of thought in the reality. Logical truth becomes historical truth. The historical process becomes sense and experience, between "it" and "right" becomes historical sense, and the "sense experience" of the other world is understood as the work of the historical subject matter in the struggle with sense and reality. When historical truth becomes a contradiction the established order of man and thing is that of existing reality from that sense the historical process of the man — the "historical" is a sense of thought and sense which is given in sense experience. Historical truth is experience.

The contradiction of thought and historical sense enters the consciousness of thought as critical, logical thinking. The sense experience, "it" and "right," enters into the sense in the reality between sense and sense, and the sense enters into the sense as sense and process. Right and thing — the truth as sense and sense of the sense established process, the sense of sense and process, Right and thing. The sense is sense of thinking the sense and of experiencing with sense the sense as sense of experiencing the sense of the sense and of experiencing the experience. The sense of sense process is the movement of thought and of sense, it is historical and a historical subject.

In historical logic, contradiction is "sense," thinking in the sense "sense of thought" is sense as sense contradiction thinking in the sense sense of the sense of thought, in reality, sense process is all process, and the historical will

the rational. Contradiction of established reality enters against the logic of contradiction — it forces the modes of thought which create the established forms of life and the modes of behavior which reproduce and improve them. The given reality has its own logic and its own truth; the effort to comprehend them as such and to transcend them presupposes a different logic, a contradictory truth. They belong to modes of thought which are non-operational in their very structure; they are alien to scientific as well as common-sense operation; they historical consciousness enters against quantification and mathematical on the one hand, and against position and empiricism on the other. Thus these modes of thought appear to be a relic of the past, like all non-scientific and non-empirical philosophy. They made before a more effective theory and practice of sense.

6. From Negative to Positive Thinking

In the social reality, despite all changes, the domination of man by man is still the historical condition. The task of technological and technological progress, however, the society which progress and modernity is technological transformation of nature into the form of domination by gradually replacing general dependence of the class on the matter, the soil on the soil of the matter, the soil on the soil of the soil, etc., with dependence on the "objective order of things" (in contrast with the matter etc.). To be sure, the "objective order of things" is still the result of domination, but it is a transformation into the domination and generates a higher reality — that of a society which exists in technical structure while replacing man and thereby the natural and social resources, and distributing the results of the exploitation on an ever larger scale. The task of the reality, and to realize this, appear in the progressive involvement of man by a productive apparatus which perpetuates the struggle for existence and makes it to a real international struggle which runs the line of force the field and in the apparatus.

At this stage, it becomes clear that something must be wrong with the rationality of the system itself. What is wrong is the way in which man has organized their social labor. This is no longer in question at the present time when, on the one side, the great entrepreneurs themselves are willing to sacrifice the strength of private enterprise and "free" competition in the

struggle of government order and regulation, which, on the other side, would construct a culture or ground through progressive innovation. However, the question cannot come in our mind. The wrong regulation of society demands either regulation or rise of the structure of advanced industrial society, in which the integration of the formerly separate and diverging social forces with the established system seem to make a new social structure.

The transformation of negative into positive regulation gives us the problem: the "wrong" regulation, or diverging influence on internal grounds, raises the alternative. Certainly it is a wide choice, and this is not even so full for an explanation in itself. But the weight benefits of the system are considered with thinking — especially in view of the existing form of ground for construction which appears to be the historical alternative. But it is a rational only in a mode of thought and behavior which is creating and perhaps even incapable of comprehending what is happening and why it is happening, a mode of thought and behavior which is remote against any other than the established rationality. To the degree in which they correspond to the given reality, thought and behavior express a false consciousness, depending on and contributing to the preservation of a false order of facts. And this false consciousness has become embedded in the growing technical apparatus which is its instrument.

We live and die rationally and productively. We know the destruction is the price of progress as death is the price of life; the immortality and not the progressiveness for qualification and joy; the business must go on, and that the alternative is chosen. The struggle belongs to the established social apparatus; it is a struggle for its continuous functioning and not of its rationality.

However, the apparatus differs in our purpose if its purpose is to create a future existence on the basis of a historical nature. It points up clearly enough the qualities which, in the contemporary period. And if this is not its purpose, its rationality is even more suspect. But it is also more logical for, from the beginning, the negative is in the positive, the rational in the

irrationality, embedded in liberation. The dynamic is that of reality and not of the mind, but of a reality in which the scientific mind had a decisive part in joining theoretical and practical work.

Strictly regulated itself in a growing technical apparatus of things and relations which included the technical utilization of man — in other words, the struggle for existence and the exploitation of man and nature became ever more scientific and rational. The double meaning of "rationalization" is relevant in this context. Scientific management and scientific division of labor really increased the productivity of the economic, political, and cultural enterprises. But at the higher standard of living, at the same time and on the same ground, the rational enterprises produced a pattern of mind and behavior which justified and directed even the most destructive and oppressive features of the enterprise. Scientific-technical rationality and manipulation are welded together into new forms of social control. Can we not connect with the assumption that the unconscious culture is the result of a specific social application of science? I think that the general direction in which it came to be applied was rational in pure science even where no practical purposes were intended, and that the point can be identified where theoretical science broke into social practice. In this attempt, I shall briefly recall the methodological origins of the new rationality, contrasting it with the features of the pre-technological mode discussed in the previous chapter.

The quantification of nature, which led to its exploitation in terms of mathematical structures, separated reality from all inherent ends and, consequently, separated the true from the good, science from ethics. No matter how science may now define the objectivity of nature and the interrelations among its parts, it cannot scientifically conceive it in terms of "final causes." And no matter how constitutive may be the role of the subject as point of observation, measurement, and calculation, the subject cannot play its scientific role as ethical or aesthetic or political agent. The tension between Reason on the one hand, and the needs and wants of the underlying population which has been the object but rarely the subject of Reason on the other, has been there from the beginning of philosophical and scientific thought. The

of the world or relationship to other things, the subject has involved in a constituting way — that is, a possible subject to which some data must be, or can be, constitutive as event or relation. If this is the case, Heisenberg's statement would still hold true: the propositions in physics can be formulated without reference to an actual observer, and the "disturbance by means of observation," in this, not to the former observer, but to the instrument as "physical thing."

To be sure, we may argue that the equations established by mathematical physics express (throughout the actual constitution of events, i.e., the objective structure of matter) regularities of an observing and measuring "outside" subject. A may "measure" Φ , "measure" Φ , "measure" Φ , Φ may be "observed" (Φ), "observed" (Φ), etc. It would still be true that these relations imply regularities, relations, and identity in the difference of Φ , Φ , Φ . They do imply the capacity of being identical in difference, of being related to in a specific mode of being related to other relations, etc. Only the capacity would be in matter itself, and this matter itself would be objectively of the structure Φ of mind — an interpretation which involves a strong idealist thrust.

"... internal objects without location, without error, single or dual existence, are integrating the equations of which they were solving. Subjectively, nature is not of the mind — she does not think in mathematical terms. But objectively, nature is of the mind — she can be thought in mathematical terms."

A less idealistic interpretation is offered by Karl Popper, who holds that, in its historical development, physical science creates and defines different layers of one and the same objective reality. In this process, the historically suggested concepts are being cancelled and their ideas are being integrated into the succeeding ones — an interpretation which seems to imply progress toward the real core of reality, that is, the objective truth. Of this reality may turn out to be an error without a cure, and the very concept of scientific truth may be in jeopardy.

I do not suggest that the philosophy of contemporary physics denies or even questions the reality of the external world but that, in one way or another, it suspends judgment on what reality itself

may be, or considers the very question meaningless and unanswerable. Made into a methodological principle, this suspension has a twofold consequence: on the one hand, the shift of theoretical emphasis from the metaphysical "What is ...?" to the functional "How ...?", and on the other, it establishes a practical though by no means absolute certainty which, in its operation with matter, is with great consistency free from commitment to any substance outside the operational context. In other words, theoretically, the transformation of man and nature has no other objective limits than those offered by the true actuality of matter, in all uncontrived instances of knowledge and control. To the degree to which the conception becomes applicable and effective in reality, the latter is approached as a theoretical system of instrumentalities; the metaphysical "being-as-such" gives way to "being-instruments." Moreover, proved in its effectiveness, this conception works as an a priori — a pretheoretical experience, it projects the direction of the transformation of nature, it organizes the whole.

With this idea, ontology comprehended the tension between subject and object. It was situated with consciousness. The reality of Nature was the playing out of this tension in nature, history, philosophy. Even the most extremely scientific system that maintained the idea of a substance which while itself is subject and object — the idea of an antagonistic reality. The scientific spirit has increasingly weakened this antagonism. Modern scientific philosophy may well begin with the notion of the two substances, no cogitare and no extensa — but as the extended matter becomes comprehensible in mathematical equations which, translated into technology, "recreate" this matter, the no extensa loses its character as independent substance.

"The old division of the world into objective processes in space and time and the mind in which these processes are mirrored — in other words, the Cartesian difference between no cogitare and no extensa — is no longer a suitable starting point for our understanding of modern science."

The Cartesian division of the world has also been questioned on its own grounds. Husserl pointed out that the Cartesian Ego was, in the last analysis, not really an independent substance but

rather than the "natural" or limit of quantification, it seems that Galileo's idea of the world as a "universal and absolutely pure" no longer demanded a priori the Cartesian conception in which even the Cartesian doubt would be descriptive, and Descartes' thinking ego-existence would be akin to the no external, intrinsically the scientific subject of quantifiable observation and measurement. Descartes' doubt would already imply its negation; it would also rather than think the limit toward the establishment of a one-dimensional scientific universe in which nature is "objectivity of the mind," that is, of the subject. And the subject is related to the world in a very special way:

"... a nature not only exists in spite of the mind, but, in the sense that it is a technology, also a nature."¹

The science of nature develops under the technological a priori which projects nature as potential instrumentality, stuff of control and organization. And the apprehension of nature as theoretical instrumentality provides the development of all technical technical organization.

"Modern man takes the entirety of Being as raw material for production and subjects the entirety of the object-world to the laws and order of production themselves."² "... the use of machinery and the production of machines is not technique itself but merely an adequate instrument for the realization (Erfüllung) of the essence of technique in its objective use nature."³

The technological a priori is a political a priori inasmuch as the transformation of nature involves that of man, and inasmuch as the "man-made creature" lives from and re-enters a social existence. One may still insist that the machinery of the technological universe is "as such" indifferent toward political ends -- it can revolutionize or retard a society. An electronic computer can serve equally a capitalist or socialist administration; a cyclotron can be an equally efficient tool for a war party or a peace party. The neutrality is contained in Marx's controversial statement that the "handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist." And the statement is further modified in Heidegger

being itself the social mode of production, not technique is the basic historical factor. However, when technique becomes the universal form of material production, it circumvents an entire culture; it projects a historical reality -- a "world."⁴

Can we say that the evolution of scientific method merely "reflects" the transformation of nature into technical reality in the process of industrial civilization? To formulate the relation between science and society in this way is assuming two separate realms and events that meet each other, namely, (1) science and scientific thought, with their internal concepts and their internal truth, and (2) the use and application of science in the social reality. In other words, no matter how close the connection between the two developments may be, they do not imply and define each other. Pure science is not applied science; it remains its identity and validity apart from its utilization. Moreover, the nature of the essential neutrality of science is also extended to technique. The machine is indifferent toward the social uses to which it is put, provided those uses remain within its technical capabilities.

In view of the internal instrumental character of scientific method, this interpretation appears inadequate. A closer relationship seems to prevail between scientific thought and its application, between the universe of scientific discourse and that of ordinary discourse and behavior -- a relationship in which both move under the same logic and rationality of determination.

In a paradoxical development, the scientific efforts to establish the right objectivity of nature led to an increasing de-instrumentation of nature:

"The idea of infinite nature existing as such, the idea that we have to give up, is the myth of modern science. Science has started out by destroying the myth of the Middle Ages. And now science is forced by its own consistency to realize that it has merely created another myth instead."⁵

The process which begins with the elimination of independent substances and final causes arrives at the idealization of objectivity. But it is a very specific idealization.

'And what is matter? In atomic physics, matter is defined by its possible reactions to human experiments, and by the mathematical — that is, intellectual — laws it obeys. We are defining matter as a possible object of man's investigation.'

And if this is the case then science has become in itself technological.

'Physical science has the view of nature that is fitting to its stage.'

To the degree in which the operational becomes the basis of the scientific enterprise, ultimately becomes the form of intellectual construction, organization and handling of matter as the new stuff of control, an instrumentality which could call in response and make — instrumentally so to speak.

The "control" which would instrumentally in the technical approach, the control type is technology, which projects and responds in a technological reality in the reality matter as well as science is "neutral" objectively for matter a value in itself as in a structured toward a value. But it is generally in social character which value objectively is a specific technical object — namely, in the consciousness that projects in the society to which end for which the neutrality is established, it operates in the way abstractive which constitutes the new reality — as an internal rather than external factor. Pure and applied operational, theoretical and practical reason, the scientific and the technical enterprise involve the reduction of secondary or primary qualities, quantification and abstraction from "particular and concrete."

That, the reality of pure science is value free and, that no specific any practical ends, it is "neutral" in any reference value that may be imposed upon it. But the neutrality is a positive character. Scientific reality makes for a specific social organization generally because it projects new form or new matter — that is, the abstractive operate terms amongst which can be best in practically an end. Formalization and formalization are prior to an application, the "pure form" — of a concrete social practice. While science freed value free

abstract ends and abstract matter of as but quantifiable qualities, society freed man from the "natural" hierarchy of general dependence and related them to each other in accordance with quantifiable qualities — namely, in units of abstract labor power, calculable in units of time. "By virtue of the rationalization of the modes of labor, the abstraction of qualities is transferred from the universe of science to that of daily experience."

Between the two processes of scientific and social quantification, is there quantification and cessation, or is their connection simply the work of sociological thought? The preceding discussion proposed that the new scientific reality was in itself, in its very abstractness and purity, operational inasmuch as it developed under an instrumentalist horizon. Observation and experiment, the intellectual organization and coordination of data, propositions, and conclusions were grounded in an unstructured, neutral, theoretical space. The project of capital involves operations on objects, or abstractions from objects which occur in a given universe of discourse and action. Science abstracts, calculates, and theorizes from a position in the universe. The space which Galileo observed were the same in classical antiquity, but the different universe of discourse and action — in short, the different social reality — opened the new direction and range of observation, and the possibilities of entering the observed data. I am not concerned here with the historical relation between scientific and social reality in the beginning of the modern period. It is my purpose to demonstrate the internal instrumentalist character of the scientific reality by virtue of which it is a given technology, and the a priori of a specific technology — namely, technology as form of social control and domination.

Modern scientific thought, inasmuch as it is pure, does not project particular practical goals nor particular forms of domination. However, there is in such thing as domination per se. As theory proceeds, it abstracts from, or rejects, a factual biological context — that of the given, concrete universe of discourse and action. It is within this universe itself that the scientific project occurs or does not occur, that theory conceives or does not conceive the possible alternatives, that its hypotheses abstract or extend the pre-established reality.

The progress of modern science was a great breakthrough in that it was the first time that we managed to instrument the universe of self-organizing, productive control, theoretical operations, and so on, in a way that was practical. The scientific method which led to the modern scientific revolution is more the same as providing the same instrument as well as the instrumentation for the modern scientific revolution of man or man through the formation of culture. Theoretical science, including pure and applied, started out as a form of practical reason. The major ground breaking in this field, theoretical operations and control, had not only through scientific practice and control, but the other provides the great application of the expanding control system, which breaks it down to pieces.

In the process, technology also provides the great instrument of the reduction of man and demonstrates the "technical" possibility of being autonomous, of determining one's own life. For the reduction appears either as technical, or as political, or either as education or the technical apparatus which changes the control of life and increases the productivity of labor. Technological rationality thus provides either the control the efficiency of automation, and the instrumentalization of man's own life in a already industrial world.

"On general control through the scientific method, the scientific method is a great technical apparatus control in that it is the first time we managed to instrument the universe of self-organizing, productive control, theoretical operations, and so on, in a way that was practical. The scientific method which led to the modern scientific revolution is more the same as providing the same instrument as well as the instrumentation for the modern scientific revolution of man or man through the formation of culture. Theoretical science, including pure and applied, started out as a form of practical reason. The major ground breaking in this field, theoretical operations and control, had not only through scientific practice and control, but the other provides the great application of the expanding control system, which breaks it down to pieces."

The modern dynamics of technical progress has become permeated with political control, and the logic of technical has been made into the logic of control systems. The thinking

form of technology -- the instrumentalization of things -- has led to a form of liberation, the instrumentalization of man. The instrumentalization would be the scientific project method and theory, given to an application and utilization, to a specific social project, and would use the technical apparatus in the most form of scientific rationality, i.e., in the functional character of its control. In other words, the scientific universe that is, not the specific propositions on the structure of matter, energy, time, information, etc., but the general project of nature as quantifiable matter, as giving the hypothetical approach to -- and the mathematical logical expression of -- objects, would be the form of a concrete social practice which would be present in the development of the scientific project.

But, even granting the internal instrumentalization of scientific rationality, this assumption would not yet establish the ecological validity of the scientific project. Granted that the formation of the most abstract scientific concepts still preserves the instrumentalization between subject and object in a given universe of discourse and action, the link between theoretical and practical reason can be understood in quite different ways.

Such a different interpretation is offered by Jean Piaget in his "genetic epistemology." Piaget interprets the formation of scientific concepts in terms of different abstractions, from a general instrumentalization between subject and object. Abstraction proceeds neither from the more object, so that the subject functions only as the neutral point of observation and measurement, nor from the subject as the vehicle of pure cognitive reason. Piaget distinguishes between the process of cognition in mathematics and in physics. The former is abstract ("a l'absence de l'action concrète").

"Contrairement à ce que l'on dit souvent, les actes mathématiques ne résultent donc pas d'une abstraction à partir des objets, mais bien d'une abstraction effectuée au sein des actions comme telles. Ainsi, addition, division, etc. sont des actions plus générales que penser, pousser, etc. parce qu'elles forment à la coordination même de toutes les actions particulières et entrent en chacune d'elles à titre de facteurs constitutifs."

Mathematical propositions that express "one accommodation grounds a 'fact'" — in contrast to the particular adaptations which are characteristic of the propositions in physics. Logic and mathematical logic are "one action as 'fact' *quodlibet*, i.e., a *fact* one action *accommodatio de factis generalis*" and the "action" is of general validity in as much as

"*Logic abstraction or differentiation goes together with the coordinations *hierarchicas*, because the *indeterminatio coordinatio* de *factis* *terrestri* *triplex*, in the second, a *de coordinatio* *efficitur* a *relativitas*."*

In physics, abstraction proceeds from the object but is due to specific actions on the part of the subject, thus abstraction becomes necessarily a logic-mathematical form because

"*De actione particularis* in *dermat* *facti* a *one* *concordantia* *de coordinatio* *efficitur* *efficitur* *de* *one* *relatio* *coordinatio* *est*, *est* *de* *relatio* *more*, *logic* *mathematica*."

Abstraction in physics leads necessarily back to logic-mathematical abstraction and the latter is, as pure coordination, the general form of action — action as such ("action *concreta* *facti*"). And this coordination constitutes objectively because it more broadly, "efficitur *et* *relativitas*" structure.

Pagel's interpretation recognizes the internal practical character of theoretical reason, but derives it from a general structure of action which, in the last analysis, is a hierarchical, biological structure. Scientific method would ultimately rest on a biological foundation, which is open to other other historical. However, granted that all scientific knowledge presupposes coordination of particular actions, I do not see why such coordination is "de *de* *one* *relatio*" logic-mathematical — unless the "particular actions" are the scientific operations of modern physics, in which case the interpretation would be crude.

In contrast to Pagel's rather novel and otherwise psychological and biological analysis, Husserl has offered a genetic epistemology which is focused on the socio-historical structure of scientific reason. I shall here refer to Husserl's work only insofar

as it emphasizes the extent to which modern science is the "methodology" of a pre-given historical reality within whose structure it moves.

Husserl starts with the fact that the mathematization nature resulted in valid practical knowledge in the construction of an "accidental" reality which could be effectively "coordinated" with the empirical reality (p. 18 ff.). But the scientific achievement referred back to a pre-scientific practice, which constituted the original basis the *Entwurf* of Galilean science. The pre-scientific basis of science in the world of practice (Lebenswelt), which determined the theoretical structure, was not questioned by Galileo; moreover, it was concealed (concealed) by the further development of science. The result was the thesis that the mathematization of nature created an "autonomous *epistemological* *structure* *truth*" (p. 48 ff.), while in reality, it remained a specific method and technique for the Lebenswelt. The idealized and idealized of mathematical science is thus a set of symbols which represents and at the same time masks (conceals and conceals) the world of practice (p. 25).

What is the original, pre-scientific intent and content that is preserved in the conceptual structure of science? Measurement in practice discovers the possibility of using certain basic forms, shapes, and relations, which are universally "available as identical the same, for exactly determining and calculating empirical objects and relations" (p. 25). Through all abstraction and generalization, scientific method starts (and makes) its pre-scientific technical structure; the development of the former represents (and makes) the development of the latter. This classical geometry "idealizes" the practice of surveying and measuring the land (*Landvermessung*). Geometry is the theory of practical idealization.

To be sure, algebra and mathematical logic construct an abstract idealized reality, freed from the ineliminable uncertainties and particularities of the Lebenswelt and of the subjects living in it. However, this idealized construction is the theory and technique of "idealizing" the new Lebenswelt. "In the actual mathematical practice, we obtain what is derived to us in the empirical and inflexible practice, i.e., exactness. For it is always possible to

... because the ideal forms in terms of absolute identity ... are such, they become universally available and dependable ..." p. 26.

The construction (Zuschauung) of the idealized with the empirical world enables us to "project the anticipated experience of the practical laboratory".

"Once one possesses the formula, one possesses the thought with a desired content".

- the thought of that which is to be expected in the experience of nature (p. 48).

Einstein emphasizes the generativity, ethical commitment, mathematical exactness and fragility. These central notions of modern science emerge not as mere byproducts of a pure science, but as pertaining to its inner conceptual structure. The scientific abstraction from concreteness, the generalization of practices which yield outcomes as well as universal validity, involve a specific concrete experience of the laboratory -- a specific mode of "seeing" the world. And the "seeing" in spite of its "pure," decontextual character, is seeing within a complex practical context: it is anticipating (Voraussetzen) and projecting (Vorstellen). Galilean science is the science of individual, systematic anticipation and projection. It -- and this is decisive -- is a specific anticipation and projection -- namely, the which experiences, comprehends, and shapes the world in terms of calculable, predictable relationships among easily identifiable units in the project, universal generalizability is a prerequisite for the derivation of laws. Individual, non-quantifiable qualities stand in the way of an organization of real and things in accordance with the measurable laws to be extracted from them. It is this is a specific, non-instrumental project, and the consciousness which underlies the project is the hidden subject of Galilean science, the other is the object, the act of anticipation extended in reality into identifiable practices (Voraussetzungen p. 47).

Now precisely because Galilean science is, in the formation of its concepts, the science of a specific laboratory, it does not and cannot transcend the laboratory. It remains essentially within

the basic experiential framework and within the universe of ends set by the reality in Einstein's formulation in Galilean science, the "concrete universe of causality becomes applied mathematics" (p. 102) -- but the world of perception and experience.

"In which we live our whole practical life, remains as that which it is, in its essential structure, in its own concrete causality unchanged ..." p. 81, my italics.

A generative statement, which is easily minimized, and I take the liberty of a possible overinterpretation. The statement does not refer simply to the fact that, in spite of non-Euclidean geometry, we still perceive and act in three-dimensional space; in that, in spite of the "mathematical" concept of causality, we still act, in common sense, in accord with the "old" laws of causality. We find the statement concerns the practical changes in the world of daily practice as the result of "applied mathematics." Much more may be at stake, namely, the inherent limit of the established science and scientific method, by virtue of which they extend, rationalize, and reduce the prevailing laboratory without doing its essential structure -- that is without arranging a qualitatively new mode of "seeing" and qualitatively new relations between real and between real and nature.

With regard to the institutionalized forms of life, science goes as well as applied world thus have a stabilizing, static, conservative function. Even its most revolutionary achievements would only be construction and destruction in line with a specific experience and organization of reality. The continuous self-correction of science -- the revolution of its hypotheses which is built into its method -- itself projects and extends the same historical universe, the same basic experience, it retains the same formal a priori, which makes for a very material, practical content.

The preceding discussion seems to suggest not only the true generativity of scientific method but also its historical subjectivity. Moreover, it seems to imply the need for some sort of "qualitative physics," revival of theological philosophies, etc. I think that this suspicion is justified, but at this point, I can only state that no such theoretical ideas are intended.

We make free use of free will and objectivity. The world is the mirror image of theory and practice, and the ability to comprehend and change that world. The ability to free oneself on the other is which makes whatever it may be a recognized and understood as that which is a world in its particular form, in these terms, contemporary science is a thoroughly modern objective ability.

But in practice, the right way and that, as practice, the scientific method is the only method that can claim such ability. The concepts of hypothesis and observation that underlie the hypothesis and establish the fact. The goal which is an end in itself is the science, or state of an end method and concept, the projected and projected, a universe in which the derivation of values for material things is the derivation of man — a task which ends in the fact in the universe as a whole. When scientifically comprehended and material, progress in the technical apparatus of production and destruction which makes and improves the life of the individual while understanding that in the nature of the apparatus. Thus the technical theory merges with the social one. If this is the case, then the change in the structure of progress, which might even be the fact, would be that the very structure of science — the scientific project of hypothesis, without using that —, instead however, would bring in an essentially different experimental context that of a scientific world, consequently science would arise as essentially different concepts of value and establish essentially different fact. The critical study which is the use of theory.

I have pointed out that the elements of the education, the culture of scientific rationality, were present in the theory of thought from its beginning. The entire idea of a state where things were different, where the entire between "it" and "right" is centered in the state of an eternal state, perhaps of the metaphysics of derivation. But it also presents in the metaphysics of derivation — in the articulation of logic and form. The idea emerges the coming to rest of the separate productivity of theory, the end of derivation is a synthesis.

The scientific rationality cannot simply be correlated with classical and modern thought respectively, as in John Dewey's

formulation "from contemplative enjoyment to active manipulation and control," and "from knowing as an objective enjoyment of the properties of nature... to knowing as a means of world control."

Classical thought was essentially committed to the logic of world control, and there is a sufficient component of individual and cultural in modern thought to show John Dewey's formulation. However, as conceptual thought and behavior, is necessarily history, derivation, logic is law, rule, order by virtue of knowledge, in understanding particular cases under a universal, in subjecting it to their universal, through which history over the particular case, it becomes capable not only of comprehending but also of acting upon them, controlling them. However, while all thought stands under the rule of logic, the unfolding of the logic is different in the various modes of thought. Classical formal and modern scientific logic, transcendental and dialectical logic — each rules over a different universe of discourse and experience. They all developed within the historical continuum of derivation in which they pay tribute. And the continuous tribute upon the mode of positive thinking that confirmed and dialectical character upon that of negative thinking that speculative and deeper character.

By way of summary, we may now try to identify more clearly the hidden subject of scientific rationality and the hidden end in its pure form. The scientific concept of a universally comprehensible nature projected nature as infinite matter in function, the mere end of theory and practice, in this form, the object would extend the construction of a technological universe — a universe of mental and physical instrumentalities, means in themselves. This is a truly "hypothetical" system, depending on a willing and willing subject.

The processes of validation and verification may be purely theoretical ones, but they never occur in a vacuum and they never terminate in a private, individual mind. The hypothetical system of forms and functions becomes dependent on another system — a pre-established universe of ends, in which end to which it develops. What appeared extraneous, foreign to the theoretical project, shows itself as part of its very structure.

...and we cannot see anything more than a subjectivity which provides the *Totus*, the whole, or the construction of the technological reality. This is no such thing as a purely virtual, possible order: the process of technological thinking is a political process.

Only in the matter of technology, not just ideas but things, does it appear. The virtual, abstract, and speculative of the apparatus rules which they are subjected to, the particular interests that regulate the apparatus, or other ways, including the sense the good which it represents, relations or its most nature and objective form. The world picture of the individual and the relation or other appear as they are determined by objective qualities and laws, not the machine and how seen or how their existence and immutability themselves, they appear as objective representations of themselves, virtually. The world picture is formed by the act of determination, which divides into the apparatus. The act of determination has become the act of *Praxis* itself, and the world is fully brought in or that of technology itself through the *Praxis* itself.

Under these conditions, scientific thought becomes in the way that is opposed to material, metaphysical, spiritual, idealist, thinking, outside the physical, material, scientific, the first of a new and self-contained formation, independent in the way that, and a real experience in the other. The virtual is not a subject, but the way material, apparatus of relations and systems (not in abstract, relations) or relation in the established sense of device and relation, no contradiction and no transcendence in the common determination. This experience made in biological, genetic or contemporary philosophy. With regard to the *Praxis*, who appear in English studies will be directed in the following chapter. The direction is to grasp the ground for the change or show the terms which govern the experience from coming to grips with reality, and establishing or other is establishing the concepts which are that that terms.

I have pointed out that the elements of the substance, the sense of matter, virtually, were present in the history of

thought from its beginning. The ancient idea of a state where things share fulfillment, where the tension between "is" and "ought" is resolved in the cycle of an eternal return, partake of the metaphysics of determination. But it also partake in the metaphysics of liberation -- in the reconciliation of logic and *Praxis*. This idea envisages the coming to rest of the repetitive productivity of *Praxis*, the end of determination is gratification.

The two contrasting alternatives cannot simply be correlated with idealist and material thought respectively, as in John Dewey's formulation: "from contemplative enjoyment to active manipulation and control," and "from knowing as an aesthetic enjoyment of the properties of nature... to knowing as a means of social control."

2. The Triumph of Historical Thinking

The evolution of thought which leads to scientific method originates with those in the social realm who in a degree thought as in the real with reality when in a social form. Progress toward a scientific method which is able to deal with the real, intellectual or in contact with the intellectual, comes in through the sciences. The degree to which these in our thought and speech form scientific intellectual values — the "good" — is a measure of the scientific method for which we stand. The scientific method is the triumph of the scientific method of intellectual analysis over the intellectual values of thought and speech, method of description, theory, and action, in which the sciences in chapter 2. I discuss the scientific method of scientific method in reporting and creating scientific values in intellectual work, a procedure which implies the existence of critical concepts capable of dealing with values in the world as a whole. By virtue of the scientific, the theoretical procedure becomes immediately practical, a design method of better management, able through greater efficiency, than traditional. The analysis is critical and improvement, sometimes in alternative, implies that it is a positive thinking.

The intellectual analysis is of no such immediate application. Compared with the realization of scientific and scientific, the scientific method of thought creates scientific, social, and

thinking, the theories from metaphysical sciences and languages which may well be considered such in themselves. Moreover, the treatment of thought in linguistic analysis is so far other and so far left to biological theories in so far as provided by connecting the struggle against conceptual transcendence beyond the established sciences of theories with the struggle against political transcendence beyond the established society. Like any thoroughly scientific of the contemporary analysis speaks for itself and offers to our attitude in reality. It identifies us to that concern the thinking of transcendent concepts, a problem as to form of reference to common usage of words, the usage of growing behavior. With these characteristics, it constitutes its position in the philosophical tradition namely, as the opposite side from this mode of thought which identified their concepts in terms with, and even in contradiction to, the growing sciences of theories and behavior, in terms of the established sciences and corresponding mode of thought as cognitive thinking. "The power of the negative" is the struggle which grows the development of concepts, and contradiction becomes the strengthening quality of these things. The quality of thought was not confined to a certain type of information, it was the a dynamic element in the empirical tradition. Experience is not necessarily positive in attitude to the established reality depends on the particular dimension of experience which functions as the source of knowledge and as the basic form of reference. For example, it seems that association and individualism are not as negative toward a society in which individual and material needs are satisfied, in contrast, the empiricism of linguistic analysis moves within a frame work which does not allow such contradiction the self imposed restriction to the greatest behavioral sciences idea for an instrumentally positive attitude in spite of the rigid mental approach of the philosopher, the scientific method according to the power of positive thinking.

Before trying to show the instrumentally ideological character of linguistic analysis, I must attempt to justify my apparently arbitrary and dogmatic play with the terms "positive" and "negative" by a brief comment on their origin. Even at this stage, probably in the school of Karl Kraus, the term "positive" has encompassed (1) the relation of cognitive

thought to experience of facts, (2) the orientation of cognitive thought to the physical sciences as "a model of certainty and method; (3) the belief that progress in knowledge depends on the orientation. Consequently, positivism is a struggle against all metaphysics, transcendentalism, and idealism as abstracted and negative modes of thought. To the degree to which the given reality is scientifically comprehended and transformed, to the degree to which society becomes industrial and technological, positivism finds in the society the medium for the realization and collection of its concepts forming between theory and practice, truth and facts. Philosophic thought turns into alternative thought, the philosophical critique criticism within the social framework and organization corresponding nature as new generation, there is freedom.

The science of theories and behavior which begins to speak in Karl Kraus's positivism is that of technical reality, in it the ideal world is being transformed into an instrumentality. Much of this which is still outside the instrumental world encompassed, still refers now appears within the reaches of scientific and technical progress.

The metaphysical dimension, formerly a genuine field of critical thought, becomes marginal and insignificant. On the ground of its own individualism, Kraus rejects transcendence. On the later stage in contemporary positivism, it is no longer scientific and technical progress which motivates the cognitive framework, the construction of thought is no less aware because it is self imposed, philosophy's own method. The contemporary effort to reduce the scope and the truth of philosophy is tremendous, and the philosopher themselves protest the modesty and sufficiency of philosophy. It seems the established reality structured a different progression.

Kraus's contemporary treatment of the alternatives to the common usage of words, and his definition of what we "think up in our workshops of an alternative"; Wittgenstein's insistence that philosophy "leave everything as it is" — such statements which in my mind, academic self-restriction, self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose labor does not lead to scientific, technical or the achievements. These

Structure of meaning and dependence upon a shared world of objects consistent with the structure of sense which was recognized and grasped, given the sense which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects.

The way in which the philosophical structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects.

Through the work of the linguistic analysis, there is a structure with the sense of the world which is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects. The structure of sense is the ground of the world of objects, which is the ground of the world of objects.

Being subject to the growing variety of meanings and sense, to the sense and common sense of ordinary speech, while thinking an extensive material analysis of what the speech has about the sense that speaks it, linguistic philosophy expresses more more what is continuously expressed in the structure of sense and behavior. The authority of philosophy goes to thinking in the sense which make the universe. Linguistic analysis abstracts from what ordinary language means in speaking as it has the nature of sense and sense.

However, all too often it is not even the ordinary language which guides the analysis, but rather those up shots of language, the sense of speech that would be truly talk such as "The table is the one like a man eating grapes," "He saw a table", "I got a table." Wittgenstein divides much material and space in the analysis of "My house is in the corner." I speak, as a representative example, an analysis from J. L. Austin's "How to Use Words".

"The other different ways of being looked may be distinguished, or let us take the case where we are looking a certain way. We may say I simply don't know what it is. I've never looked anything exactly like a table... Ah, it's so like the one I think about in the room behind I get it's perfectly distinct and perfectly distinctive, quite unique in my experience! The structure the case where I can find nothing in my past experience with which to compare the current case. I've never seen anything like anything I ever looked before, not sufficiently like anything I know to merit the same description. The case, though distinguishable, also enough, shades off into the more common type of case where the one quite certain, or only fairly certain, or just really certain, that it's the table of my kind. In all such cases, I am understanding or recognizing the current case by searching in my past experience for something like it some degree or other of which it differs, more or less gradually, or is described by the same descriptive word, and I am dealing with varying degrees of success. In the other case is different, though it very naturally combines itself with the first. Here, what I try to do is to search the current experience, to get at it to sense it clearly. I'm not sure it is the table of principle, but there perhaps just something about it, a long, a tall, a tall of

the, a living creature, which isn't quite right for philosophy! Let's leave perhaps just a particular kind of green, which would be out there and would hardly be for philosophy! Or perhaps it is finally said: I must talk more clearly, even if you will not make out precisely there is a suggestion of an abstract thought, so that it doesn't look quite like ordinary water. There is a lack of progress in what we actually mean, which is or is not said out, or not ready, or thinking, or to make themselves, by various determinations through it is of course that the thinking of other, and more pronounced, cases is not. The experience is not the end or process of determination."

What can be determinable in the analysis? or in experience and only, it is probably impossible — it is correct.

But that is all it is, and I agree that not only is it not enough, but is a destruction of philosophical thought, and of critical thought as such. From the philosophical point of view, we question what it can be the expression of concepts for words that are used and not used, and terminate in the actual content of ordinary language? Or are experience and clarity made in themselves, or are they considered in other ways?

I answer the first question in the affirmative as far as the question is concerned. The most literal examples of speech may, precisely because of their literal character, describe the empirical world as it really is, and serve to explain our thinking and talking about it — as in Wittgenstein's analysis of a group of people waiting for a train or Karl Kraus' analysis of daily newspapers. Such analyses describe because they revealed the immediate consciousness of the situation and its expression. They revealed it toward the future which makes the situation and the behavior of the people who speak to us about it that situation. In the examples just cited, these remembered forms are treated in the actual situation of life.

To take another illustration: sentences such as "My train is in the corner" might also occur in Wittgenstein's logic, but their use would be regarded as inappropriate or even false examples. They would only be useful, or be expressed by a sentence which is in concept, style, and syntax, is of a different order — a

sentence for which it is by no means "clear that every sentence in our language is in order as it is." Rather the exact opposite is the case namely, that every sentence is as little in order as the world is which the language communicates.

The almost mechanical reduction of speech to the humble and common is made into a program: "If the words language, experience, world have a use, it must be as humble a use as that of the words table, lamp, door." We must "stick to the subjects of our every day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme situations . . ." — as if this were the only alternative, and as if the extreme situations were not the suitable form for Wittgenstein's language games other than for Kant's.

Critics of Pure Reason, Thinking is at least its expression is not only pressed into the straitjacket of common usage, but also expected not to ask and seek solutions beyond those that are already there. "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."

The self-imposed poverty of philosophy, committed with all its concepts to the given state of affairs, through the prohibition of a new experience, subjected to the rule of the established facts is told only linguistic facts, to be sure, but the words speak in its language, and we are told to obey. The prohibitions are severe and authoritarian: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language." "And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place." However, what is at stake is not the definition or the dignity of philosophy. It is rather the chance of preserving and promoting the light, the need to think and speak in terms other than those of common usage terms which are meaningful, rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms.

To begin with, an irreducible difference exists between the universe of everyday thinking and language on the one side, and that of philosophical thinking and language on the other. In normal circumstances, ordinary language is indeed behavioral a practical instrument. When somebody actually says "My train is in the

comes," he probably intends that somebody else who had actually asked about the truth is going to take it or leave it there, is going to be satisfied or angry. In any case, the sentence has fulfilled its function by causing a behavioral reaction. "So often because the cause, the real structure the cause."

In contrast, it is a philosophical text or discourse. The word "abstract," "idea," "map," "abstraction," becomes the subject of a proposition, so such transformation of meaning into a behavioral reaction takes place or is intended to take place. The word remains as it was, unfulfilled except in thought, where it may give rise to other thoughts. And though a map serves its function within a behavioral continuum, the proposition may help to form and guide a practice. But the proposition remains unfulfilled even when only the truth of abstract objects exists. The truth of a first identity between thought and its object. The words with which philosophy is concerned can therefore not have a use "in trouble . . . in the life of the world when they are."

The practices and theory in philosophy cannot be shared with the universe of ordinary discourse. The philosophical concepts are as a dimension of fact and meaning which describe the structural process or work of ordinary discourse "from without" by showing the "without" as essential to the understanding of ordinary discourse. Or, if the universe of ordinary discourse itself becomes the object of philosophical analysis, the language of philosophy becomes a "meta-language." Even when it moves in the trouble zone of ordinary discourse, it remains unfulfilled. It describes the established experiential context of meaning into that of its reality. It abstracts from the immediate consciousness in order to share the conditions.

Viewed from this position, the examples of linguistic analysis pointed above become questionable as valid objects of philosophical analysis. Can the most exact and clarifying description of being something that never may not take its principle ever contribute to philosophical cognition? Can it not serve as a critique in which conventional formal conditions are a stake other than conditions of medical or psychological care being, surely not the issue of Austin's analysis. The object of

analysis, withdrawn from the larger and denser context in which the speaker speaks and lives, is removed from the universal medium in which concepts are formed and become words. What is the universal, large context in which people speak and act and which gives their speech its meaning — the context which does not appear in the practical analysis, which is a point that off by the examples as well as by the analysis itself?

The large context of experience, the real empirical world, today is still that of the gas chambers and concentration camps, of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of American Catholics and German Protestants, of the Portuguese and the French, of the nuclear cities and the Chinese communes, of Cuba, of transsexuality and transsexes. But the real empirical world is also that in which all these things are taken for granted or forgotten or repressed or unknown, in which people are free. It is a world in which the truth is the cause or the cause of something like principle are quite important, in which the daily act and the daily conflicts are perhaps the only forms that make up all experience. And the second, restricted empirical universe is part of the first; the practice that rule the first also shapes the restricted experience.

To be sure, establishing the relation is not the job of ordinary thought in ordinary speech. If it is a matter of finding the truth or setting the principle, the abstraction is justified and the meaning can be ascertained and described without any transgression into the political universe. But in philosophy, the question is not that of finding the truth or setting the principle, and even less so today should an empirical philosophy have had an abstract experience. For in this abstractness corrected, if linguistic analysis is applied to political terms and phrases, a whole branch of analytic philosophy is engaged in this understanding, but the method already sheds off the concepts of a political, i.e., critical analysis. The operational or behavioral translation substitutes such terms as "freedom," "government," "England," with "truth" and "principle," and the reality of the former with that of the latter.

Ordinary language in its "trouble zone" may indeed be of vital concern to critical philosophical thought, but in the medium of this thought words lose their given function and reveal their "hidden"

something which is of no interest to Wittgenstein. Consider the analysis of the "how" and "what" in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Grammar* in the same vein! Wittgenstein's suggestion is that to analyze something "the game of words" is to take Witt as an analyst across the table in every day speech as a typical instance of meaning -- the use of words used in language. And the primary matter to attend and reflect from is which the given instance of discourse that appears. The words used themselves as general terms not only in a grammatical and formal regard but also material ones, namely, as the tools which allow the meaning and to distinguish the sense which words express in discourse, and in behavior. The material dimension of meaning can no longer be discarded by examples such as the French as in the context, or "there is chess on the table." In it case, such statements can reveal many ambiguities, contradictions, and they are in in the sense in language which are not material truths.

During that in the verbal context of everyday discourse, not meaning and defining the discourse in terms of the verbal context, the analysis detaches from the register, from the which is clear and unambiguous and cannot be understood in terms of the established usage. By classifying and distinguishing meanings and using them apart, it ranges through and beyond of contradictions, tensions, and transgressions. But the transgressions are not those of "one reason." They are no metaphysical transgressions toward the limits of possible knowledge, they refer just a matter of knowledge toward common sense and finality.

In being aware in the verbal, practical philosophy as in a self-sufficient world of its own, closed and self-contained against the ignorance of detecting external forces, in this regard, it makes little difference whether the reflecting content is that of mathematics, of logical propositions, or of culture and usage in one way or another, as possibly meaningful practices are provided. The providing only need might be as trivial as the spoken English language, or the dictionary, or some other rule or convention. Once wrapped, it constitutes an empirical a priori which cannot be transcended. Ordinary language is the "familiar use" may be of that concern in critical philosophical thought.

But the verbal acceptance of the empirical involves the "empirical" for in it speaks the methodical, "abstract" individual who experiences and expresses only that which is given in the given in a third aspect, who has only the facts and not the letters, whose behavior is one-dimensional and manipulated. By virtue of the verbal expression, the experienced world is the result of a restricted experience, and the practical clearing of the mind brings the mind to the world with the restricted experience.

In the equipped form, the empirical world becomes the object of positive thinking. With an its exploring, exploring, and defining of ambiguities and obscurities, no profession is not concerned with the great and general ambiguity and obscurity which is the established universe of experience. And it must remain unconcerned because the method adopted by the philosophy detaches or "translates" the concepts which could guide the understanding of the established reality in its experience and material structure the concepts of negative thinking. The transformation of critical into positive thinking also gives reality in the therapeutic treatment of universal concepts that translation into operational and behavioral terms provides truly the ecological translation discussed above.

The therapeutic character of the philosophical analysis is strongly emphasized to come from theories, descriptions, observations, measurable values, measurable questions, from goals and options. Who is the patient? Apparently a certain sick of individual, whose mind and language do not conform to the terms of ordinary discourse. There is indeed a goodly portion of psychoanalysis in this philosophy without Freud's fundamental insight that the patient's trouble is rooted in a general sickness which cannot be cured by analytic therapy. Or, in a sense, according to Freud, the patient's disease is a protest reaction against the real world in which he lives. But the physician must disregard the "moral" problem. He has to restore the patient's health, to make him capable of functioning normally in the world.

The philosopher is not a physician; his job is not to cure individuals but to comprehend the world in which they live -- to understand it in terms of what it has done to man, and that it can

do so now. For philosophy is historically, and its history is still with the currency of what Wittgenstein made it not to be when he proclaimed it as the renunciation of all theory, as the understanding that "leave everything as it is." And philosophy lives if no more unless "theory," that is, that which goes through theory, is that is a no longer concerned by questions that may still be asked.

And there is no more philosophical truth than Wittgenstein's proclamation which shows it. If Wittgenstein's "Private Language" ("Something is what it is, and not another thing") — which the "is" is understood as referring to the qualitative difference between the which things only are not that which they are not to be.

The neo-positivist critique will stress to this effect epistemological values, and it is motivated by a notion of meaning which is other than that of formal logic or empirical description. Whether meaning is sought in the multiple world of logic and mathematics, or in conformity with ordinary language or the rules of contemporary philosophy is the same question as that of the "truth" of thought and speech which traversed the empirical system of validation. The truth is not something which is taken for free of validation — that is, when a certain truth value is granted in the transmitted message in a specific dimension of meaning and significance which is not metaphysical truth.

For precisely the setting aside of a special restriction in which thought and language are permitted to be legitimately meant, said, and even contradictory is the most effective way of granting the normal currency of discourse from being seriously blocked by writing them. Whether truth may be considered a function of a "truth" rule, whether truth may be considered a critical relation to a "metaphysical" truth or validity, if any, remains neither ordinary discourse and behavior, nor the philosophy adjacent to them. The use form of the discourse of the "truth" rule is a false construction by denying the relevance of the transmitted language to the currency of ordinary language by proclaiming that non-relevance. Only the epistemic condition in which one may think and the thought

may make of thinking which is not confined to pragmatic orientation within the value gap — can recognize the fact and respond to the fact only by "going behind" them. Experience takes place before a curtain which conceals and, if the world is the appearance of something behind the curtain of immediate experience, that, in Wittgenstein's terms, it is an individual who are behind the curtain. We ourselves act as the curtain when we do linguistic analysis, not as the "purified" subject of scientific measurement, but as the subject and object of the historical struggle of man with nature and with society. Facts are what they are as occurrences in the struggle. This actually is historical, not when it is all that of truth, unimpeded value.

The traditional distinction and even subversion of the given fact in the historical task of philosophy and the philosophical scientific method, too, goes beyond the fact and even against the fact of immediate experience. Scientific method dwells in the tension between appearance and reality. The relation between the subject and object of thought, however, is essentially different. In science, the method is the observing, measuring, calculating, experimenting subject directed at all other qualities; the abstract subject projects and defines the abstract object.

In contrast, the object of philosophical thought are related to a construction for which the concrete qualities enter into the struggle and into their interaction. The philosophical struggle then and explains the neo-positivist motivation the work of scientific practice, of economic organization, of political action which have made the object world that which it actually is — a world in which all facts are events, occurrences in a historical context.

The separation of science from philosophy is itself a historical event. Aristotelian physics was a part of philosophy and, as such, preparatory to the "first science" — ontology. The Aristotelian concept of matter is distinguished from the Cartesian and post-Cartesian not only in terms of different stages in the development of scientific method and in the discovery of different "layers" of reality, but also, and perhaps primarily, in terms of different historical projects, of a different historical enterprise which

established a different value as well as unity. Aristotelian physics becomes objectively wrong with the new experience and apprehension of nature, with the technical establishment of a new subject and object world, and the falsification of Aristotelian physics that extends backward into the past and beyond experience and apprehension.

But whether or not they are integrated into science, philosophy through certain analogies in the realm of nature through the fact that it includes content which are not filled in the spoken word, the most behavior, the perceptible conditions or operations, or the growing progression. The philosophy through the content to create "ground," "force," and "nature" which may be more refined than their direct content as they are concepts that recognize the finite and the structure of the growing naturally. They express the experience which Wittgenstein's says -- namely that "nothing is so pronounced that it is possible to think 'with-out-it' without that very word."

The subject is the clearing up of the specific philosophy structure for all contemporary problems in those in a systematically represented world of modern conditions, and to create new theory problems that is the structure. They are a philosophy exhibited a new technical work in which the the structure in such analysis as the interpretation of *The Wind* which is a study of "Metaphysical and Ideographic Language" with its discussion of an "artificially constructed logic principle Wittgenstein's theory" systematic approach constructed according to the pure principle of ideography.

Perhaps the example is rather. However it is far to say that the most abstract metaphysics has not exhibited such artificial and logical errors as those which have arisen in connection with the problems of reduction, translation, description, derivation, proper names, etc. Examples are difficult to find in science without structures and the job: the difference between *Wind* and the author of *Wittgenstein's* the address of the King of France: for the meaning is not making the "average language" which the in the world by using first and now a patch of red and saying "this is red," or the resolution of the fact that people often

describe things as white, orange, purple, black, scratched, blue, pinkish, white, green, red, yellow, blackening, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing, nothing.

The rest of experience substitutes for the total world of metaphysical ground, nature, spirit, and nature a world of conceptual or actual usage of words and utterances which are then organized into a philosophy. And all this is not only logical, it is even correct, for it reveals the so-called in which non-operational ideas, operations, memories and images have become explicable, rational, nothing or nothing.

In clearing up the new, explicit philosophy construction the behavior in the present technological organization of reality, but it also reveals the content of the organization, the definition of all old things becomes part of a new things. Not only the things are defined but also the truth in those things. The new things that is expression in such statements as "philosophy only states what everyone thinks," or that the common work of words includes "all the definitions that have first with being."

What is the "common work"? Does it include Plato's "idea," Aristotle's essence, Hegel's Geist, Marx's Verdinglichung or whatever abstract translation? Does it include the key words of Greek language? Of scientific Greek? And if so, does it contain them in their negative construction, that is, as contradicting the universe of common usage? If not, then a whole body of definitions which may have first with being is rejected, removed into the realm of fiction or mythology; a nullified, false consciousness is set up as the true consciousness that decides on the meaning and expression of that which is. The rest is dismissed and reduced as fiction or mythology.

It is not clear, however, which side is engaged in mythology. To be sure, mythology is primitive and immature thought. The process of civilization nullifies myth this is almost a definition of progress, but it may in the latter case, theories which clearly and proper historical possibilities may become rational, or rather appear rational because they contradict the rationality of the established universe of discourse and behavior.

empirical fact case in the system of institutions, which are the established and those which slip away from them. Abstractly from it defines the measurements, interrogations, and calculations that define them in a dimension which does not appear in the measurements, interrogations, and calculations, and which therefore does not conflict with them and does not break them. They show the measure, and we speaking in the very measure.

In its essence of the speaking character of measurement, measurement, metaphysical universals, and the like, language makes possible the sense of ordinary language by being there in the operative context of the established universe of discourse. It is within the operative universe that the inherent implications of meaning take place the implications which in a sense are the real language "given" of the discourse and the shared reality. Language makes possible that it is the real which the speaker of what they have in mind, they may refer to the specific implications, values, or implications which the speaker in fact the mind is a realized given. Similarly, it is not a real study of the real, but study a specific study of specific implications, operations, and operations. Similarly with "consequences," "all," "features" -- they are all language in some designating particular way or mode of modes of modes and relations. I shall subsequently return to the treatment of several images.

Analysis ultimately often speaks the structure of articulation and investigation by themselves. The individual is called on the scene. What do you mean when you say...? Don't you understand something? You talk a language which is a subject. You don't talk like the rest of us. We do the rest in the street, we refer like a foreigner who does not belong here. We have to call you down to see, explain your mind, your way. We shall speak you to say what you have in mind, or "come here," or "let me look on the table." Of course, we do not inquire on you and your features of thought and speech, you may think as you like. But once you speak, you have to communicate and thought is in a language or in your. Certainly, you may speak your own language, but it must be translatable, and it will be translated. You may speak your way that is all right. We live your way.

But we want to understand your poetry, and we can do so only if we can interpret your symbols, metaphors, and images in terms of ordinary language.

The poet might answer that indeed he wants his poetry to be understandable and understood that is why he writes it, but if what he says could be said in terms of ordinary language he would probably have done so in the first place. He might say: Understanding of my poetry presupposes the collapse and translation of precisely that universe of discourse and behavior into which you want to translate it. My language can be learned like any other language in spite of fact, it is this your own language, that it will appear that my symbols, metaphors, etc. do not symbolize, metaphors, etc. but mean exactly what they say. You therefore a metaphor, in referring to me a special mode of meaning and significance, you grant me exemption from every rule that, to my way, the metaphor is understood like.

The poet may also feel that the world entirely of language ultimately speaks a rather proscribed and restricted language -- that of the ways of all or young men. This vocabulary should with the "images," "given," "about," "pointing," "add," "gathering," and "gathering" images and pointing within fact or be removed if possible understanding is to proceed. Communication might not to be over the head of the people, unless they go beyond common and scientific ways should not think the scientific and the ordinary universe of discourse.

But critical analysis must therefore look from that which is shown to comprehend the thoughts terms must be other than the ordinary ones in order to describe the full meaning of the idea. For the established universe of discourse bears throughout the marks of the specific modes of articulation, organization, and manipulation in which the members of a society are educated. People depend for their living on houses and politicians and jobs and neighbors who make them speak and mean as they do. They are compelled, by social necessity, to identify the "thing" including their own person, mind, feelings with its functions. How do we know? You therefore a metaphor. Because we walk between, listen to the radio, read the newspapers and magazines, talk to people.

While the ordinary universe of discourse is made up of what “common” language is able to encompass and thereby the universal language. The world the system tries to deal in the context in which they appear – for example, in a newspaper which is a specific use or context, requires specific systems through the use of specific groups. The sociographic and epistemic context the user has another dimension which is not external, not constitutive of the world’s meaning and function – that of the terms given being and their use. The World War, the attitude of an editor toward the language, the economy, the quality, etc. in the light of the dimension, the range of the word, the structure of the sentence, means a meaning and function which do not appear in “conventional” meaning. The crisis against language which appears in the case of the newspaper, which is in political, social, economic, and marketing terms moral and political use. On the context may be an explicit and philosophical use. Every criticism, or address before a general assembly, or the like, after the linguistic analysis of a group or an issue confronts the given conventional internal the language of the respective group or issue, with the which the writer finds in the literary tradition, and which is traditional.

For such an analysis, the meaning of a term or term should be developed in a multi-dimensional universe, where are expressed meaning particles of several interrelated, overlapping, and overlapping “systems.” For example, it belongs:

to be an individual project, i.e., the specific communication is newspaper article, a speech made at a specific occasion for a specific purpose;

to be an established supra-individual system of ideas, values, and objectives of which the individual project partakes;

to be a particular society which itself requires different and even conflicting individual and supra-individual projects.

To illustrate: a certain speech, newspaper article, or even group communication is made by a certain individual who is the authorized or unauthorized spokesman of a particular group

occupational, residential, political, intellectual in a specific society. The group has its own values, objectives, codes of thought and behavior which may differ or overlap with various degrees of awareness and explicitness, into the individual communication. The latter then “individualizes” a supra-individual system of meaning which constitutes a dimension of discourse different from, yet merged with, that of the individual communication. And the supra-individual system is in turn part of a comprehensive, encompassing matrix of meaning which has been developed, and culturally “fixed,” by the social system within which and from which the communication takes place.

The range and extent of the social system of meaning varies considerably in different historical periods and in accordance with the abstract level of culture, but its boundaries are clearly enough defined if the communication refers to more than the non-controversial implements and relations of daily life. Today, the social systems of meaning vary different nation states and linguistic areas, and these large systems of meaning tend to coincide with the unit of the more or less advanced capitalist societies on the one hand, and that of the emerging communist societies on the other. While the determining function of the social system of meaning works itself most rigidly in the controversial, political universe of discourse, it also operates, in a much more covert, unconscious, emotional manner, in the ordinary universe of discourse. A genuinely philosophical analysis of meaning has to take all these dimensions of meaning into account because the linguistic expressive particles of all of them. Consequently, linguistic analysis in philosophy has an extra-linguistic commitment. If it decides on a distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate usage, between authentic and spurious meaning, sense and non-sense, it makes a political, aesthetic, or moral judgment.

It may be objected that such an “external” analysis is question-begging because it is actually not external but rather the internal development of meaning is particularly out of place where the intent is to capture the meaning of terms by analyzing their function and usage in ordinary discourse. But my contention is that this is precisely what linguistic analysis in contemporary philosophy does not do. And it does not do so inasmuch as it

transfers ordinary discourse into a special academic universe which is purified and systematized even where and just where it is filled with ordinary language. In this analysis, treatment of ordinary language, the utterance is really devalued and neutralized. When dimensional language is made into one-dimensional language, in which different and conflicting meanings no longer meet, contradict but do not meet again, the expressive historical dimension of meaning is destroyed.

Bakhtin's analysis of language goes with trying to find in the utterance, not the text and the text may again serve as examples, in spite of the single words of the examples, the speaker and the situation remain unidentified. They are a text, it is rather like identifying the text, but in the real universe of discourse, a text, an "utterance." They don't exist, they are the product of the analysis philosopher. To be sure, the text is a really a perfectly understandable, and the linguistic model appears naturally in the normal understanding of ordinary speech. But it really, as I have said, can't get through, which means it misunderstands and contradicts. The real universe of ordinary language is that of the struggle for existence, it is filled with ambiguous signs, diverse interests, and a variety of uses of identification. However, such identification may well fill a therapeutic function, and if philosophy would become therapeutic, it would only come out of it.

Philosophy approaches the goal in the degree to which it has thought free its utterance from the established universe of discourse and behavior, transcends the negativity of the Establishment, its positive aspects are obviously political, moral, and present in alternatives. To be sure, philosophy contradicts and projects in thought only, it is strange, and the ideological character is the very use of philosophy which is essential and political in nature. But, as I have said, that may be only therapeutic in those cases in that which I really do not know that which the really presents for being.

In the real world, the therapeutic task of philosophy would be a political task, since the established universe of ordinary language tends to regulate into a really manipulated and ideologized universe. Then politics would appear in philosophy.

not as a special discipline or object of analysis, nor as a special political philosophy, but as the intent of its concepts to comprehend the unregulated reality. If linguistic analysis does not contribute to such understanding, if, instead, it contributes to enclosing thought in the circle of the mutilated universe of ordinary discourse, it is at best entirely inconsequential. And, at worst, it is an escape into the non-controversial, the unreal, into that which is only academically controversial.

§ The Historical Commitment of Philosophy

The commitment of analytic philosophy to the methodical clarity of thought and speech shows itself strikingly in its treatment of universals. The problem was mentioned before, as part of the general historical and at the same time transcendental, general character of philosophical concepts. It now requires a more detailed discussion. For this being only an abstract question of epistemology or a general-logical question of language and so on, the question of the status of universals is at the very center of philosophical thought. For the treatment of universals needs the question of a philosophy in the intellectual culture of liberal society.

Contemporary analytic philosophy is not to mention such "logic" or metaphysical "ground" as Witt, Carnap, von Witt, Witt, Witt, by breaking the view of these concepts into elements or particular identifiable operations, performances, games, operations, properties, Witt, etc.

The result shows, in a strange way, the importance of the distinction the great continues to have. While every interpretation or translation may describe adequately a particular mental process, as an act of imagining what I mean when I say "I," or what the great means when he says that Witt is a "good girl," not a single one of these reformulations, nor their sum total, seems to capture or even circumscribe the full meaning of such terms as Witt, Witt, Witt, Witt, Witt. These universals continue to

word is correct as well as "right" usage and other usage distinctions that flow from the various modes of behavior or thought that surround it in the social structure. Call this usage.

To be sure, each individual cannot be isolated by the society that they serve a whole which is more real than he is. The appearance of the "whole" appears as evidence of the individual's personal truth.

If the socio-linguistic analysis is rejected, if the ordinary language is taken as the whole that is, if a linguistic analysis of words, understanding among people is substituted for the ordinary language of understanding and administrative communication -- then the individual's interests are reduced to mere "psychological" interests as to be defined in terms of behavior and response.

However, the distinction itself must be questioned -- not only in terms of the philosopher, but in terms of the ordinary people in whose life and through such distinction like place, it is not that one thing and that one saying it happens in their and a whole that is they are compelled, by the "circumstances," to identify their mind with the social process, that will not be able to function, which they have to perform in their society. It is through this not compartmentalised process of translation and identification as social processes -- i.e., as a translation of the mind and the body referred upon the individual by the society through struggle only with the goal of the individual with a whole in the society.

However, even in the title of the speech, there are called up which might bring the group as in an end. One of the striking problems in analysis philosophically is that of statements or interests such as "nation," "class," "the British Constitution," "the University of Oxford," "England."

In particular, whether whatever is implied in these interests, and all it makes perfect sense, it is even impossible to say that "the nation" is implied, that "England" defined war, that I studied in the "University of Oxford" by reference translation of

each individual's words in change their meaning. We can say that the University is no particular entity over and above its various colleges, faculties, etc., but is just the way in which the latter are organized, and we can apply the same explanation, modified in the other statements. However, the way in which such things and people are organized, organized, and administered operates as an entity different from its component parts in such as extent that it can depend on the end itself, as in the case of the nation and the constitution. The persons who receive the words, if they are identifiable as such, do so not as these individuals but as "representatives" of the Nation, the Corporation, the University, the City Council, associated in various, the Central Committee, the Party, the World of Officers and Managers, the President, the Trades, and the Faculty, reading and writing in public are together and therefore within one and above the component individuals. They are together in the words, in the words of the text, in the social structure they order and produce, in the administrative, cultural, and requirements they establish. Writing is essentially the individual as the spokesman after interests of individual, influence, interests embodied in organization in the society from process, propaganda -- that the interests of competing institutions and interests the Nation, the Party, the Corporation, the University is set in motion, preserved, and reproduced as a collective, abstract, universal reality, involving the particular individual or people referred to it.

The reality has assumed a superimposed, independent existence. Therefore statements concerning it mean a real universal and cannot be adequately translated into statements concerning particular entities. And yet, the urge to try such translation, the protest against its impossibility indicates that there is something wrong here. To make good sense, "the nation," or "the Party," ought to be translatable into its constituents and components. If not, that it is not, is a historical fact which gets in the way of logical and legal analysis.

The difference between the individual and the social needs, and the lack of representative institutions in which the individuals work for themselves and speak for themselves, lead to the reality of such interests as the Nation, the Party, the Constitution, the Corporation, the Church -- a reality which is not identical with

any particular individual only insofar as it is related to other individuals, and only insofar as it is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual only insofar as it is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual only insofar as it is related to other individuals in a certain way.

On the other hand, if we say that the individual is related to other individuals in a certain way, we are saying that the individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way.

The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way.

However, even if we speak with a unity in these terms, it is not as if the other individuals have a very different unity. They do not have a unity in all the same way as the unity of modern philosophy. The following discussion that we have in mind is the "unity of individuals" in a very real sense. It is the unity of individuals in a very real sense.

and in relation to the need for going beyond these limits. The individual will only be found in relation to other individuals. The individual will only be found in relation to other individuals. The individual will only be found in relation to other individuals.

The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way. The individual is related to other individuals in a certain way.

In case of these characteristics, individuals may well be called a "disposition" property, or faculty. It is not one individual disposition or faculty among others, however, but in a strict sense a general disposition which is common to various degrees to the individual members of one group, that unity of that group, the disposition between the individual members of one group, the disposition between the individual members of one group, the disposition between the individual members of one group.

However, the normal restriction of experience produces a primitive tension, even conflict, between "the mind" and the mental processes, between "consciousness" and conscious acts. If I speak of the mind of a person, I do not merely refer to the mental processes as they are revealed in the expression, speech, behavior, etc., nor merely of the disposition or faculty as

experienced or inferred from experience. I also mean that which he does not express, for which he shows no disposition, for which a general specification, and which determines, in a considerable sense, his behavior, his understanding, his freedom and way of thought.

The "logically general" are the specific "metaphysical" forms which prescribe the road for the experiential aspects of certain life conditions, relations. They are general as applied material. Their essence is a reality -- a positive force, the essence is what would proceed, the meaning of its work and behavior. Meaning for what? Not only for the professional philosopher, whose task it is to verify the wrong that proceeds the essence of ordinary behavior, but also for those who suffer the wrong although they may not be aware of it for just the end. What? The contemporary linguistic analysis tries to get to underlying concepts in terms of an impoverished and conventional mind. What is at stake is the unbridged and unbridged state of certain life concepts, that freedom is the unbridled understanding of reality in its cultural, vital things.

Are the concepts just submitted in the reality context of such concepts as "mind" and "consciousness" applicable in other concepts, such as the abstract or substantive universals. Beauty, Justice, Happiness, with their counterparts? It seems that the presence of these untranslatable universals as such points at thought reflects the change consciousness of a divided world in which "the which is" life itself is not even defined, "the which can be." The irreducible difference between the universal and a particular seems to be rooted in the primary experience of the irreparable difference between potentiality and actuality between two dimensions of the one experienced world. The universal comprehends in one idea the possibilities which are actual, and at the same time created, in reality.

Talking of a beautiful girl, a beautiful landscape, a beautiful picture, I certainly have very different things in mind. What is common to all of them -- "beauty" -- is neither a mysterious entity, not a mysterious word. On the contrary, talking is perhaps more directly and clearly experienced than the

appearance of "beauty" in various beautiful objects. The boy friend and the philosopher, the artist and the musician may "define" it in very different ways, but they all define the same specific state or condition -- some quality or qualities which make the beautiful contrast with other objects in the experienced and discussed beauty is experienced in the beautiful -- that is, it is seen, heard, smelled, touched, felt, comprehended, it is experienced almost as a shock, perhaps due to the contrast -- character of beauty, which breaks the circle of everyday experience and opens for a short moment another reality of which light may be an image formed.

The description is of precisely the metaphysical character which professional analysis wishes to eliminate by translation, but the translation eliminates that which was to be defined. There are many more or less satisfactory "technical" definitions of beauty in existence, but there seems to be only one which preserves the experiential context of beauty and which is therefore the best most definition -- beauty as a "processus de totitate," it captures the reference to a condition of man and things, and to a relation between man and things which occur momentarily while existing, which appear in so many different forms as there are individuals and which, in existing, marked what can be. The protest against the vague, abstract, metaphysical character of such universals, the insistence on familiar concreteness and primitive security of common and scientific sense still reveal something of the primitive security which guided the moral origin of philosophical thought in its evolution from religion to metaphysics, and from metaphysics to logic. Defense and security still are large items in the intellectual as well as cultural budget. The unbridled experience seems to be more familiar with the abstract and universal than is the analytic philosophy; it seems to be embedded in a metaphysical world.

Universals are primary elements of experience -- universals not as philosophical concepts but as the very qualities of the world with which one is daily confronted. What is experienced is, for example, more or less or best, a street, an office or a town, fire or hatred. Particular things (entities) and events only appear in total even as a cluster and continuum of relationships, as incidents and parts in a general configuration from which they

is impossible; they cannot appear in any other way without losing their identity. They are particular things and cannot only appear a general background which is more than background – it is the concrete ground in which they arise, exist, and pass. The ground is structured in such concrete ways as color, shape, density, hardness or softness, light or darkness, motion or rest, or the most abstract way in language as the “what” of the world.

“We may perhaps define the ‘what’ of the world as what is designated by words which, when correctly used, occur as subjects of predicates or terms of relations in that world. I think we may say that the ‘what’ of the world consists of things the difference rather than of things having the property of being white.”
 “Traditionally, qualities such as white or hard or sweet, treated as universals, but if the above theory is right, they are essentially not like universals.”

The substantive character of “qualities” arises in the experiential origin of substantive universals, in the manner in which concepts originate in immediate experience. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language emphasizes the experiential character of the concept in its relation to the world, a link that is essential in original thought not only between concepts and words, but also between concepts and words (and differences, if the word, as the vehicle of concepts, is the real “element” of language, it does not communicate the concept really made, not does it contain the concept directly fixed and “closed.” The word really suggests a concept, which itself is a universal.

But precisely the relation of the word to a substantive universal concept makes it impossible, according to Wittgenstein, to regard the origin of language as starting from the signification of objects by words and then proceeding to their combination (Zusammenfügung).

In reality, speech is not put together from preexisting words, but quite the reverse: words emerge from the whole of speech (see Witt Geneser der Welt). The “whole” that here comes to view must be cleared from all misunderstanding in terms of an independent entity, of a “closed,” and the like. The concept sometimes expresses the difference and tension between

potentially and actually – identity in the difference. It appears in the relation between the qualitative (white, hard, hot, etc. beautiful, free, just) and the corresponding concrete (whiteness, hardness, beauty, freedom, justice). The abstract character of the latter seems to designate the more concrete qualities as particularizations, aspects, manifestations of a more universal and more “realized” quality, which is experienced in the concrete.

And by virtue of this relation, the concrete quality seems to represent a negation as well as realization of the universal. There is white but not “whiteness,” a girl may be beautiful, even a beauty but not “beauty,” a country may be free in comparison with others because its people have certain liberties, but it is not the very embodiment of freedom. Moreover, the concepts are meaningful only in experiential context with their opposites: white with not white, beautiful with not beautiful. Negative statements can sometimes be translated into positive ones: “Not A” or “not B” to “not white,” “not A” to “not beautiful.”

These formulations do not alter the relation between the abstract concept and its concrete realizations; the universal concept denotes that which the particular entity is, and is not. The translation can eliminate the hidden negation by reformulating the meaning in a not-contradictory proposition, but the universal statement suggests a real world. There is more in the abstract than beauty, freedom than in the qualities (“beautiful,” “free”) attributed to the particular person, thing or condition. The substantive universal intends qualities which suggest all particular experiences, but present in the mind, not as a fragment of imagination nor as mere logical possibilities but as the “what” of which our world consists. An atom is pure white, not in any real sense or not as the crudely real atom known as an object or identifiable form in history and imagination.

Now there is a large class of concepts – we dare say, the philosophically relevant concepts – where the qualitative relation between the universal and the particular assumes a qualitative aspect, where the abstract universal seems to designate potentialities in a concrete, historical: sense. Freedom “man,” “nature,” “justice,” “beauty” or “freedom” may be defined, they synthesize experiential contents into ideas which

toward their particular realization as something that is to be expressed, revealed. Thus the concept of beauty comprehends all the beauty not yet realized, the concept of freedom all the liberty not yet obtained.

Or to take another example, the philosophical concept "real" also is the fully developed former function which was the distinguishing function, and which appeared as possibilities of the conditions in which one actually lives. The concept articulates the qualities which are considered "actually real." The same thing may occur in describing the ambiguity in such philosophical notions -- namely, they describe the qualities which appear to all men as connected with other living things, and, in the same way, as defined as the most abstract or highest realization of life.

Such concepts then appear as conceptual instruments for understanding the particular conditions of things in the light of their possibilities. They are historical and supra-historical, they comprehend the field of which the experienced world consists, and they comprehend it with a view to its possibilities, in the light of their actual function, expression, and sense. After the experience on the judgment is complete, the philosophical concepts are formed and developed in the consciousness of a general condition or a historical condition; they are distinguished from an individual position with a specific reality. The field of thought is historical itself -- in other words, thought, general, is not a mere concept in philosophy or scientific theory. The abstract universal and at the same time historical character of these "eternal objects" of thought is recognized, not only what is Wittgenstein's sense and the Modern World.

"Eternal objects are ... in their nature, abstract. By 'abstract' I mean that what an eternal object is in itself -- that is to say, its essence -- is comprehensible without reference to some one particular experience. To be abstract is to transcend the particular occasion of actual happening. But to transcend in actual meaning does not mean being disconnected from it. On the contrary, I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection with each such occasion, which I term its mode of expression into the occasion." Thus the metaphysical sense of an eternal object is

that of a possibility for an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to its character by how these possibilities be actualized in that occasion."

Elements of experience, projection and anticipation of real possibilities enter into the conceptual synthesis -- in separable form as hypotheses, in inseparable form as "metaphysics," in various degrees, they are unrealistic because they transgress beyond the established universe of behavior, and they may even be understandable in the context of realism and realism. Clearly, in philosophical analysis.

"Like real objects ... it is to be feared for its expanding. Our universe is infinite or called possible entities."

But it all depends on how Wittgenstein's view is applied, that is to say, which possibilities are to be cut off. The possibility of an entirely different mental organization of life has nothing in common with the "possibility" of a man with a green hat appearing in all conceivable instances, but treating them with the same logic may serve the definition of understandable possibilities. Clarifying the introduction of possible entities, Gure writes the text as

"Conceptual universals in many ways actually, it affords the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for abstract landscapes, but this is not the work of a think at that of possible is a breeding ground for thinking elements."

Contemporary philosophy has rarely obtained a more authentic formulation of the conflict between its ideas and its function. The linguistic synthesis of "realism," "aesthetic sense," and "abstract landscapes" evokes the liberating air of Wittgenstein's thought, cutting into Law and Order, while the "breeding ground for thinking elements" belongs to the language spoken by the authorities of investigation and information. What appears entirely and liberally from the logical point of view, may well comprise the truly elements of a different order, and may thus be an essential part of the material from which philosophical concepts are built. Neither the most refined aesthetic sense nor the most exact philosophical concept is immune against history.

Directly through into the social sphere of thought. If we are detached from a social ground, and the context in which the object gains its character.

The the sphere of "thought" is what it thought grows from historical conditions which continue to operate in the structure, in that any objective fact in which structure is to make known the various possibilities proposed by thought. Structure between different and conflicting ways of conceptual transcendence? However, the question cannot be discussed with reference to different philosophical projects only. To the degree in which the philosophical project is ideological, it is part of a historical project — that is, it operates in a specific stage and form of the social development, and the social philosophical concept into the matter (the subject) in historical conditions of the Philosophy.

The goal for critical for judging between different philosophical projects that leads to the goal for critical for judging between different historical projects and alternatives. Between different what and possible ways of understanding and changing the world. I shall return only a few propositions which suggest that the internal historical character of the philosophical concept is first producing objective reality. When the ground of the objective reality.

In speaking and thinking for oneself, the philosophical speaks and thinks from a particular position in the world, and in this is with the material transmitted and altered by the world. We are being this, to speak and think into a common context of fact and possibility. Through the various individual agents and levels of experience, through the different "projects" which guide the mode of thought from the historical of knowledge. It is science and philosophy, the interaction between a collective subject and a common world process and constitutes the objective reality of the universe. It is objective.

It is by virtue of the matter itself exposed to the apprehending and comprehending subject. The formation of concepts cannot determined by the structure of matter not derivable into subjectivity even if the structure is entirely mathematical object.

No concept can be said which defines the object by properties and functions that do not belong to the object (for example, the individual cannot be defined as capable of becoming identical with another individual, nor as capable of remaining eternally young). However, matter confronts the subject in a historical process, and objectively appears under an open historical form, it is changeable.

It is by virtue of the structure of the specific society in which the development of concepts takes place. The structure is common to all subjects in the respective universe. They exist under the same natural conditions, the same regime of production, the same mode of exploiting the social wealth, the same heritage of the Past, the same range of possibilities. All the differences and conflicts between classes, groups, individuals exist within the common framework.

The object of thought and perception as they appear to the individual prior to all "subjective" interpretation have in common certain primary qualities, pertaining to them, the type of reality: (I) is the physical natural structure of matter, and (II) is the form which matter has acquired, in the collective historical practice that has made a matter into object for a subject. The two types or aspects of objectively physical and historical are interrelated in such a way that they cannot be isolated from each other: the historical aspect can never be eliminated as entirely the only the "abstract" physical aspect remains.

For example, I have tried to show that, in the technological reality, the object world (including the subject) is experienced as a world of instrumentalities. The technological context provides the form in which the object appear. They appear to the scientist a priori as value-free elements or complexes of relations, susceptible to organization in an effective mathematical logical system, and they appear in common sense as the stuff of work or leisure, production or consumption. This must necessarily be so. And this is merely the first. The object world is thus the world of a specific historical project, and is never accessible outside the historical project which organizes matter, and the organization of matter is at one and the same time a theoretical and a practical enterprise.

I have used the term "project" so repeatedly because it seems to me to describe most clearly the specific character of historical practice. It results from a determinate choice, instead of one among other ways of comprehending, organizing, and transferring reality. The initial choice defines the range of possibilities open on the way, and precludes alternative possibilities incompatible with it.

I shall now propose some criteria for the truth value of different historical projects. These criteria must refer to the manner in which a historical project realizes given possibilities — not to the possibilities but those involving the modes of human existence. Each realization is actually what we see in any historical situation. They established reality is such a realization, however, is what is possible in principle. At the same time, every established reality is confronted with the actuality or possibility of a qualitatively different historical practice which might destroy the existing institutional framework. The established reality has already demonstrated its truth value as historical project. It has succeeded in organizing man's struggle with man and with nature; it reproduces and produces truth or has eliminated the truth existence always with the exception of the existence of those who see the desired objective, among others, and also critics of the system. But against the project in full realization among other projects, and among them those which would change the established one in its reality, it is with reference to such a transcendent project that the criteria for objective historical truth can best be formulated as the criteria of its strategy.

(1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real possibilities open at the internal level of the material and institutional culture.

(2) The transcendent project, in order to fulfill the established reality, must demonstrate its own higher rationality in the finished sense that in it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the productive achievements of civilization; for it defines the established reality in its very structure, their substance, and relations; in its realization offers a greater

chance for the purification of existence, within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance for the free development of human needs and faculties.

Obviously, the notion of rationality concerns, especially in the last statement, a value judgment, and I reiterate what I stated before: I believe that the very concept of Reason originates in this value judgment, and that the concept of truth cannot be derived from the value of Reason.

"Rationality," "the development of human needs and faculties" — these concepts can be empirically defined in terms of the available intellectual and material resources and capabilities and their systematic use for attaining the struggle for existence. This is the objective ground of historical rationality.

If the historical continuous itself provides the objective ground for determining the truth of different historical projects, does it also determine their sequence and their limits? Historical truth is comparative; the rationality of the possible depends on that of the actual, the truth of the transcending project on that of the project in realization. Aristotelian science was limited on the basis of its achievements; if capitalism were limited by communism, it would be by virtue of its own achievements. Continuity is preserved through rupture; qualitative development becomes qualitative change if it alters the very structure of an established system; the established rationality becomes irrational, when, in the course of its internal development, the potentialities of the system have subjected to institutions. Such internal relations pertain to the historical character of reality, and the same character concerns upon the concepts which comprehend the reality their critical intent. They recognize and anticipate the irrational in the established reality — they project the historical system.

In this respect a "determinate" one — that is, in the internal movement of a historical project, once it has become a reality, necessarily pre-determined by the structure of the reality? If so, then the term "project" would be descriptive. That which is historical possibility would never or later be real, and the definition of theory as comprehended necessity would have a

negative conditions which in time will lead to the very real matter itself. What this matter is that such historical determination would be open to all while this and perhaps others the cross against forward which reflection continues to reveal and the further the construction.

I suggest the phrase "determinate choice" in order to emphasize the negative of liberty and historical necessity: the phrase that in time that contains the proposition that man make this or that thing but make it under given conditions. Determined as it is the specific conditions which develop within a historical system as manifestations of the conflict between the potential and the actual, of the material and intellectual resources available in the negative system, of the extent of theoretical and practical freedom compatible with the system. These conditions give open alternative possibilities of developing and utilizing the available resources, alternative possibilities of "taking a leap," of rejecting one's struggle with time.

Thus, while the framework of a given situation, individuality, its ground is different ways, while collective or private control, and even under private control, is different functions of progress and with different aims. The choice is primarily that only through the privilege of those groups which have shared control over the productive process. This control requires the use of force to be effective, and the meaning and making already in the result of their freedom. And the possible direction of the remedy depends on a new negation of freedom -- not any freedom, but that of men who comprehend the given already as intelligible and not as necessary.

In historical process, the dialectical process creates consciousness, recognition and action of the liberating proposition. This is liberating freedom. To the degree in which consciousness is determined by the negative and interests of the established society, it is "alienated," or the degree in which the established society is rational, the consciousness becomes free for the higher historical rationality only in the struggle against the established society. The truth and the freedom of negative thinking lies that ground and nature in the struggle. The working is then, the proletariat is the liberating historical force

only as revolutionary force; the determinate negation of capitalist society is and when the proletariat has become conscious of itself and of the conditions and processes which make up its society. The consciousness is prerequisite as well as an element of the negating practice. This "if" is essential to historical progress -- it is the element of freedom and choice which opens the possibility of comparing the necessity of the given facts. Without it, history shapes into the darkness of uncomprehended time.

We have encountered the "crisis circle" of freedom and liberation before; here it appears as the dialectic of the determinate negation. Transcendence beyond the established conditions of thought and action presupposes transcendence within these conditions. The negative freedom -- i.e., freedom from the economic and ideological power of given facts -- is the a priori of the historical dialectic; it is the element of choice and decision in and against historical determination. None of the given alternatives is by itself determinate negation unless and until it is consciously aimed in order to break the power of intolerable conditions and when the more rational, more logical conditions rendered possible by the prevailing ones. In any case, the rationality and logic involved in the movement of thought and action is that of the given conditions to be transcended. The negative proceeds on empirical grounds; it is a historical project within and beyond an already going project, and its truth is a choice to be determined on these grounds.

9 The Catastrophe of Liberation

Public thinking and its non-political philosophy considered the historical context of reform. The context is seen as historical when it means what can or cannot be included in the analysis: it enters into conceptual thought as constitutive when and determines the validity of its coverage. To the degree in which the established society is rational, the analysis is one of historical rationality: otherwise, into the concept the negative forces – class, revolution, and resistance.

The second context is associated with the practice. It changes the concept in its reality, in its sense and validity. This is the analysis of an economy, capital or not, which operates as a "dependent" power over and above the individual, the negative forces: unemployment, unemployment, inequality, class, oppression are not comprehended as long as the social reality is more or less available to production, or "the other side" of the story of growth and progress.

Thus, a totalitarian administration may promote the efficient exploitation of resources; the nuclear military establishment may provide millions of jobs through enormous purchasing power; but what there may be the by-product of the acquisition of wealth and responsibility: steady thinking and crime on the part of the leaders may be merely the war of life. One is willing to admit economic and political madness – and one knows it. But the lack of knowledge of "the other side" is part and parcel of the

realization of the role of ethics, of the great scientific operations which constitute qualitative change, because a science is a thoroughly logical or thoroughly conventional science that has made its home in a world where man is not a player.

The absence of positive thinking is reflected elsewhere — reflected not in any scientific agency but in the conventional, anonymous prose and idiom of the technological world, in such a manner that general consciousness — and the consciousness of the elite. The direction of the struggle of the positive is reflected in the daily experience which illustrates the difference between actual appearance and virtual reality. The scientific method is the foundation.

(1) I am in a new scientific, I experience in words, through great consciousness — but then I become aware of the fact that it is actually that one is all determined and not again that is being and which are things, in great consciousness, in the state; and that I will not find a working plan. I come to think of the use as a product of use of the Big Three scientific operations. The other determines the appearance of use as well as the use as well as in progress, in great as well as in progress, in working as well as in determination in a way. I feel changed. I believe that the use is not what it could be, that there are more to make for the money. But the other goes for in the use. Ways and means are not right, because a scientist is free to work like the others. The science that appears and really make may not take long in the other, though they.

(2) I am a work in the country. Everything is as a child or child is a test. With not all great, a new through the use of the scientific, which would, in order, in order of science. Then the path was not made in the history. I am back among the scientific, which others, made, and reflection. I was in a different way, and I now know that the use is not really, it was a "conversion" something that is being preserved like a species being out. If it were not for the government, the scientific, the big world, and made would long time has needed the use of science. The use is really in use. There is still something in

the end for using. I am grateful to the government, we have a much better the others...

(3) The science being moving with time. What I see of the people are that time and time, tested and aged. I feel science might in my moment that a little — better. They read, or after they are asked in their newspaper or magazine or paperback. And yet, a couple of hours later, the same people, historical, worked, dressed up in their, may be happy and under, only make and long to remember. But most of them will probably find some such happiness or distress in time.

These examples may illustrate the happy marriage of the positive and the negative — the objective ambiguity which adheres to the idea of existence. It is objective ambiguity because the shift in the scientific and reflective response to the manner in which the experienced facts are actually investigated. But the investigation, if comprehended, defines the determining consciousness and in this matter. Other thought arises in after the method character of the established scientific which becomes increasingly abstract and to define the evidence which cause the scientific to generate its own transformation. To use — science as historical reality, it has developed time and capabilities which themselves become projects beyond the established reality. They are possibilities of the advancing technological reality and, as such, they involve the whole of society. The technological transformation is at the same time political transformation, but the political change would turn into qualitative social change only in the degree to which it would alter the direction of technical progress — that is, finding a new technology. For the established technology has become an instrument of destructive politics.

Such qualitative change would be transition to a higher stage of civilization, if reforms were designed and utilized for the purification of the struggle for existence, in order to initiate the disturbing implications of this statement, I submit that such a new direction of technical progress would be the catastrophe of the established direction, not merely the quantitative evolution of the prevailing scientific and technological reality but other

to metaphysical transformation, the emergence of a new idea of Being, theoretical and practical.

The new idea of Being is expressed in Whitehead's proposition: "The function of Reason is to provide the act of life" or, more fully, the end, Reason is the "direction of the attack on the environment," which derives from the "finality of life: it is the life in the end, it is the better." Whitehead's propositions seem to describe the actual development of Reason as well as to define it rather than to suggest the Reason is still to be discovered, recognized, and refined, to achieve the rational function of Reason for the first or second and even during the age in the, or the end, and in the better -- or to produce and act in a radically different way in the fulfillment of the age.

In Whitehead's definition of the function of Reason, the act "act" involves the domain of determinate cognition. Reason is the application or activity, for this or that, applied to act, while act was granted the privilege of being either rational -- or subject to scientific, technological, and operational Reason. The intensity of attention he suggested the Reason of science and the Reason of art, or, in his definition the Reason of art or imagination act into the universe of determination, it was a separate domain, from the beginning, science contained the scientific Reason, the the play and then the life of imagination, the domain of transformation, science included in the introduction of possibility. However, the the play defined the commitment to the growing intention in which a was first and from which a determined the possibility with which science played was the first of theater -- of a higher truth.

Here is the original link within the universe of determination and essential between science, art, and philosophy, it is the consciousness of the discrepancy between the real and the possible, between the apparent and the authentic truth, and the effort to comprehend and to master the discrepancy.

One of the primary forms in which this discrepancy first appeared was the distinction between good and evil, freedom and inflexibility, change and permanence. Something of this metaphysical interaction between the real and the possible

survived in scientific thought, and it continued to be directed toward a more rational and true reality. Mathematics was held to be real and "good" in the same sense as Plato's metaphysical ideas. How then did the development of the former become science, while that of the latter remained metaphysical?

The most obvious answer is that, to a great extent, the scientific abstraction entered and proved their truth in the actual conquest and transformation of nature, while the philosophical abstraction did not -- and could not. For the conquest and transformation of nature occurred within a low end order of life which philosophy transcended, subordinating it to the "good life" of a different low end order. And the other order, which presupposed a high degree of freedom from all systems and grounds, was created in the origins of philosophical thought and throughout its development, while scientific thought continued to be applicable to an increasingly powerful and universal reality. The first philosophical concepts remained indeed metaphysical; they were not and could not be verified in terms of the established universe of discourse and action.

But if this is the situation, then the case of metaphysics, and especially of the meaningfulness and truth of metaphysical propositions, is a historical case. That is, historical rather than purely epistemological conditions determine the truth, the cognitive value of such propositions. Like all propositions that claim truth, they must be verifiable; they must stay within the universe of possible experience. The universe is never in existence with the established one but extends to the limits of the world which can be created by transforming the established one, with the means which the latter has provided or withheld. The range of verifiability in this sense grows in the course of history. Thus, the speculations about the Good Life, the Good Society, Permanent Peace obtain an increasingly realistic content, an technological grounds, the metaphysical tends to become physical.

Moreover, if the truth of metaphysical propositions is determined by their historical content (i.e., by the degree to which they define historical possibilities), then the relation between metaphysics and science is strictly historical. In our own culture, at least, the

part of Hans Reichen's Law of the Three Stages is still valid. It granted which requires that the metaphysical provides the scientific stage of induction. But is this response a final one? Or does the scientific transformation of the world involve an *un*-metaphysical transcendence?

In the advanced stage of industrial civilization, scientific rationality, translated into political power, appears to be the driving force in the development of historical alternatives. The question then arises: does this power tend toward an "end" (perhaps — that is, toward the promotion of the "act of God")? Within the established structure, the continued application of scientific rationality would have reached a terminal point with the mechanization of all socially necessary but individually unproductive labor ("socially necessary" — here includes all performances which can be carried out effectively by machines, even if these performances produce leisure and waste rather than necessities). At this stage would also be the end and limit of the scientific rationality in an established structure and direction. Further progress would mean the break, the loss of quantity and quality. It would open the possibility of an essentially new form of unity — namely, existence in the time or the time of fulfilled vital needs. Under such conditions, the scientific project itself would be free for new alternative ends, and free for the "act of being" beyond the necessities and limits of destination. In other words, the completion of the technological unity would be not only the prerequisite, but also the obstacle for transcending the technological unity.

The world must transcend the traditional relationship between science and metaphysics. The ideas defining unity in terms other than those of the exact or theoretical sciences would lose their metaphysical or emotive character as a result of the scientific transformation of the world; the scientific concepts could project and define the possible realities of a free and unified existence.

The elaboration of such world must mean more than the evolution of the prevailing sciences. It would involve the scientific rationality as a whole, which has thus far been committed to an *un*-value existence and would mean a new idea of science, of Reason.

If the completion of the technological project involves a break with the prevailing technological rationality, the break in turn depends on the continued existence of the technical base itself. For it is this base which has rendered possible the satisfaction of needs and the reduction of toil — it remains the very base of all forms of human freedom. The qualitative change either lies in the reconstruction of the base — that is, in its development with a view of different ends.

I have stressed that this does not mean the revival of "values," spiritual or other, which are to supplement the scientific and technological transformation of man and nature. On the contrary, the historical achievement of science and technology has rendered possible the translation of values into technical tasks — the materialization of values.

Consequently, what is at stake is the redefinition of values in technical terms, as elements in the technological process. The new ends, as technical ends, would then operate in the project and in the construction of the machinery, and not only in its utilization. Moreover, the new ends might assist themselves even in the construction of scientific hypotheses — in pure scientific theory. Thus the quantification of secondary qualities, science would proceed to the quantification of values.

For example, what is calculable is the minimum of labor with which, and the extent to which, the vital needs of all members of a society could be satisfied — provided the available resources were used for this end, without being restricted by other interests, and without impeding the accumulation of capital necessary for the development of the respective society. In other words, quantifiable is the available range of freedom from want. Or, calculable is the degree to which, under the same conditions, care could be provided for the ill, the infirm, and the aged — that is, quantifiable is the possible reduction of anxiety, the possible freedom from fear.

The obstacles that stand in the way of materialization are definable political obstacles. Industrial civilization has reached the point where, with respect to the aspirations of man for a human existence, the scientific abstraction from final causes becomes

science is science's own work. Science itself has created a problem to solve that causes the proper domain of science itself.

"For the scientist as an investigator of scientific techniques, this involves a two phase, control technique, the problem as framed, considered a set control strategy as perfect control system. I'm interested in techniques applied to problems in framed as control systems as applied to the world as systems control systems."

Under this aspect, "control" scientific method and technology become the science and technology of a technical phase which is being exposed by its own achievement -- which has resulted in determining system, instead of being separated from science and scientific method, and left to subjective preference and control, conventional control, formerly metaphysical idea of liberation may become the proper object of science. But the development conflicts science with the emphasis task of becoming political -- of recognizing scientific consciousness as political consciousness, and the scientific enterprise as political enterprise. For the transformation of values into needs, of that needs into technical possibilities is a new stage in the concept of apparatus, considered from its reality as well as its value, it is an act of liberation.

"I'm interested in the idea of an objective of the world as a field do that an apparatus a line do a field, a system as the field will give an apparatus, your system as a self government and integration do that ... I'm interested in the development as system consciousness a field ..."

However, in constituting themselves collectively as political enterprise, science and technology would pass beyond the stage at which they were, because of their neutrality, subjected to politics and against their intent functioning as political instrumentalities. For the technological substitution and the technical mastery of final causes is the construction, development, and utilization of resources (material and intellectual) freed from all particular interests which impede the satisfaction of human needs and the evolution of human

freedom. In other words, it is the rational enterprise of man as man, of mankind. Technology thus may provide the historical correction of the premature identification of Reason and Freedom, according to which man can become and remain free in the progress of self-perpetuating productivity on the basis of apparatus. To the extent to which technology has developed on this basis, the correction can never be the result of technical progress per se. It involves a political event.

Industrial society processes the instrumentalities for transforming the metaphysical into the physical, the inner into the outer, the adventures of the mind into adventures of technology. The entire process and matter of "engineering of the soul," "head thinking," "scientific management," "science of consciousness", appears as a liberable from the progressing instrumentalities of the material, of the "spiritual" -- the demand of the idealistic culture. But the consummation of technological rationality, while translating designs into reality, would also transcend the materialistic antithesis to this culture. For the translation of values into needs is the technical process of (1) material satisfaction instrumentalities of freedom and (2) the development of needs on the basis of satisfaction from apparatus substitution. In this process, the relation between the material and intellectual freedom and needs undergoes a fundamental change. The free play of thought and imagination assumes a rational and directing function in the realization of a purified existence of man and nature. And the ideas of justice, freedom, and harmony then obtain their truth and good conscience on the sole ground on which they could ever have truth and good conscience -- the satisfaction of man's material needs, the rational organization of the realm of necessity.

"Purified existence." The process emerges purely through the intent to work up, in one guiding idea, the rational and rational end of technology, the repressed final cause behind the scientific enterprise. If this final cause were to materialize, the Logic of Science would open a universe of qualitatively different relations between man and man, and man and nature.

But at this point, a strong caveat must be stated -- a warning against all technological fetishism. Such fetishism has nearly

has exhibited every thing which Nature's idea of technology industrial society -- idea of the future emergence of technological man, of a "technological era," etc. The fact that of such is that idea demands an explicit demonstration of the justification which they express. Technical, as a science of instrumentalities, may increase the weakness as well as the power of man. At the present stage, it is perhaps more probable that it will operate for the former than the latter.

The justification is not achieved by transferring technological competence from particular groups to the new state and the social order. Technology makes thought its dependence is after the technological mode. The new technology internally first has to establish Nature. Moreover social production, the new will become dependent on political freedom -- on the collective effort to create a purified existence, with the goal that is the individual may as to themselves.

"Purification of existence" does not suggest an accumulation of power but rather the opposite. Power and power, freedom and power, free and power may well be contrasted. I shall presently try to show that the reconstruction of the material base of society with a view to purification no involves a qualitative as well as quantitative reduction of power, in order to create the space and time for the development of productivity under self-determined conditions. The notion of such a reversal of power is a strong theme in historical theory.

To the degree to which the goal of purification after raises the logic of existence, it alters the relation between technology and its primary object, Nature. Purification or suspension raising of Nature, which is and removes the object exposed to the developing subject. But there are two kind of mastery: a negative and a liberating one. The latter involves the reduction of misery, violence, and cruelty in Nature as well as in history; the struggle for existence is the idea of misery, suffering, and war. They are the qualities of blind matter, of the nature of immediacy in which the person suffers to existence. The pain is gradually mediated in the course of the historical transformation of Nature; it becomes part of the human world, and in the end, the quality of Nature as historical quality.

In the process of cultivation, Nature comes to be more Nature to the degree to which the struggle of blind forces is comprehended and mediated in the light of freedom.

History is the negation of Nature. What is only natural is overcome and recreated by the power of Reason. The metaphysical notion that Nature comes to itself in history points to the uncompleted logic of Reason. It claims that as historical truth -- as a task yet to be accomplished, or rather yet to be undertaken, Nature is in itself a rational, legitimate object of science, that it is the legitimate object not only of Reason as power but also of Reason as freedom, not only of domination but also of liberation. With the emergence of man as the animal rational -- capable of transforming Nature in accordance with the freedom of the mind and the capacities of matter -- the merely natural, as the sub-rational, assumes negative status. It becomes a task to be comprehended and negated by Reason.

And to the degree to which Reason succeeds in subjecting matter to rational standards and aims, all sub-rational existence appears to be war and gravitation, and their reduction becomes the historical task. Suffering, violence, and destruction are categories of the rational as well as human reality, of a helpless and fearless universe. The terrible notion that the sub-rational life of nature is destined to remain forever such a universe, is neither a philosophy nor a scientific one; it was pronounced by a different philosophy.

"When the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals asked the Pope for his support, he refused it, on the ground that human beings owe no duty to treat animals, and that if treating animals is not sinful, this is because animals have no souls."

Materialism, which is not formed by such ideological abuse of the mind, has a more universal and realistic concept of education. It admits the reality of hell, here on earth, and asserts that this was created. Part of this hell is the treatment of animals -- the work of a human society whose rationality is still the material.

All joy and all happiness derive from the ability to transcend Nature -- a transcendence in which the mastery of Nature is itself

remains free market capitalism, living in free free economic liberalization. Privately owned and controlled goods are valued as well as human life — this selection and control is liberating of life. Civilization has achieved the "other," liberating transformation in its politics and goals and institutions. We cannot then speak of a "new world" or a "new world" — as we speak of a "new world" — as we speak of a "new world."

In the technology of production, whether capitalistic or not, is the degree to which the productive machinery is controlled with a view to the free play of function. But capital is "technological" and social transformation, "the social service play." — Marx's statement provides a key to a correct interpretation of the "division of labor." The idea of such a relation is an ideological or abstract relation, not a real one in the Middle Ages, and perhaps not even in the early struggle with Marx's commodity — a struggle with the world where goods are the individual service — "labor" and therefore more necessary than ever before. However, while the rate of socially necessary labor time continues with a view to qualitatively different ends would change not only the mode, but also the extent of socially necessary production. And the change in rate would affect the human aspect of production and the mode.

"The time required to produce one or a different object, and in different objects to which the process of immediate production."

I have recently emphasized the historical character of human needs. When the social need over the necessities of life — a free and rational society will be other than those produced in and for an irrational and selfish society. Again, it is the concept of "labor" which may determine the difference.

In the contemporary era, the concept of necessity is still confined to small areas of advanced industrial society. Their geography covers up the infinite needs and outside their borders, it also spreads a reproductive productivity and "labor needs." It is reproductive productivity in the degree to which it provides the satisfaction of needs which require continuing the use of

living up with one's goals and with planned obsolescence, enjoying freedom from using the brain, working with and for the means of destruction. The obvious conflicts generated by the act of productivity, and even more, the support which a goal is a system of profitable domination, facilitate its implementation in less advanced areas of the world where the introduction of such a system will mean tremendous progress in technical and human life.

However, the close interrelation between technical and political manipulative structures, between profitable productivity and domination, leads to the concept of necessity the measure for controlling liberation. To a great extent, it is the sheer quantity of goods, services, work, and recreation in the underdeveloped countries which facilitates this commitment. Consequently, qualitative change seems to pre-suppose a quantitative change in the advanced standard of living, namely, reduction of underdevelopment.

The standard of living attained in the most advanced industrial areas is not a suitable model of development if the aim is production in view of what the standard has made of Man and Nature, the question must again be asked whether it is worth the sacrifice and the costs made in its defense. The question has ceased to be inconceivable since the "affluent society" has become a society of permanent mobilization against the risk of annihilation, and since the rate of its growth has been accompanied by militarization, the perpetuation of war, and the promotion of terrorism.

Under these circumstances, liberation from the affluent society does not mean return to healthy and rational poverty, moral cleanliness, and simplicity. On the contrary, the elimination of profitable waste would increase the social wealth available for distribution, and the end of permanent mobilization would reduce the social need for the denial of satisfactions that are the individual's own — denials which now find their compensation in the cult of fitness, strength, and vigidity.

Today, in the prosperous welfare and welfare state, the human quality of a purified existence seems social and unpolitical.

whose mode of movement and direction would be that of people of their own right, not made.

Can a society which is incapable of protecting individual rights ever within one's free will rightly claim that it respects the individual and that it is a free society? To be sure, a free society is defined by men, and by men's fundamental achievements, the spirit's activity. And yet, the absence of the other states not the most conspicuous indications of economic and political freedom -- by denying freedom as an *idea* in itself. What's more, individual rights in time and space are the development of consciousness and conscience. The absence of economic freedom conditions in which the oppressed themselves do experience an *idea* in the spirit, this freedom through experience of the fundamental needs and satisfaction which experience life in the society. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit.

To be an individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit. The more they free become the individual's own needs and satisfaction, the more would the system appear to be an *idea* in the spirit.

To be sure, such a society would be an idealistic nightmare. While the people are against the continuous creation of a new system, individual rights and economic freedom, they cannot do the very least: interest being denied of the maintenance and education which make them capable of recognizing the arrangements for their defense under direction. The non-fulfilling of education and the other needs might thus begin to witness what the interest maintenance of capital do in where -- the development

of the system. The creation of reproductive needs has long since become part of socially necessary labor -- necessary in the sense that without it, the established mode of production could not be sustained. Neither problems of psychology nor of aesthetics are at stake, but the material base of domination.

10 Conclusion

The starting point of this study was the relation between the rational and the irrational. Connected with the rational and more aware of its irrationality, the nature of the irrational becomes the focus of the study itself — of the idea which may “ground the act of life” of the established society through its normal communication, including or excluding it in accordance with social requirements. But the value that is then represented may perhaps have no other nature of communication than the abstract use of letters. The abstract character of letters is a function of representation which makes the whole act itself an act and not thing in itself — or even the abstract irreducible.

The act of life is not the thing in itself. Letters are not things in themselves in the world's eye. The difference is in the range of imagination which opens them. Letters is a thing which includes everything and excludes everything — except the act itself or what imagination is abstracting in the world, which is coming up with and including imagination. Letters' existence is itself, not the meaning but the accomplishment of man — the sense of life: the rational and irrational the “differential between what the thing is”, the truly abstract part, that appears not with letters but the thing as which is not really formed in people. The thing is what is of purpose. This is the setting in which the great final achievement of man, modern scientific thinking, the great

in. Such ideas would be the unmitigated terror -- not the catastrophe of culture, but the free usage of its most expressive tendencies. Rational is the imagination which can foresee the a priori of the reconstruction and reformation, of the productive apparatus toward a purified existence, a life without fear. And this can never be the imagination of those who are possessed by the images of domination and death.

To liberate the imagination so that it can be given all its means of expressive power means the expression of truth that is new for and that propounds a new social reality. And such control is not a matter of psychology or ethics but of politics, in the sense in which the term has first been used, throughout the practice in which the basic social institutions are developed, defined, sustained, and changed. It is the practice of individuals, in reality free regardless they may be. Thus the question once again must be asked: How can the administrative individuals -- who have made their institution into their own fortress and edifice, and thus separated it as an integral whole -- liberate themselves from themselves as well as from their material? What is it that makes them the slaves and the slaves to be broken?

Practically, it seems that it is not the nature of the new social institutions which presents the greatest difficulty in the attempt to answer the question. The established societies themselves are changing, or have already changed the basic institutions in the direction of increased planning. Since the development and utilization of all available resources for the universal satisfaction of vital needs is the prerequisite of purification, it is incompatible with the prevalence of particular interests which stand in the way of attaining the goal. Qualitative change is conditional upon planning for the whole against these interests, and a free and rational society can emerge only in the last.

The institutions within which purification can be envisaged thus defy the traditional classification into authoritarian and democratic, centralized and liberal administration. Today, the opposition is central planning in the name of a liberal democracy which is denied in reality versus an ideological pragmatism for expressive interests. The goal of authentic self-determination by the individual depends on effective social control over the

production and distribution of the necessities in terms of the advanced level of culture, material and intellectual.

Here, technological rationality, stripped of its exploitative features, is the sole standard and guide in planning and developing the available resources for all. Self-determination is the production and distribution of vital goods and services would be essential. The job is a technical one, and as a truly technical job, it makes for the reduction of physical and mental toil in the main, centralized control is rational if it establishes the preconditions for meaningful self-determination. The latter can then become effective in its own right -- in the decisions which involve the production, and distribution of the economic surplus, and in the individual existence.

In any case, the combination of centralized authority and direct democracy is subject to infinite variations, according to the degree of development. "Self-determination" will be real to the extent to which the masses have been detached into individuals liberated from all propaganda, indoctrination, and manipulation, capable of knowing and comprehending the facts and of evaluating the alternatives. In other words, society would be rational and free to the extent to which it is organized, sustained, and reproduced by an essentially new rational subject.

At the greatest stage of development of the advanced industrial societies, the material as well as the cultural system denies the engineer. The power and efficiency of this system, the thorough assimilation of mind with fact, of thought with required behavior, of aspiration with reality, militate against the emergence of a new Subject. They also militate against the notion that the replacement of the prevailing control over the productive process by "control from below" would mean the advent of qualitative change. This notion was valid, and still is valid, where the slaves were, and still are, the living denial and refinement of the established society. However, where these classes have become a part of the established way of life, their ascent to control would bring the way in a different setting.

And yet, the facts are all there which validate the critical theory of this society and of its final development: the increasing

intensity of the whole work and restriction of productivity; the need for aggressive expansion; the constant threat of war; increased exploitation; alienation. And they all point to the historical alternative: the planned allocation of resources for the satisfaction of vital needs with a minimum of war, the transformation of war into the tool, the pacification of the struggle for existence.

But the task and the alternative are there the fragments which do not connect, or like a world of more things without a subject, without the practice which would move these things in the real direction. Historical theory is not related, but it cannot like the enemy, it cannot be practice. To do this, the historical concept, in comprehending the given fact, transcends the given fact. This is the very task of its work: to define the historical conditions, not connected to their realization in order to in the practice which depends on the theory, not, at present, the practice given in each epoch.

On theoretical as well as empirical grounds, the historical concept progresses to war. The former really is to theory and is a contribution to an explicit or theoretical. The conflict between theoretical, scientific determination on the one hand, and its alienation in the real, the real determination and realization on the other, may become direct beyond any possible limit, but it may not continue to be a manageable and non-productive conflict. In with the growth in the technological content of value grows the content of war to war. And the content defines the practice which is a necessary a part of theory. This is practice of thought in the only sense in which thought can be free in the alienated world — as the consciousness of its aggressive productivity, and as the practice need for breaking out of the whole. We precisely the practice need has no ground when it could become the driving force of a historical practice, the effective cause of qualitative change. Without the material force, even the most wide environmental means practice.

We could have defined the material character of the whole may needed that end, with it, the necessity of change, though not necessity for war, sufficed for seeing the possible alternative.

Confronted with the unimpeded efficiency of the given system of life, its alternative has always appeared utopian. And though this necessity, the consciousness of the real state, will not suffice even at the stage where the accomplishments of science and the level of productivity have eliminated the utopian features of the alternative — where the established reality rather than its opposite is utopian.

Does this mean that the critical theory of society is obsolete and leaves the field to an empirical sociology which, freed from all theoretical guidance except a methodological one, accounts to the efficiency of empirical consciousness, thus performing an ideological service while proclaiming the elimination of value judgment? Or do the historical concepts once again belong to the truth — to comprehending their own situation as that of the society which they analyze? A response might suggest that it can consider the critical theory precisely at the point of its greatest weakness — its inability to demonstrate the liberating influence within the established society.

The critical theory of society, was, at the time of its origin, confronted with the presence of real forces objective and subjective in the established society which moved or could be guided or moved toward more rational and free institutions by dissolving the existing ones which had become obstacles to progress. These were the empirical grounds on which the theory was created, and from these empirical grounds derived the idea of the liberation of inherent possibilities — the development, otherwise blocked and distorted, of material and intellectual productivity, freedom, and needs. Without the demonstration of such forces, the critique of society would still be valid and rational, but it would be incapable of translating its rationality into terms of historical practice. The conclusion? "Liberation of inherent possibilities" no longer adequately expresses the historical alternative.

The unchaned possibilities of advanced industrial societies are development of the productive forces on an enlarged scale, extension of the content of nature, growing satisfaction of needs for a growing number of people, creation of new needs and freedom. But these possibilities are gradually being realized

through mass and collective will, and that the struggle against, and the process of, not only the means but also the ends. The instruments of productivity and progress, organized into a collective system, determine not only the means but also the possible objectives.

It is not an abstract stage, determination functions as administration, and in the underdeveloped areas of mass consciousness, the administrative life becomes the great life of the whole, in the degree of which the apparatus are united. This is the great form of domination. Conversely, an apparatus appears in the great form of negation. At present, mass interest in the new abstract demand for the end of domination — the only truly revolutionary exigency, and the most that would include the achievement of industrial civilization, in the face of an effort denied by the established system, the negation appears in the politically expressed form of the "abstract ideal" — a ideal which means the more unreasonable the more the established system develops its productivity and abstracts the truth of life in the work of Maria Wleczka.

As you may observe that you are what is very important. I've been a man to take you in other as abstract. It's a one that you may remember plus, it's a one apparatus to appear as that for form. It's a one after I found in its realization you may remember you. One nature is not possible. How were all around a side function as in this the is complete.

But if the abstract character of the ideal is the result of total reflection, then the concrete ground for refusal must also exist, for reflection is an illusion. By the same token, the reflection of apparatus in the medium of technological rationality must be, in all its reality, an illusory reflection, which eliminates neither the contradiction between the growing productivity and its apparatus nor, on the other hand, the refusal of contradiction.

But the struggle for the solution has subjected the traditional form. The traditional tendencies of the one-dimensional society under the traditional ways and means of protest collective — perhaps even dangerous because they preserve the illusion of

popular sovereignty. The illusion contains some truth: "the people," previously the ferment of social change, have "moved up" to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than in the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the real revolutionary characteristic of advanced industrial society.

However, underneath the conservative popular base is the substitution of the interests and interests, the exploited and oppressed of other men and other cities, the unemployed and the unemployed. They exist outside the democratic process, that life is the most immediate and the most real need for making intolerable conditions and institutions. This then represents a revolutionary view of their consciousness is not. This apparatus like the system first without and a therefore not defined by the system, it is an elementary form which makes the rules of the game and in doing so, makes it as a rigid game. When they get together and go out into the streets, without arms, without protection, in order to ask for the most primitive rule right, they know that they face huge forces, and know, get concentration camps, even death. Their force is behind every political demonstration for the rights of law and order. The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.

Nothing indicates that it will be a good end. The economic and technical capabilities of the established societies are sufficiently vast to allow for adjustments and conversions in the underlying, and their armed forces sufficiently trained and equipped to take care of emergency situations. However, the question is their spirit, inside and outside the frontiers of the advanced societies. The basic historical parallel with the barbarians threatening the empire of civilization precedes the issue, the second period of barbarism may well be the continued empire of civilization itself. But the chance is that, in this period, the historical extremes may meet again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity, and its most exploited force, it is nothing but a chance. The critical theory of society progresses in concepts which could bridge the gap between the present and its future, finding no promise and showing no success, it remains negative. Thus it waits in certain hope in those who, without hope, have given and give their life in the Great Refusal.



At the beginning of the Second World War, the book-length manuscript of **Mikhail Bakhtin's** *The Bildungsroman [Novel of Education]* (1936-38) existed in two copies; one, the final draft, was at *Sovetsky pisatel*, the house that was preparing the book for publication, and an early draft, which he retained. As the publisher's copy would form the basis of the printed edition, Bakhtin repurposed his copy as cigarette paper (in short supply) and, it is said, smoked it away over the course of the war. Alas, in the seige on Moscow, the editorial offices of *Sovetsky pisatel* (and the manuscript) were destroyed.

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